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
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THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

1870-1914

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 1870-1914

BY

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TO
G. W. S.

PREFACE

The study which follows does not profess to be a detailed history of the diplomacy of the past forty-five years. It attempts merely to correlate in their logical sequence the most significant events of recent European history and to show how the great disaster was the inevitable result of their reaction upon each other. The author's aim is to indicate the manner in which German primacy in continental politics, first acquired by Bismarck and maintained by William II, led, in combination with the economic and moral transformation of the Empire, to Germany's new conception of the rôle she must play in world politics. The effect upon British policy was such that a far-reaching diplomatic revolution took place, and was succeeded by the series of crises which marked the diplomatic conflict of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. The last of these crises, that of 1914, was the most serious and could not be settled peacefully, partly because Germany felt it essential at this time to reinforce her prestige, partly because her vital interests in the Near East seemed to be at stake.

I am deeply indebted to those who have given their constant and invaluable assistance: to Professor S. B. Hemingway, Dr. E. W. Nichols, and my sister, Mrs. G. C. St. John, for criticisms and suggestions; to Professor S. L. Mims, for aid in the reading of proof; above all to my wife, who has made the book her own by untiring labor in the construction of every chapter and in the reading of every page of proof.

Yale College, March 6, 1916.

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THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist in the streets of the chief town of Bosnia. Doubtless not more than the merest handful of the millions who read the news on the following day, realized that the murder would carry in its train consequences of extraordinary moment. The popular mind had become accustomed to assassination of royalty. The Empress Elizabeth of Austria, King Humbert of Italy, King Carlos of Portugal, King George of Greece, had all experienced a similar fate and the international diplomatic situation had not been affected. Who could guess that this new crime would prove to be of greater significance? And yet within five weeks of the murder and apparently as a direct result, the five greatest Powers of Europe were battling in the most terrific war of history.

It very soon became obvious that so great a catastrophe could not have resulted solely from the assassination of a single man, even though he were archduke and future emperor. Other forces must have been at work, of wider scope and more vital significance. The murder was merely the occasion of the conflict, the spark igniting the magazine; if it had not been for thirty years' accumulation of powder, there could have been no explosion. History shows

that great events find their genesis in influences which work for a long time separately and silently, but which when brought together by some comparatively minor factor, are powerful in their union to produce results of the utmost magnitude. So it was in the case of the war that broke out in 1914. And to comprehend, even in the most general fashion, the influences which by their combination resulted in the titanic conflict, a survey of the previous forty-five years of diplomacy is essential.

Even the most superficial consideration of the generation that followed the Franco-Prussian War, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the factor of vital significance during this period was the development of the new German Empire. It was Germany that forced the new conditions which contained the germs of the international struggle. Not that German policy was more aggressive or more nationally selfish than that of the other states; but that simply by her entrance into the circle of great nations and by her extraordinary growth, new elements were introduced into the diplomatic situation, which were destined to result inevitably in conflict. The other states were simply passive, in the sense that they pursued their policy along much the same lines as those followed previous to 1871. Germany was the active agent.

By defeating France and forcing upon her a humiliating peace in 1871, Germany attained her political unity and at once secured a position of unquestioned weight in the councils of the great Powers. A decade later, she organized the Triple Alliance, which guaranteed the support of Austria and Italy and soon assured to her a preponderant rôle in European diplomacy; by means of this coalition of the three

states of central Europe and despite the Dual Alliance of France and Russia which was formed in 1891, Germany practically controlled the Continent from 1882 to the end of the century.

This position of primacy she utilized skillfully to secure a period of uninterrupted peace on the Continent, which gave her the necessary opportunity for organizing her imperial political institutions and developing the industrial and commercial activities essential to the economic life of the nation. With increasing intensity, the Germans created new industries, built up their mercantile marine, opened up new markets, laid down vessels of war, dreamed of colonies. And as a result partly of economic necessity and partly of a moral transformation that came over the Empire, German policy began to concern itself not merely with European matters, but with everything that went on over all the globe. It was the inauguration of Germany's "World Policy."

It was inevitable that the policy of the other states should be affected by the successful growth of Germany, and when they recognized its true significance, a new period opened in the history of European diplomacy. The more far-sighted in France and Great Britain perceived with inexorable lucidity that Germany's new policy must necessarily threaten the position of their own countries. In the face of the common danger they agreed to put an end to their traditional enmity and, together with Russia, to form a tentative combination, which was designed merely to preserve the balance of power threatened by the growth and ambitions of Germany. The latter Power, disquieted by this apparent barricade to the realization of her hopes and in order to reinforce her prestige,

adopted a policy of bluster, which was at times successful, but which culminated in welding the loose understanding between the three Powers into a comparatively solid force of opposition.

Under such conditions there arose a diplomatic conflict scarcely less bitter than the war which was to succeed it. On the one side stood the Entente Powers, unalterably convinced that the development of the German world policy spelled their ultimate or their immediate ruin; on the other, Germany, equally determined in the belief that failure to win for herself a position in world affairs comparable to her influence in European matters, meant economic and national disaster. Between such opposite poles there could be no compromise. With each successive crisis the tension increased. Finally, in the summer of 1914, the strain suddenly exerted upon the thread of fate proved too severe and it snapped.

If, as seems obvious, the development of Germany—military, naval, economic, national—was the essential leit-motif of the international drama which was to have such a tremendous dénouement, we ought to remind ourselves briefly of the circumstances under which united Germany came into being. The foundation of the German Empire in 1871 was, perhaps, the greatest political fact of the nineteenth century. Both because of the immediate effects of the process of unification and because of the ultimate consequences, which were not at once revealed, any survey of recent diplomatic history must go back to the great triumph of Prussia and Bismarck in 1871.

Previous to that date, Germany as a political state was non-existent. The hundred and more kingdoms, principalities, duchies and cities which were loosely

bound together in the German Federation, formed something more than a geographical expression, for they were sentimentally united by language and by pride in a common literature and music; but they formed nothing like a nation in the political sense. From disunion comes weakness, and all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Germany was the prey of Europe. Although the two chief German states, Austria and Prussia, were reckoned as great Powers, their mutual jealousy had on more than one occasion left Germany impotent before the attack of a powerful foe on the east and on the west.

For centuries the dream of a politically united nation had filled the minds of Germans. The dream went back to the days of Charlemagne and Frederick Barbarossa, the red-bearded emperor who, according to legend, was not dead but sleeping, and was destined to awake and reunite Teutonia and rule the world. From the time of Otto the Great, all through the Middle Ages down to the days of Wallenstein, the unity of Germany formed the subject of the most exalted plans. But whenever a definite attempt was made to transform the vision into fact, the mutual hatred of the warring German states proved disastrous and the dream of union was never realized. The forces of disintegration always triumphed over those of consolidation.

With the fall of Napoleon, it seemed for a moment as though the hope of unification might be fulfilled. The burst of patriotism which informed the war of liberation against the French Emperor was enforced by the conviction that the national aspiration was about to be satisfied; the youths who pressed on from Leipsic, driving the French across the Rhine, fought

the more fiercely in the belief that they were fighting for a united Fatherland. The stirring war songs of the period are all imbued with the idea that once Germany was freed from the foreign yoke, she would be united. But the hopes of the peoples were deceived by the princes. The popular enthusiasm for national unity based upon liberalism was not in accord with the designs of the diplomats and sovereigns who planned the map of Europe in 1815, and Germany was left disunited.

A generation later, in 1848, the German Liberals made another effort to attain national unity. For the moment the reactionary Austrian Government was paralyzed by a revolution which spread through all the Hapsburg possessions; the King of Prussia was intimidated by the Berlin mob; and the Liberals, meeting at Frankfort, had free hand. But their attempt was again frustrated by the opposition of the princes. Austria, which soon recovered her control and stamped out revolution, refused to sanction a centralized Germany founded upon liberal principles. And the King of Prussia would not take the imperial crown from the hands of the people, "picked up out of the mud," as he said; he would reign as emperor only by the grace of God and at the invitation of his fellow princes.

The failure of the German Liberals in 1848 was succeeded by the far different method of Bismarck, which ultimately proved successful, although the cost was great. The Liberals had hoped that unification might be accomplished peacefully through a national Parliament, representing the German people, and that the result would be a liberal confederation, not unlike the United States of America. In the mind of Bis-

marck, the sole means of union was to be found in the Prussian King and army. Austria, the great stumbling-block to unity, must be driven out of Germany by war; the other German states must be compelled by force to accept union under the Prussian domination. With the strongest army in Europe as his instrument, Bismarck carried this policy into effect by means of three wars: the war of 1864 with Denmark, of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with France.

It was in 1862 that Bismarck was called to ministerial power in Prussia, and he lost no time in developing his policy. Under William I, who had been a soldier from his youth and had made the campaigns against Napoleon, the Prussian army had been thoroughly reorganized, and offered to the diplomacy of the new minister the material force necessary for the success of his plans. A quarrel that sprang up in 1863 between the King of Denmark and the German states, over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented the opportunity he desired. Persuading Austria to act with Prussia, Bismarck brought on a war with Denmark in 1864, in which the smaller Power was naturally overwhelmed. Denmark surrendered the two duchies to the rulers of Austria and Prussia.

Realizing that so long as Austria remained a member of the German Confederation, Prussia could not hope to unify Germany under her own control, Bismarck did not seek to prevent the quarrel that soon developed over the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein. In both his military and diplomatic arrangements he was thoroughly prepared for the struggle with Austria that was to decide the hegemony of Germany. The Prussian army had been brought to the highest degree

of efficiency by the Minister of War, Roon, and was led by that master of strategy, Moltke. Bismarck had received from Napoleon III a guarantee of benevolent neutrality, in return for vague promises of compensation for France along the Rhine. He obtained the active assistance of Italy in his attack upon Austria by promising that Italy should win the province of Venetia.

The war with Austria, which broke forth in 1866, was brief and decisive; it completely fulfilled the hopes of Bismarck. Austria, defeated in a seven weeks' campaign and with her main army crushed at Sadowa, agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation, and allow Prussia to organize a centralized union of the North German states under Prussian domination. Hannover and some five smaller states were annexed to Prussia outright, despite their protests.

It was the first step towards national unity; the new North German Federation was solidly constituted and led by Prussia formed a powerful political entity. But it was incomplete. There still remained the states of South Germany, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, who were jealous of Prussia, resentful of the position of mastery that she was securing, and who appeared determined on remaining aloof. Bismarck perceived that to bring them into the union a third war would be necessary, preferably directed against France, the national enemy of Germany; a war in which the states of both North and South Germany should fight together side by side.

By a series of diplomatic manœuvres, which force our admiration if not our approval, and favored by the rash and bellicose attitude of the French Government, Bismarck precipitated the Franco-German War

in 1870. With equal skill he saw to it that the struggle was regarded as a national and not merely a Prussian quarrel, and that South Germany stood by the North German Federation. The entire country was a unit, and the sentiment of national consciousness aroused by battling against a common foe was enforced by the common victory. The brave, but ill-equipped and miserably officered French armies proved totally incapable of coping with the Germans, who were splendidly organized and directed by the genius of Moltke. Overwhelmed at Sedan in September, 1870, the French Emperor surrendered; four months later Paris capitulated, and the Provisional Government of France accepted the German terms. In order that France might be stripped of future powers of offence and defence, Alsace-Lorraine was taken from her, and she was forced to pay an indemnity of five billion francs (Treaty of Frankfort).

Through this national victory over France, Bismarck's hope of persuading the South German states to enter the union was realized. While the German guns were still thundering outside the walls of Paris, at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, painted with all the scenes of the triumphs of Louis XIV, the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and accepted by the rulers of all the German states. A consolidated unified Germany, in which the principle of centralization triumphed over all factors of disunion, became a definite fact.

Thus was born in Europe a new political state, whose entrance upon the international stage was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences. The whole set of international conditions which rested upon the division of Germany disappeared. France was humil-

iated and her material power broken, at least for the moment. The creation of united Germany brought with it the completion of Italian unity, for upon the withdrawal of the French troops, which had been stationed at Rome to protect the Pope, Victor Emmanuel was able to make of Rome the capital of his kingdom. German unification also reopened the Near Eastern Question, for Bismarck, in order to win the benevolent neutrality of Russia in 1870, had agreed to her violation of the neutrality of the Black Sea, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris in 1856; Russia could once more send her warships down to the Bosphorus and again threaten Constantinople.

More important than the immediate political results were the moral effects of the methods employed by Bismarck in the unification of Germany. Instead of coming through the application of liberal and nationalistic principles, as the idealists of 1815 and 1848 had hoped, it was consummated in direct contravention to those principles. It was the product of force not unadulterated with trickery. The theory of brute strength, of "blood and iron," had triumphed. By the incorporation of a Danish duchy, by the forcible annexation of Hannover to Prussia, by taking Alsace-Lorraine without the consent of its inhabitants, Bismarck had frankly given effect to the doctrine that might is right. The generous nationalistic theories of the French Revolution were crushed under the fist of military armaments, and for them was substituted the

> good old plan,
> That he should take who has the power,
> And he should keep who can.

The effect upon Germany was inevitable. Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and the success of the Bismarckian method, the German people "conceived thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power and might that has directed in large part the subsequent course of German life and history."[1] The material prosperity that followed upon the military and political success of Bismarck only enhanced their belief that "iron is gold."

The world did not realize at once the full significance of the Prussian victory and the acceptance of Prussian methods by Germany; and the ultimate consequences of Prussian domination in Germany were not completely manifested until the twentieth century. For, after securing the unification of Germany, Bismarck was careful to allay the fears caused by his methods and extraordinary success. During the twenty years that followed the birth of the German Empire, he made use of quite different weapons than those by which he had carried out his earlier policy. War and brute force had served their turn; what he desired after the war with France was a period of uninterrupted peace in which he might consolidate the Empire and foster its economic development. Above all he was anxious to preserve the new diplomatic prestige that Germany had won on the Continent of Europe. The study of how he worked towards these ends is essential to an understanding of contemporary international relations.

[1] Priest, *Germany since 1740*, 123.

CHAPTER II

BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

With the successful termination of the last of the three wars that led to German unity, Bismarck completed the task which so many had attempted and which he alone had been able to carry through. But his diplomatic labors were not finished, for the problem which confronted him after 1871 was one of hardly less difficulty and demanded, perhaps, the exercise of even greater adroitness than all his diplomatic and military victories of the earlier period. The success of his policy in the political organization of the new Empire and the preservation of the European peace after the close of the war with France, was no less than that which he achieved in the unification of Germany, and it certainly affected the recent history of Europe to an equal degree.

His first problem was obviously the actual consolidation of the new federated Germany: the translation of the forms that had been fixed in 1871 into fact.[1] The task was one of herculean character. As we observed, the states of southern Germany had always looked to Vienna for guidance and been jealous of Berlin; the victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866 had been regarded by them in the light of a national disaster. With their racial dislike and their political fear of Prussia, they were none too enthusiastic in their

[1] Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, ii, 368; Von Poschinger, *Life of the Emperor Frederick*, 359.

acceptance of the new Germanic constitution, which gave practical hegemony to the Hohenzollerns.[2] Bismarck had also to face the protests of Poles, Danes, and Alsatians, who had been included in the Empire against their will and in defiance of the rights of nationality. In the North, Hanoverians complained of their annexation to Prussia; in the South, intriguing prelates fostered the particularist elements, hoping thus to weaken the power of the State and increase that of the Church.[3]

With such factors of disruption constantly working against him, Bismarck found his policy of centralization to be one that called for all his administrative skill. He finally succeeded, and Germany became a political unit, thanks in large measure to the national victory over the traditional enemy across the Rhine, to the self-abnegation of the German princes, and to the almost universal consciousness that national strength could come only from union. But in order to succeed, peace with foreign countries was necessary and a period of international calm must be ensured. In Bismarck's opinion, Germany was "satiated" and her interests demanded only the opportunity to absorb what she had secured. As war during the preceding period had been the essential condition of German unification, so, after 1871, the preservation of the status quo offered the only assurance of German development.[4]

2 Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences* (ed. Butler), ii, 128; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, ii, 372-373; Oncken, "The German Empire," in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 137; Bourgeois, *Politique Etrangère*, iii, 763, 766; cf. the remark of the Wittelsbach monarch: "Ich unterwerfe mich keinem Hohenzollern," White, *Seven Great Statesmen*, 463.

3 Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 189, 249; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, ii, 369.

4 Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 763.

The difficulty of ensuring the preservation of the status quo, however, was not small. Notwithstanding the constant expressions emanating from the German Chancellor to the effect that the new Empire entertained no further military ambitions, the other states found real cause for anxiety in the rapid success of Germany, and their attitude was inevitably one of agitated watchfulness. The smaller states, having witnessed the extent and variety of Prussian annexations, were not entirely reassured as to their own fate. Prussia had rendered military force the order of the day, and an atmosphere of febrile anxiety resulted, especially in the countries that were impotent to defend themselves. "There is no longer any protection," said one statesman, "for the small and the weak." The larger states also felt that they must be on their guard. They found a centralized political entity, based on the strongest army in the world, far less to their taste than the "impotent galaxy of squabbling states, chiefly notable for literature, art, and music," which had been the Germany of the earlier period.

Such distrust was an obstacle to the fulfilment of Bismarck's sincerely pacific policy. Moreover, he had to face the special danger of disturbance which might arise from the French desire for revenge. The humiliation of defeat was not soon forgotten in France, and all chance of closing up the wound was prevented by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, which kept it an open sore. As a German historian has said, the new structure of the German Empire was burdened at the very outset by a French mortgage, as it were, since in the future every foreign foe of Germany could

reckon unconditionally upon French support.[5] It was the price paid for Alsace-Lorraine. Of this the Germans were not unaware, and the most harmless words and actions of the French filled them with the certain belief that the war of revenge would burst forth on the day when the German armies left the French soil; nor was their conviction lessened by the speed with which the war indemnity was paid. Bismarck realized acutely the danger that threatened, and always stood in deadly fear of the coalition of some state with France, designed to break down the new position of Germany.[6]

As the best means of preventing such an anti-German coalition and of assuring a continuance of the status quo, he sought to create a diplomatic combination of his own. He realized the hazards of Germany's position, which was unprotected by natural frontiers of defence, and set down between three Powers with two of whom she had recently been at war; and he considered that it was of vital importance to Germany to become one of a political alliance which would lessen the chances of an anti-Teutonic combination, and which would, by intimidation, forestall any possible attempt at revenge on the part of France. During the decade that followed the unification of Germany the foreign policy of Bismarck was chiefly directed towards the creation of such an alliance. His first attempts to bring Russia and Austria into a political coalition with Germany were frustrated, largely because of the jealousy of the two first-named Powers in the Near East. Austria, however, joined

[5] Oncken, in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 136.
[6] Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 252.

with Germany, and in 1882 the place originally designed for Russia was taken by Italy.

As early as 1870 and before the end of the war with France, Bismarck had determined that a permanent understanding, and if possible an alliance, between the three imperial Powers, Germany, Austria, and Russia, should be the keystone of his foreign policy.[7] Friendly relations with Russia were, in his opinion, natural and desirable for both Germany and Russia. They were traditional for each nation and royal family; with the exception of a brief period during the wars of Frederick the Great and the factitious alliance of Prussia with Napoleon in 1812, the Hohenzollerns and Romanoffs had invariably recognized their mutual interests and remained on terms of close friendship. Bismarck himself had done much to bring the two states together during his stay as Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and in 1863 he had further won the good-will of the Tsar by refusing to take advantage of a Polish revolt or to aid the rebels.[8]

During the war of 1870, the understanding had not been broken, for Bismarck persuaded Russia to adopt an attitude of friendly neutrality by acceding to her demand that the Treaty of Paris be abrogated so as to allow Russia to send her warships out on the Black Sea. Russia did nothing to hinder the creation of a new and powerful German state, inasmuch as her position in the Near East found compensation; henceforth she could again bear aid to her kinsmen in the Balkans, and find a new opportunity of menacing

[7] Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 248, 249.

[8] Benedetti, *Studies in Diplomacy*, 77-80; Lowe, *Bismarck*, i, 241-245, 302-304.

Turkey.[9] The political bonds which thus united Germany and Russia were drawn closer by the deep personal affection that existed between the Kaiser William and his nephew, the Tsar Alexander II.[10]

To come to an understanding with Austria was, in Bismarck's opinion, no less desirable for Germany; but it proved at the outset more difficult. Two centuries of mutual jealousy and hostility had left traces which were not to be eradicated in a moment. The conquest of Silesia by Frederick the Great was not entirely forgotten or forgiven by Austria. The defeat of 1866 and what amounted to Austria's expulsion from Germany still rankled. And the Austrian Chancellor, Beust, had always been the bitterest foe both of Prussia and of Bismarck.

The restraint displayed by Bismarck in his treatment of Austria after her defeat by Prussia had done much to smooth matters between the two states.[11] Austria, on her side, had raised no objections to the union of Germany under Prussian hegemony, although it was contrary to the Treaty of Prague, and Francis Joseph saluted the transformation of Germany with at least outward cordiality.[12] Bismarck's readiness to pass over the Austrian negotiations with France immediately before the Franco-German War, had also gone far to facilitate an understanding. The real obstacle to the union of Austria and Germany was to be found in the policy of Beust, who retained his

[9] Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 785.

[10] Schneider, *L'Empereur Guillaume*, iii, 312; Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 268.

[11] Andrews, *The Historical Development of Modern Europe*, ii, 251. Although defeated by Prussia, Austria had suffered no loss of territory except the surrender of Venetia to Italy.

[12] Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 768.

ancient hatred of Prussia and could be bribed by no offer to enter into treaty arrangements. Bismarck determined to get rid of Beust.[13]

He found his opportunity in the domestic jealousy that existed in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It must not be forgotten that the Hapsburg Empire was a heterogeneous compilation of mutually hostile nationalities, of which there are three main divisions: the German, the Hungarian or Magyar, and the Slav. By a compromise reached in 1867, the German and Magyar elements divided the power to the exclusion of the Slav; but their mutual jealousy still persisted.[14] When Beust, who represented the German element and was in difficulties owing to trouble with the Slavs, refused to accept the advances of Bismarck, the latter turned to the Magyars.

The Magyar party, led by Count Andrassy, saw in the German alliance an opportunity for making themselves supreme in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They were little affected by the Prussian victory of 1866 and felt no disappointment at the exclusion of Austria from Germany. Their ambitions were directed rather to the Southeast. They were desirous first of maintaining Magyar supremacy over the Slav races in the Austrian Empire, and then of extending the hegemony of their race over the Slavs of the Balkans. An understanding with Germany would undoubtedly facilitate the success of their policy; they would agree to accept Bismarck's offers on condition that he would permit them to exploit the rich field of the Balkans. A bargain, based on such

[13] Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 787.

[14] Beavan, *Austrian Policy since 1867*, 7; Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy, passim.*

terms, was struck with Germany. Bismarck, who had come into contact with Andrassy through the naïve mediation of Beust himself, planned with the former the overthrow of the latter. The plot succeeded, Beust was dismissed in 1871, and his place was filled by Andrassy. It meant that the new Austrian Government would renounce all claim to its German heritage, would seek compensations in the Balkans, and would enter into terms of close friendship with Germany.[15]

Andrassy was the more ready to enter into Bismarck's scheme of a triple understanding between the imperial Powers, since he sincerely desired to strike a bargain with Russia. The chief obstruction to his policy of extending the sway of the Magyar race over the Slavs of the Danube and Balkans, was the assistance which they were likely to receive from Russia. But Russia also had her fear of difficulties with the Poles of Galicia, who were supported by Austria. Andrassy agreed to withdraw the support that the Poles had found at Vienna, on condition that Russia would deliver the Slavs of the Danube and Balkans over to the Magyars.[16]

The policy of Andrassy and Bismarck thus coincided and there resulted what historians have called the League of the Three Emperors. Bismarck counselled his Emperor to make a visit to Francis Joseph at Ischl, in August, 1871, which was returned by the latter at Salzburg. Andrassy sent the Archduke William to the Russian manœuvres in the summer of 1872, with the result that the Tsar consented to meet Francis Joseph and the Kaiser William at Berlin

[15] White, *Seven Great Statesmen*, 471. See also, Thiers, *Notes et Souvenirs*, 92.

[16] Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 787-789.

in September of the same year. Other interviews followed in 1873 and the two following years, apparently demonstrating the permanence of the entente.[17]

But the League of the Three Emperors was in no sense an alliance and hardly a league, and Bismarck found it impossible to give to it anything of real solidity. Nor could he use it as a weapon of intimidation against France; the French conviction that in the interviews of the Emperors were to be found a series of plots formed against them under the malign genius of Bismarck, was wholly at fault. Andrassy favored the combination solely in order to preserve the status quo in Central Europe, so that he might carry out his plan of subjugating the Slavs. He entered into the triple understanding, not to assist any movement directed against France, but simply to come to a compromise with Russia.[18] And the Tsar was by no means willing to act as Bismarck's tool in keeping France entirely disarmed and at the mercy of Germany. At the very moment of the interview at Berlin, in September, 1872, Alexander sent word to the French President, Thiers, that he had nothing to fear from what might transpire there; and Gortchakoff, the Russian Chancellor, said to the French Ambassador at Berlin: "We are not indifferent to your army or to your reorganization. On this point Germany has not the right to address any criticism to you. I have said, and I repeat with pleasure, that we need a strong France."[19]

[17] Hanotaux, *France Contemporaine*, i, 498; Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 249; Seignobos, *l'Europe Contemporaine*, 780.

[18] Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 500.

[19] Broglie, *La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron à Berlin*, 47. See also, Thiers, *Notes et Souvenirs*, 333; Gavard, *Le Procès d'Arnim*, 59.

Bismarck's hope of definitely transforming the League of the Three Emperors into a solid alliance and guaranteeing the status quo against any disturbance on the part of France was thus not realized. Even the understanding that existed between the three Empires was soon destroyed by the strain of two crises. The first of these occurred in 1875, when it seemed as if war might again break out between France and Germany. The moral assistance brought by Russia to France on this occasion was such as to separate Russia and Germany. The second crisis took place in 1878 as a result of the Near Eastern situation, and brought Austria and Russia face to face in the Balkans. The hostility between the two Powers made a continuance of their understanding impossible, and forced Bismarck to recognize that his scheme of a triple imperial alliance was impracticable.

The crisis of 1875 was the culmination of the policy of intimidation adopted by Bismarck with regard to France. From the moment when he opened negotiations in 1871, he was determined that France should be so crushed that she would be unable to lift her head against Germany for a generation. It was for this reason that he imposed a war indemnity so heavy that she was allowed four years in which to pay it, and which he later regretted as being too small.[20] It was to prevent any counter attack on the part of France that Germany took Alsace-Lorraine, which shifted the frontier from the Rhine to the Vosges and protected the states of South Germany from a sudden French invasion. The same fear of the recrudescence of France accounts for the successful demand of the

[20] Gabriac, *Souvenirs diplomatiques de Russie et de l'Allemagne*, 155.

German army staff that the fortress of Metz, in the midst of a district linguistically French, should be taken from her.[21] "This treaty," said Thiers of the Treaty of Frankfort, "is impregnated with the fear that France inspires in our foe."[22]

Both Thiers and Bismarck ardently desired the continuance of peace, but everything that they did to ensure peace awoke mutual suspicion. To reorganize France and safeguard her national existence was the only care of the French leaders, but in the efforts made by Thiers and Gambetta to reorganize their nation, Bismarck saw preparations for an immediate war of revenge.[23] On the other hand, the French did not understand the mystery of the interviews of the three Emperors, and saw in them and in Germany's construction of forts and strategic lines, the active and brutal hand of Bismarck always threatening them.[24] As time went on, the mutual suspicion increased. The success of the French monarchists in ousting Thiers in 1873, seemed to the Germans to presage a crusade for the restoration of the Pope's temporal power at the very moment when Bismarck was fighting the Papacy in the *Kulturkampf*. Finally in 1875 the suspicion reached its culmination in a serious crisis.

It was the year of the proclamation of the French Republic, and the Germans saw in this and in a vote

[21] Oncken, in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 136; Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, ii, 341; Blowitz, *Memoirs*, 161.

[22] Bourgeois, *Politique Etrangère*, iii, 757.

[23] Von Poschinger, *Life of the Emperor Frederick*, 360; Gavard, *Le Procès d'Arnim*, 94; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 338, 494; ii, 370; Gabriac, *Souvenirs diplomatiques*, 141.

[24] Thiers, *Libération du Territoire*, ii, 182-192.

passed by the French Legislative Chambers, which increased the army of France, the clearest indication that the conflicting parties in that country were coming to an understanding in preparation for a war of revenge. In answer, Bismarck let drop a disquieting phrase to the effect that he would not wait until France was ready for war, and that he knew that she would be ready in two years.[25] In April, 1875, there was a general rustle of arms and the German Crown Prince did not conceal the fact that Berlin was filled with warlike tendencies. So far as Bismarck's intentions went, it is probable that he merely hoped to frighten France by his sabre-rattling and that he found a "pledge of peace in not allowing France the certainty of not being attacked, no matter what she did." Doubtless he hoped to warn her that any resumption of an aggressive policy on her part would not be tolerated by Germany.[26]

But it is possible that the German army party, led by Moltke, were more serious in their intentions and were determined to finish once and for all with France. They doubtless believed that an eventual war was a certainty and that in eighteen months France would be able to wage it on nearly equal terms. According to one of the articles published at the time, Germany could not believe that Europe would be tranquil so long as a struggle were possible and France remained in a position to survive and recommence the duel. "Germany was troubled by the consciousness of having

[25] Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 777; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, ii, 410; Broglie, *La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron à Berlin*, 166, 182.

[26] Oncken, in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 141; Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la troisième République*, 84, 109.

only half crushed her enemy and of being able to defend herself only by sleeping with one eye open.'"[27]

Whether or not the German military party were really determined to crush France at this opportunity has never been definitely established. At any rate their sentiments were thus described by Blowitz in a sensational article in the *Times,* which helped to wake Europe to the danger of the situation.[28] The French Foreign Minister telegraphed the fears of France to London and St. Petersburg, with the result that France was saved from the peril of a German attack, if peril there was, by the protests of England and especially of Russia. Lord Derby instructed the British Ambassador at Berlin to exert his influence to calm the manifestations of war-fever in Berlin, and Queen Victoria expressed her desire that Europe should be spared serious trouble.[29] At St. Petersburg, the Tsar assured the French Ambassador that he would prevent any such attack as France feared on the part of Germany, and he immediately took steps to let the German Government know his sentiments.[30]

Berlin at once became pacific, and the danger of war between France and Germany passed. But the crisis was of the utmost importance, since it proved definitely that the understanding built up between the three Emperors could not be utilized for the purpose of intimidating France. And inevitably it opened a rift

[27] Blowitz, *Memoirs,* 102, 111; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances,* 124; Morier, *Memoirs,* ii, 333-345.

[28] Blowitz, *Memoirs,* 103.

[29] Hanotaux, *op. cit.,* ii, 407; Bourgeois, *op. cit.,* iii, 775, 780; Gavard, *Un Diplomat à Londres,* 242-243.

[30] Bismarck, *Reflections,* ii, 188, 236; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances,* 126; Hanotaux, *France Contemporaine,* iii, *chap.* iv; Daudet, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Alliance Franco-Russe,* 78-112.

between Germany and Russia. It became clear that Germany had need of a weak France, Russia of a strong France; so long as the degradation of France remained the keystone of Bismarck's policy, an alliance between Slav and Teuton was out of the question. This rift was widened by the ever-increasing personal animosity that existed between Bismarck and the Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff.[31] With the Near Eastern crisis of 1878 it became a gulf.

Both Austria and Russia had vital interests in the Near East and it was almost inevitable that sooner or later those interests would conflict. Russia, searching for an ice-free port and coveting control of the Dardanelles, looked upon Constantinople as her natural heritage. She was, moreover, the natural protector of her Slav kinsmen in the Balkans. By sentiment and policy she was impelled toward aggressive action in the Near East. Austro-Hungary, especially after her expulsion from Germany, also looked to the Southeast as a field for expansion, actuated by economic as well as by political motives. When the clash with Russia came, the understanding entered into by the Tsar and Andrassy under Bismarckian auspices, was doomed.

The temporary rapprochement of the two Powers in 1872 resulted from the desire of each to have a free hand with which to deal with internal difficulties. The domestic problems of each Empire demanded a more prompt solution than the questions of foreign policy which sometime must separate Russia and Austria. For the moment the maintenance of the status quo in the Orient was as desirable as in the Occident, and like Bismarck, Andrassy sought it in

[31] Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 114; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, 497.

the Russian understanding.[32] But although the chances of conflict between Austria and Russia were thus laid aside, they were not destroyed, and in 1878 the clash of their Near Eastern ambitions took place, and definitely terminated Bismarck's hope of a triple imperial alliance.

For many years the decadence of the Turkish Empire had presented the most difficult problem confronting Europe; Ottoman weakness was a temptation to the greed of the great Powers, and Turkey's treatment of her Christian subjects a constant provocation. In fear of the results, should its Empire go to pieces, Great Britain and France had saved it from Russia in 1855, and the Treaty of Paris had proclaimed the sacredness of its integrity. Turkish decadence, however, could not be remedied. The finances of the Porte were chaotic, sustained only by paper currency and foreign loans; its administration was weak and at the same time tyrannical. Finally in 1875, a revolt began in Bosnia, which had its origin in the misery dealt out by the Turkish governors and in the hope offered by Turkish weakness.

For two years the Powers of Europe sought vainly to arrange matters between the Sultan and his Christian subjects; the rebellion could not be checked, and spread until it included most of the Balkan provinces. Finally, in 1877, after receiving repeated appeals for assistance from her Slavic kinsmen, Russia declared war on Turkey, in order to bring them aid.[33] The

[32] Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 790; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, 380.

[33] Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, iv, *passim;* Phillips, *Modern Europe*, 494-505; Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 793-799; for the causes of the war, Songeon, *Histoire de la Bulgarie*, 332 sq.; for its course, Rüstow, *Der Krieg in der Turkei.*

campaign was long and bloody. At first the Russians were unable to make headway against the valiant and intelligent resistance of the Turks, but in the spring of 1878 they broke down their obstinate defence by force of numbers. They advanced to within cannon-shot of Constantinople, and there dictated the terms of the peace (San Stefano).[34] According to the treaty, Turkey in Europe was dismembered. She retained only a narrow and broken strip of territory from the Bosphorus to the Adriatic, and was forced to see the rest of the Balkan Peninsula divided up on paper between Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the first-named receiving Rumelia to the south and most of Macedonia.

But Russia had counted without the other Powers, and her partition of the Balkans was not allowed to go into effect. Great Britain was absolutely opposed to the division of the Turkish Empire among the Balkan states, and especially disliked the enormous accession of territory provided for Bulgaria; the Balkan Principalities would be, in her opinion, simply clients of the Tsar who had freed them; the more their power was increased, the greater would be the influence of Russia in the Near East.[35] Nor was Austria inclined to allow her pathway to the Ægean and lower Adriatic to be barred and her influence in the Balkans nullified by the threatened protectorate of Russia over the Slavic states.

Realizing the determination of the two Powers,

[34] Seignobos, *L'Europe Contemporaine*, 602, 782-784; Phillips, *op. cit.*, 514-515; Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la troisième République*, 181-197.

[35] Circular despatch of Lord Salisbury, April 1, 1878, published in *Annual Register*, 1878, Appendix; Hippeau, *op. cit.*, 176.

Russia did not insist upon the acceptance of her scheme and agreed that the Treaty of San Stefano should be discussed and revised at an international congress. A few months later she saw her plan torn to pieces by the Congress of Berlin, which settled the matter in July, 1878.[36] Turkey retained the larger part of her former European possessions, and although Rumania was granted absolute independence and Bulgaria became an autonomous tributary principality, the latter did not receive Macedonia nor even Eastern Rumelia. The power of Russia's protegés was thus not increased as she had hoped, and she was at the same time forced to witness the development of Austrian plans for control in the Balkans, since Austria received permission to occupy and administer the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[37] Once more, as in the time of the Crimean War, Russian schemes for predominant influence in the peninsula were blocked.

After this diplomatic conflict of Austria and Russia, a continuance of the understanding between the three Empires was extremely difficult, and its development into an alliance impossible. The irreconcilable interests of Austria and Russia in the Near East were laid bare and any compromise between the two Powers was obviously out of the question. The relations between Russia and Germany were also embittered.[38] Russia, in her vexation at the result of the Berlin Congress, saw the explanation of her diplomatic

[36] Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 233-236; Andrews, *op. cit.*, ii, 321-323; Cahuet, *La Question d'Orient*, 399 sq.

[37] The text of the treaty is printed in *Annual Register*, 1878, Appendix; cf. Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe*, ii, 515.

[38] Oncken, in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 143.

defeat in what she believed to be the underhand intrigues of Germany. The ill-feeling that already existed between Bismarck and Gortchakoff was heightened; the Russian Chancellor called the Congress the "darkest episode in his career," and laid the blame entirely upon Bismarck.[39]

Russian feeling was not entirely justified by the actual facts. It does not appear that Bismarck took sides against Russia in the Congress, and he was apparently sincere when he professed his absolute indifference to the Eastern Question, saying that "it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." Furthermore, it was certainly in consonance with his general policy not to offend Russia; so that we may believe that he really did his utmost at Berlin to play the rôle of "the honest broker," as he professed.[40] But it was impossible to convince Russia that Germany had not acted as agent for Austrian ambitions in the Near East. The Russian press covered Bismarck with invective and frankly called him a traitor; members of the Russian royal family passing through Berlin refused to meet him, the Tsar protested to the Kaiser that Bismarck was an ingrate. Russian tariffs on German goods were raised, and Russian armies on the German frontier were increased.[41]

Notwithstanding the wave of anti-German feeling that swept through Russia at this time, Bismarck was by no means inclined to break with a Power whose friendliness he believed to be essential for Germany;

[39] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 127.

[40] Von Poschinger, *Life of the Emperor Frederick*, 381; Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 288.

[41] White, *Seven Great Statesmen*, 476; Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 234-236; Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, ii, 427.

convinced that the display of Russian ill-humor was merely temporary and resulted from emotion, he still hoped to preserve good relations with the Slav state. But he could not fail to realize that the break between Russia and Austria was definite, for it rested upon the conflict of interests and not upon sentimental grounds. And he saw plainly that Germany must choose between Russia and Austria, for she could not be the ally of both.[42] Not without difficulty he decided at last that the Austrian alliance would be more useful to Germany than the Russian. Despite the protests of the old Kaiser William, who could not but feel that alliance with Austria meant an ultimate break with Russia, and was only persuaded by Bismarck's threat of resignation, the German Chancellor at once made advances to Andrassy. They were acceptable to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and in October, 1879, a defensive alliance was signed between the two Powers.[43]

According to the terms of the treaty, which were secret, if either Austria or Germany were attacked by Russia they were bound to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their forces, and not to conclude peace, except jointly and in agreement. If one of them were attacked by another Power, the Ally was to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality; and if the attacking Power were supported by Russia, the obligation of reciprocal help would come into force

[42] Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 255-257; Busch, *Diary*, ii, 223; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 498.

[43] *Correspondence of William I and Bismarck* (ed. Ford), ii, 200-202; Busch, *Diary*, ii, 475-489; Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 266, 268; Oncken, in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 144. The text of the treaty is printed in Price, *Diplomatic History of the War*, 273-274.

and the war would be waged jointly until the joint conclusion of peace.

By the conclusion of the alliance with Austria, Bismarck received the guarantee that he had been seeking against an attempt at revenge on the part of France. Should France dare to attack Germany, he was assured of Austrian neutrality, and if France secured the assistance of Russia against Germany, he was certain of Austrian assistance. The position that Germany had won by the Peace of Frankfort was thus stamped with the character of stability and permanence. Bismarck, however, was not satisfied with the new combination and sought to render it stronger by the inclusion of a third Power. As he could not make assurance doubly sure by the inclusion of Russia he turned to the south and determined that the place that Russia was to have occupied, should be taken by Italy. The adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German pact would set up in Central Europe a solid block of Powers, sufficient to maintain the status quo against any opposing group that could be marshalled against them.

That Italy should have consented to enter the Teutonic alliance seems at first glance anomalous. A Latin Power, her racial sympathies were naturally with France; moreover she owed to France her first advance towards national unity, since it was Napoleon who had driven the Austrians out of Lombardy in 1796 and later brought the whole peninsula under his suzerainty; to his genius Italy owed her civil and economic organization. Napoleon III had enabled Italy again to free herself from Austrian misrule in 1859, and establish her independence under Victor Emmanuel.

It is true that the relations of Italy with Prussia

had been close in 1866 and that it was only through Prussian assistance that Italy had finally won Venetia.[44] But Italian gratitude was largely destroyed when Prussia imposed a peace that left the Trentino and Trieste in the hands of Austria. Italy had always regarded Austria as the traditional and national foe, and the fact that the Hapsburg still held territory which was claimed as Italian, did not lessen the bitterness that informed the relations of the two states. In Italy, a party that made up by zeal for its paucity of numbers, demanded loudly and constantly that the unredeemed provinces be reclaimed by force. In Austria, on the other hand, the anti-Papal policy of the Italian Government gave offence to the powerful Catholic party. Furthermore, the economic and maritime interests of the two countries clashed in the Adriatic and on the Albanian coast, and the rivalry in this quarter seemed so keen as to render an alliance a practical impossibility.

But circumstances played into Bismarck's hands. Italian gratitude to France for the assistance of Napoleon III was almost obliterated by the subsequent policy of the Emperor, which the Italians considered to be calculated perfidy. After promising that Italy should be freed from the Alps to the Adriatic, he had made a treacherous peace with Francis Joseph, in 1859, leaving Venetia in Austrian hands. He had, moreover, maintained the Pope in Rome for ten years, so that it was not until the defeat of France in 1870 that the King of Italy was able to make Rome his capital.

[44] Italy had entered the war of 1866 against Austria with Prussia, and although defeated on the field of battle, received Venetia as the price of her coöperation and as the result of Prussia's victory.

Even after the establishment of the Third Republic, French policy continued to be ultramontane and consequently anti-Italian. At the moment when Bismarck was winning Italian sympathies by his struggle against the Papacy, the French royalists were making noisy manifestations in favor of the reëstablishment of the temporal power. The ministers who showed themselves hostile to ultramontane demonstrations were forced to resign: first Jules Favre in 1871, and then Thiers in 1873. "Our chief enemy," said the leading Italian paper, "is the Papacy, and with the Papacy, France; that is to say the implacable enemies of Germany."[45]

The identity of adversaries and consequently of interests thus pushed Italy in the direction of an understanding with Germany, and Italy began to consider the possibility of an alliance. In 1872 Prince Humbert went to Berlin, where he was received with enthusiasm by the Prussian Government and people, and in the following year Victor Emmanuel visited the capitals of Austria and Germany. In 1875, at the beginning of the war scare and while Italy was arming, Francis Joseph came to Venice, where he met the King of Italy, and thus publicly affirmed the reconciliation of the two countries.[46] Austria had done much to render a friendly understanding possible by her moderate attitude: Francis Joseph, head of the most Catholic of states, accepted the Italian occupation of Rome, and thus gave to the Italian ministers a guarantee that their most precious victory would

[45] Feiling, *Italian Policy since 1870*, 4-5; Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, iii, 770; Seignobos, *op. cit.*, 780; King and Okey, *Italy Today*, 288.

[46] Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, ii, 378-383.

not be contested at Vienna.[47] The Italian Government, on its side, exerted efforts to stem the tide of irredentism.

Something more, however, was necessary if Italy were to overcome completely her traditional hostility towards Austria and enter into the Austro-German combination. That additional factor was furnished in 1881, largely under Bismarckian auspices. Young Italy was indulging in dreams of grandeur and it was in the Mediterranean that she hoped to realize them. Especially did she consider control of part of the North African seaboard to be essential to her strategic security as well as to her commercial development. As early as 1838 Mazzini had declared that "Northern Africa is Italy's inheritance."[48] It was therefore with a jealous eye that she regarded the French colonial empire in Algeria, and with no secrecy that she looked forward to gaining compensation in Tunis. That province is geographically the continuation of Sicily and it adjoins Tripoli, which it was understood might be taken by Italy whenever she dared.

It might have been expected that Bismarck, seeking for the friendship of Italy, would have assisted her in the conquest of the African province. But the methods of the German Chancellor were less direct, and he liked to kill two birds with one stone. He knew that the French minister, Jules Ferry, was anxious to develop the colonial policy of France and that at the Congress of Berlin the French were receiving encouragement from Great Britain to extend their African empire by the addition of Tunis. To this proposal Bismarck made no objection, and is said

[47] *Mémorial diplomatique*, October 4, 1873, 626.
[48] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 83.

to have volunteered his cordial assent. The colonial policy of France would help to make the French forget the "gap in the Vosges," and when they were busy in Tunis they would cease to think of the Rhine frontier. At the same time the acquisition of Tunis by France would arouse such bitterness in Italy that Bismarck could undoubtedly secure the consent of the Italian Government to an alliance with Austria and Germany. Encouraged by Great Britain and Germany, Ferry sent an expedition to Tunis in 1881, and transformed it into a French protectorate.[49]

Bismarck's calculations were justified by the results. At the moment when the Italian Government was overwhelmed with rage and disgust at the march stolen on them by France, Bismarck had no difficulty in persuading Italy that her interests lay in an alliance with the Teutonic Powers. The ancient enmity to Austria was forgotten in the desire for revenge on France; impelled by pique, Italy threw herself into the compact of Germany with Austria, and in 1882 the Triple Alliance was thus formed.[50]

The completion of this alliance gave to Bismarck that solid bulwark for which he had been seeking ever since the war with France. It guaranteed the diplomatic position that Germany had won in 1871 and it strengthened it. It assured the status quo and gave to Germany free hand for the solution of her internal

[49] Busch, *Diary*, ii, 475; Crispi, *Memoirs*, ii, 97-104; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, iv, 387; Despagnet, *La troisième République et le Droit des Gens*, 234; Adam, *Après l'Abandon de la Revanche*, 174, sq.; Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 55; Rambaud, *Le France Coloniale*, 140 sq.; Piequet, *Campagnes d'Afrique*, 141 sq.; White, *Seven Great Statesmen*, 477; Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la troisième République*, 383-406.

[50] Crispi, *Politica Estera*, 44-47; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 126, 130-132; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 8-11.

problems. A single-handed attack on Germany by France would be the wildest chauvinistic madness; an attack in conjunction with Russia would find Germany supported by both Austria and Italy. The alliance was purely defensive, but under the circumstances that was all that Bismarck desired; as far as foreign relations were concerned, Germany's strength was in sitting still.

By means of the alliance Bismarck began to exercise what was virtually a diplomatic mastery over Europe. Both French and German historians have agreed that with it the hegemony of Germany began;[51] the military primacy secured by the war with France, now became a political primacy. The friendliness of Spain was assured. The German tendencies of Lord Salisbury made certain the coöperation of Great Britain, which was furthermore guaranteed by the understanding between Italy and Great Britain. And even the newborn colonial aspirations of Germany did not seriously disturb the cordiality of Anglo-German relations. France was isolated and involved in bitter quarrels with Italy and Great Britain; her attention was thus distracted from the continental situation, and Bismarck received a double assurance that he had nothing to fear from that side of the Rhine.

The single cloud on the horizon was the possibility of a diplomatic combination between France and Russia. But Bismarck had perfect confidence in his ability to prevent this contingency, and he never neglected an opportunity of cultivating good feeling with Russia in order to obviate the chance of her casting in her lot with France. Although he preferred

[51] Oncken, in *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 159; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 132. Cf. also, White, *Seven Great Statesmen*, 478.

Austria, when forced to choose between that Power and Russia, he always held to his conviction that the interests of Germany and Russia were closely allied, and that a definite breach could always be avoided. With the fall of Gortchakoff the relations of the two countries began to improve, and Bismarck was soon able, in spite of his alliance with Austria, to create what almost amounted to an understanding with the Government of the Tsar. In 1884 and 1887 he concluded treaties with Russia, stipulating mutual neutrality if either Russia or Germany should be attacked by a third Power.[52]

Bismarck thus reinsured the German position of preponderance against any attack by a hostile coalition. If France should threaten, he had a promise from Russia that she would remain neutral. So long as Germany abstained from aggressive action, there was no need to fear any assault. Secure from all danger, Germany could turn her whole energy into the organization and consolidation of her domestic political system and the development of her latent economic forces.

[52] Bismarck, *Reflections*, ii, 271, 273; *Annual Register*, 1884, 300; Headlam, *Bismarck*, 442, 443; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 3, 5, 18-23.

CHAPTER III

THE DUAL ALLIANCE

The success of Bismarck's diplomacy after 1871, which isolated France and led to German primacy on the Continent through the creation of the Triple Alliance, forms, perhaps, his chief title to greatness. It is at any rate a manifestation of diplomatic skill hardly less to be admired than his earlier policy which resulted in the unification of Germany. Disappointed in his plan of an alliance of the three Empires, he had nevertheless succeeded in building up a solid coalition of the chief states of central Europe, preserved friendship with Russia, maintained cordial relations with Great Britain, and, by encouraging the colonial aspirations of France, fostered quarrels which incapacitated her for action on the Continent. The peace of Europe was secured, Germany's political supremacy was recognized, and Bismarck could proceed with his plans of internal consolidation and industrial development.

But the maintenance of Germany's position was a task of extreme difficulty. Bismarckian diplomacy had succeeded, but it had sown seeds of future developments that were likely to disturb the conditions upon which German primacy rested. One of the most important of these conditions was the separation of France and Russia; and the process of creating the international greatness of Germany had brought factors into play which made a diplomatic union

between France and Russia a probability if not a certainty.

Each Power was isolated to a greater or less extent by the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, and naturally began to look to the other for support. Each Power, furthermore, felt itself the victim of some stroke of Bismarckian diplomacy: France had been humiliated and dismembered by the Treaty of Frankfort, and although she smothered outward manifestations of the spirit of revenge, could not but regard Germany as the national enemy; Russia considered that Germany had been largely responsible for the Treaty of Berlin, which shattered her dream of control in the Near East, and on that account bore her ill-feeling. Neither Power was content to accept the verdict of these treaties as final, and sooner or later each was bound to come to the realization that the continental equilibrium could be reëstablished only by a rapprochement. The Balkans and the spire of Strasburg cathedral were destined to dominate European politics.

A glance at the map will suffice to indicate that from geographical necessity France and Russia are natural allies. The former Power, protected on the north, west and south by the sea, on the southwest by the Pyrenees, on the southeast by the Alps, finds her eastern frontier open at many points to the attack of a hostile nation. To distract the attention of an enemy advancing from that side, she has need of a friend in the East. The value and necessity of such a friendship has constantly been recognized by the rulers of France and demonstrated by the course of her international relations.[1]

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the

[1] Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Alliance Franco-Russe*, 2-35.

national foe on her eastern frontier was Austria, France sought alliance in turn with Turkey, with Sweden, and with Brandenburg. In the eighteenth century, during the wars of Frederick the Great of Prussia, an alliance with Austria was consummated. Half a century later, Napoleon signed treaties of alliance with Russia on two separate occasions, believing that the friendship of the Power farthest east was the surest guarantee of the security of France's position and the success of her development. Similarly under the Restoration that followed the fall of Napoleon, an understanding with the Tsar helped France to regain her international prestige and embark on the enterprise that was destined to found her colonial empire in North Africa.

Russia on her side had often sought alliance or friendship with France. Peter the Great realized keenly the value of French support at the time when he was endeavoring to make a modern European state out of the half-barbarous Moscovy, and many of his successors, notably Catherine II, recognized the truth of the principle that Russia had need of a strong and friendly France. The Empire of the Tsars, a half Asiatic Power, must have the assistance of a western Power if it was to play a rôle of importance in European affairs. France was the nation to which it looked for assistance, for with the vast frontiers of Russia largely open to the attack of Austria and Prussia, it naturally sought support from the nation in their rear, in order to neutralize the danger.

History shows that adjacent and contiguous countries are often, by the fact of their geographical location, hostile to each other; those separated often have allied interests. So it was in the case of Russia

and France. It is an example of what may be termed checkerboard diplomacy: all the red squares have a natural tendency to join in alliance against the black squares.

Although nature and history thus presented a Franco-Russian alliance as a development to be expected and desired by both nations, there existed many obstacles to its consummation, even after Bismarck had formed the Triple Alliance. Memories of the past hindered a cordial rapprochement. Napoleon's capture of holy Moscow in 1812, his nephew's attack upon the Crimea in 1855, Russia's indifference to the plight of France in 1870, left vestiges of mutual bitterness in both countries. Russia remembered that Napoleon III, to avenge a fancied slight and to gain the prestige of an alliance with Great Britain, had helped to block the Slav advance towards Constantinople. France could not forget that her call for help in 1870 had been silenced by Bismarck's bribe of acquiescence in the tearing up of the Treaty of Paris, and that Russia for the sake of sending warships on the Black Sea, had left her to her fate.

The two countries were also separated by the difference in their domestic political régimes, and their Governments sometimes found it difficult to understand each other: France was a democratic republic, and Russia an autocratic monarchy. The radical tendencies of the French people and ministers frightened the Tsar and his advisers, who feared lest their holy empire might be contaminated by contact with the nation of revolutions. France on the other hand, had no sympathy with Russian political methods: the efforts of the Poles to win their freedom met with the sentimental approval, if not the material support of

Frenchmen; and Russian revolutionaries in exile not infrequently found a kindly haven of refuge in Paris.[2]

The personalities and opinions of their statesmen also tended to keep the two nations apart. President Grévy, who was elected to the supreme office of France in 1879, was firmly opposed to any alliance with Russia. He argued the necessity of a period of quiet during which France might recuperate, and he feared that negotiations with Russia would alarm Germany and lead to a resumption of her menaces and possibly something worse; nor did he believe that negotiations would result in any sort of a definite understanding. In his opinion, complete isolation was the wisest policy for France and afforded the only assurance of her peaceful renaissance.[3] On the other hand, French statesmen and diplomats were unable to secure the personal approval of the Tsar and his ministers. It did not smooth the path to friendship that a man who had publicly insulted Alexander in 1867 should become Prime Minister of France hardly more than a decade later.[4] And the representatives of France at St. Petersburg were very frequently in diplomatic hot water; more than one French Ambassador lost the favor of the Russian court by his faux pas, which created the worst impression in a circle where etiquette was of the utmost importance.[5]

[2] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 4.

[3] Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique*, 125.

[4] M. Floquet, who had become Prime Minister, had in 1867, met the Tsar on his visit to Paris with the cry, "Vive la Pologne," *Annual Register*, 1888, 243.

[5] Admiral Jaurès, who represented France, remarked, when he was shown the portraits of the ancient Tsars, "Who are those hideous fellows?" Again in discussing Nihilism with the Minister of the Interior, he said, "You can only get out of this fix by becoming a Republic," Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique*, 155.

Thus, notwithstanding Bismarck's belief, which he expressed as early as 1856, that a Franco-Russian alliance was in the nature of things, the two countries remained isolated. And the elements of hostility were not unskillfully exploited by Bismarck, whose entire policy was affected by his dread of a coalition. Nevertheless, the general tendency of the two nations to come together was discernible, despite incidental factors of separation. And the same events that weakened the understanding between Germany and Russia assisted the tendency.

It will not be forgotten that the understanding of the three Emperors first threatened dissolution as a result of the war scare of 1875. As we saw, the policy of intimidation employed by Bismarck towards France resulted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and a fear of the reopening of the Franco-German duel. In 1875 there appeared the bellicose articles in the German papers which, coupled with the increase of German armaments, seemed to presage an immediate attack upon France. The French ministers, sincerely terrified, sought the assistance of the other Powers, and particularly that of Russia. Largely because of the firm tone adopted by the Tsar on this occasion, the warlike schemes of Germany, if they existed, were not prosecuted. All through the crisis Russia encouraged France to have no fear and to trust in Russian friendship. The Tsar, in a personal interview with the French Ambassador, told him that Russia would stand by France, that the two countries had interests in common, and that he hoped that their relations would become more and more cordial. And the Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff, announced the assur-

ance of peace in such a way as to imply that Russia was responsible for the salvation of France.[6]

The attitude assumed by Russia at this time necessarily threw a cloud over the German-Russian entente and increased very obviously the cordiality of Franco-Russian relations. The gratitude of the whole French nation rose to the Tsar. All the French papers expatiated upon the service done to the Republic by her friend in the East, and the President expressed the warmth of French feeling in a personal letter to the Tsar.[7] Thus the ill-considered brutality of German threats brought the Franco-Russian rapprochement into the light of possibility.

The next step in the coming together of the two nations was the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Russia saw her plan of control in the Balkans torn up and notwithstanding the protestations of honesty that Bismarck uttered, she more than half suspected that Germany had been guilty of double dealing in favor of Russia's rival, Austria. At all events the crisis, which humiliated Russia in her prestige at the same time that it affected adversely her material interests, severed temporarily the bonds of German-Russian intimacy. It was a case of the farther is from Germany the nearer is to France, and the Russian newspapers began to advocate the French alliance with warm enthusiasm.[8] The following year saw the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance, and Russia realized plainly that Germany, having to choose between Russia and Austria, had deliberately elected

[6] Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, iii, 277; Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique*, 84.

[7] Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, iii, 285.

[8] Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, iv, 427.

the latter Power. When in 1882 Italy signified her adhesion to the Teutonic combination, the Russian position, if not quite comparable to the isolation of France, was at any rate that of an outsider.

For another decade the diplomatic skill of Bismarck was sufficient to keep Russia and France apart, and had he remained in office their ultimate rapprochement might have been postponed still longer. Notwithstanding the hostility of the journals of Russia to Germany and the uncompromising antipathy of the "Slavist" party, and despite fiscal and commercial quarrels, Bismarck managed, after 1884, to bring about a resumption of cordial relations with Russia. With tact and adroitness he showed the new Tsar, Alexander III, that monarchical Germany was likely to be a far better friend than revolutionary France. He commanded the German press to flatter and conciliate Russia on every occasion. The royal families of each nation exchanged visits, and Russian favor was secured by expelling from Berlin all persons suspected of hostility to the Government of the Tsar.[9] More significant still, Bismarck brought about a meeting of the three Emperors in 1884 at Skiernevice, which sealed the compact of reinsurance drawn up by Bismarck six months previously, and which stipulated for a benevolent neutrality in case either Germany or Russia were attacked by another Power. In 1887 this reinsurance treaty was renewed.[10]

But presages of the coming revolution in diplomacy began to appear with increasing frequency. In the West, France was meditating a reinvigoration of her

[9] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 134-137.

[10] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 18-23; Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique*, 169-170.

continental policy, and for this, an understanding with Russia was necessary. With the fall of Jules Ferry from power in 1885, the Government of France lost much of its ardor for colonial expansion and again took thought of the possibility of revenge on the Rhine and of reinforcing the position of France in Europe. The Radical party, which was constantly increasing in numbers, demanded a reversal of policy, leading to the renunciation of distant conquests and an alliance with some foreign Power against Germany, as the sole possible guarantee of the existence of France as a great nation.[11] Bismarck's attempt to intimidate France in 1887, by the arrest of a French commissioner of police, Schnoebele, and the passing of a law which increased the German army, only tended to augment the rising feeling against Germany and the sentiment that favored a close understanding with Russia.[12]

In the following year Germany practically closed Alsace-Lorraine to French citizens and even to persons coming from France; relations between the two countries became consequently still more embittered. The spirit of nationalism which made possible the rise and popularity of Boulanger, captured the mass of the French nation, seemed likely to result in a conflict with Germany, and made an understanding with Russia still more popular. Furthermore, the retirement of President Grévy, who was always the obstinate

[11] Eckhardt, *Berlin, Wien, Rom,* 15; Duc de Broglie, *Discours,* iii, 14, 23; Pinon, *France et Allemagne,* 70 sq.; Albin, *Le Coup d'Agadir,* 61; Rose, *The Origins of the War,* 100.

[12] *Annual Register,* 1887, 213; 1888, 243; Tardieu, "La Politique Extérieure de l'Allemagne," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère,* 1911, 73; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,* 3.

advocate of a policy of isolation, tended to render negotiations with Russia possible.

In the latter country, notwithstanding the reinsurance treaties, friendly relations with Germany appeared less stable. A Near Eastern crisis had again separated the two nations, and the cordial support manifested by France on this occasion strengthened the idea of a Franco-Russian alliance.[13] Still greater was the effect of Bismarck's publication of the text of the Triple Alliance in 1888; Russia was wounded and alarmed when she discovered the extent of the preparations made against her by Austria and Germany.

The new tone of intimidation adopted at this time by Bismarck, not merely towards France but towards all Europe, aroused Russian fears. Only a few days after publishing the text of the Triple Alliance, the German Chancellor, in an acrid speech, asserted the necessity of maintaining Germany's position on the Continent; his terms were so unmeasured that it seemed as though he were attempting to overawe all the Powers, and Russia in particular: "The fears that have arisen in the course of the present year have been caused by Russia more even than by France, chiefly through an exchange of provocations, threats, insults, and reciprocal investigations, which have occurred during the past summer in the Russian and French press. . . . God has given us on our flank the French, who are the most warlike and turbulent nation that exists, and He has permitted the development in Russia of warlike propensities which, until lately, did not manifest themselves to the same extent. . . . By means of courtesy and kind methods we may be

[13] *Annual Register*, 1887, 263.

easily—too easily perhaps—influenced, but by means of threats, never. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world.'"[14]

In such terms Bismarck warned France and Russia to keep apart and practically asserted the mastery of Germany in Europe. Germany desired that the peace should be kept, but it must be the *Pax Germanica*. Whether or not the harsh and domineering attitude assumed by Bismarck would have succeeded in its purpose and frightened Russia into an avoidance of an understanding with France, cannot be determined. Bismarck was sure of his ground and certain of his ability to keep the two nations permanently separated. What is certain is that at the moment when Russia was in doubt as to whether she should accept Germany's warning and shun an understanding with France, or whether she should accept the challenge, the two personalities which more than anything else held Russia to Germany were removed in quick succession, the one by death, the other by disgrace.

In 1888 the aged Kaiser William I died, and in March, 1890, Bismarck was dismissed.

The old Kaiser had always looked upon Russia and Prussia as natural friends, and it was largely through his influence that the two nations had not become frankly hostile after the Congress of Berlin. He had opposed the alliance with Austria because he feared that it would give umbrage to Russia, and to his last day he had worked for a close understanding with his beloved great-nephew, the Tsar.[15] To the Russophile Emperor there succeeded, after the brief hundred-day

[14] *Annual Register*, 1888, 267-269; Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, 89-91; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 144-145.

[15] Schneider, *L'Empereur Guillaume I, passim.*

reign of Frederick III, the youthful prince, William II, whose desires and policy were unknown quantities; Europe waited in anxiety, wondering whether he would use the enormous power bequeathed to him for peace or for war.

Almost his first words seemed a threat. His accession was signalized by an address to the army first of all: "I swear to remember that the eyes of my ancestors look down on me from the other world and that I shall one day have to render account to them for the glory and honor of the army." On the same day he expressed similar sentiments to the navy. It was not until three days later that he issued a proclamation to his people. "Men everywhere remembered that his father had first addressed his people, and then his army and navy. The inference was unavoidable that the young Kaiser meant to be a Frederick the Great rather than a citizen emperor as his father had longed to be known."[16]

To France and Russia, who were already agitated by the fear of a resumption of aggressive policy on the part of Germany, this army order, coming as it did, seemed to proclaim the advent of a Hohenzollern possessing all the martial traits of his forefathers and all the imprudence and recklessness of youth. Their alarm brought them closer together. At such a moment when they were anxiously awaiting some fresh manifestation of the Kaiser's intentions, arrived the news of Bismarck's dismissal (March 8, 1890). The one man who possessed the power to separate France and Russia thus disappeared. In Russia, the disgrace of Bismarck aroused not merely surprise but

[16] The proclamations are printed in Elkind, *The German Emperor's Speeches*, 4-7.

dismay. For despite the brutality with which the old Chancellor had fulminated against Russia in 1888, he was recognized as a force making for peace; and notwithstanding his unpopularity with the Slavist party, he was always regarded by the Tsar as a friend of Russia. With his removal from the political stage it seemed as though the ties of friendship that bound Russia and Germany were completely loosened.[17]

The French were not slow to seize their opportunity and give to their relations with Russia the character they desired. In one respect these relations had been ameliorated in striking fashion even before the dismissal of Bismarck, for Russia was exceedingly grateful for the financial assistance that was given by France at the moment when Russia was seeking capital to be used in her industrial and commercial development. The aid brought by France to the Russian economic policy established a broad material basis for the political alliance that France was seeking.

Previous to 1888 Russian loans had generally been floated by a small group of Berlin bankers, who remained masters of the market value of loans on Exchange. Russia was thus largely dependent upon a coterie of Prussian financiers. But in 1888 the initiative of a number of French bankers led to a change in Russian financial methods. They suggested

[17] Hohenlohe (*Memoirs*, ii, 412, 413) says that the Grand Duke of Baden believed that the chief cause of Bismarck's disgrace was that he desired a close understanding with Russia, even if it meant a split in the Triple Alliance. Relations with Russia were cool after Bismarck's fall, *Ibid.*, ii, 428. Rambaud, on the other hand, believes (*Histoire de la Russie*, 825) that the retirement of Bismarck did not hasten the Dual Alliance, that it had already been forced by his brutality; in support of this thesis he quotes Caprivi, "The interview of Kronstadt has simply made visible to the eyes what has long existed."

that the Russian loans be floated on the French market and subscribed for by the French people. The suggestion was accepted by the Russian Minister of Finance, and in the same year a loan of five hundred million francs was thus floated. In the two following years other loans, amounting to more than a billion and a half, were similarly floated and were subscribed for by more than a hundred thousand persons.[18] Instead of seeing her commerce and industrial enterprises controlled by a group of bankers, Russia became debtor to the French people. Since the number of subscribers was so large, it was impossible to manipulate the market value of the loans to Russia's disadvantage. To France, who was anxious to lend the money and desired the favor of Russia, and to Russia, who needed the capital and liked the terms, the arrangement was mutually satisfactory.

Taking advantage of the friendliness created by the success of the loans, and the anxiety caused in Russia by the accession of William II and the dismissal of Bismarck, the French Ministers lost no time in further improving relations with the Slav Government. In 1890 the French Minister of War placed at the disposal of Russia the great arms factory at Chatellerault. At the same time the Minister of the Interior arrested a band of Nihilists engaged in making bombs to be used against the Tsar; nothing could have been found that would more certainly secure the gratitude of the Russian Government. The French Foreign Minister, Ribot, and the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, de Laboulaye, worked constantly for the development of the friendly feeling with Russia into an actual alliance.

[18] Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique,* 246-279, 282-297; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,* 3-5; *Annual Register,* 1888, 243.

"Every day the atmosphere grew more favorable. With statesmanlike perspicacity M. de Laboulaye saw that the time had come for action, and that only the approval of the people was required to bring to a successful issue these combinations, previously conceived in the secret councils of the two Chancelleries."[19]

To win the expression of popular approval which was deemed necessary, it was essential to stage an act which would publicly make manifest the rapprochement of the two nations. This was effected in the summer of 1891, when the French fleet sailed to Russian waters under the command of Admiral Gervais, and on July 25, anchored off Kronstadt. The French received an enthusiastic welcome and there followed a fraternization of the sailors and officers of the two fleets which was warmly applauded both in France and in Russia.[20] The Tsar visited the French flagship and listened with uncovered head to the French band playing the national airs of the two countries: the revolutionary Marseillaise received the homage of the autocrat of the East, and the concord of the two countries hitherto isolated was thus symbolized.

The warmth of approval which this demonstration evoked in both nations made the determination of some sort of pact inevitable. Although the existence of the alliance was not officially stated until 1896, the treaty was signed in August, 1891, nor was it then denied that the relations of France and Russia had entered upon a new phase.[21] In the following year the alliance was supplemented by a military arrangement of a

[19] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 11.

[20] Daudet, *Histoire Diplomatique*, 299-314; *Annual Register*, 1891, 262.

[21] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 12-13.

defensive character, which undoubtedly stipulated for mutual defence in case either Power should be attacked.

The coming together of France and Russia in a defensive coalition, apparently ended the diplomatic hegemony of Germany and restored the equilibrium that had been destroyed by the German victories of 1870 and the creation of the Triple Alliance. Diplomats in both France and Germany believed that the balance of power was recovered, and in the latter country not a few agreed with Bismarck that German supremacy would end with the rise of the opposing combination. The dismissed Chancellor from his retreat covered with bitter sarcasms the policy of the young Kaiser, who had been impotent to prevent what Bismarck had so long staved off.

It is true that at first the new alliance seemed destined to have an enormous moral effect. It was not formed to satisfy the French ambition for revenge, nor could it be counted upon for the winning back of Alsace-Lorraine; in no sense could it be regarded as an offensive league against Germany. But it apparently announced to the world that the two nations were determined that their independence of action should not be shackled by German domination. "It insured us in Europe a moral authority which, since our defeats, had been wanting to us. It augmented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field of political combinations, from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation, we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power."[22]

[22] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 14; cf. Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 31.

But the effects of the alliance were more apparent than real, and although the two nations may have acquired a new moral authority, their combination did not affect the practical control of Germany as much as had been expected. For some years, the Allies, as Tardieu says, were too exclusively absorbed in contemplating the fact of their union, and too desirous of multiplying outward manifestations that might convince the world at large of its reality. There were without question endless official visits made and returned, and a constant interchange of congratulatory addresses; that the practical value of the alliance was enhanced by such demonstrations is by no means certain. It is undeniable that both nations played into the hands of Germany: France by allowing her foreign policy to be paralyzed by domestic dissensions; Russia by directing her activities from Europe to Asia.

It resulted that the mastery of Germany, which Europe had experienced during the latter years of the Bismarck régime, was indeed less ostentatious under William II, but it was in reality no less effective. For another decade, following the Franco-Russian alliance, Germany exercised a very actual hegemony on the Continent. The explanation for this fact, which has not always been clearly recognized, is to be sought in two directions: partly in the failure of the French and Russian diplomats clearly to define and coördinate the interests of their countries; partly in the skill with which the young German Kaiser handled the situation.

To meet the new Franco-Russian combination Germany had an untried emperor and was deprived of

the services of the veteran Bismarck, whose genius had first won for the Empire its position of supremacy, and then successfully maintained it so long as he was in office. In this difficult situation, the new sovereign, whose chief characteristic in popular judgment was an opinionated conceit combined with the ability to make bellicose speeches, displayed at once the enigma of his character and the brilliance of his diplomacy.

William II was then thirty-two years of age. In him there was to be found a melange of the salient traits of his various ancestors. Born and brought up in the midst of a militaristic circle and influenced by the ancient militarist traditions of his race, he nevertheless was to keep the peace for quarter of a century; the ambition and aggressiveness of Frederick the Great was in him balanced by the caution of Frederick William I. The flighty brilliance and impetuosity of his great uncle, Frederick William IV, was offset by the power of application and laborious drudgery, characteristic of the Great Elector. Bound by the traditions of the Hohenzollerns to the Junkers and imbued with a thoroughly mediæval spirit, he was at the same time essentially modern in his tastes and delighted in the society of bourgeois manufacturers and Hebraic capitalists.

One characteristic of his family was dominant in his nature: the will to rule. The power that God had bestowed upon the monarch was not, in his opinion, to be shared. Frederick William IV had written to Bunsen: "You all have good motives in your advice to me and you are good in the execution of orders, but there are things which are revealed only to one who is king, things which as Crown Prince were withheld from me and which I have only learned

by becoming king." Such were the feelings of William II. His personal will must guide the fortunes of Germany, within the Empire and without: "He who stands in my path, him will I shatter (*den zerschmettere ich*)."

It is therefore necessary to regard Germany's policy as, to a large extent, the Kaiser's policy. The influence of capitalists and Junkers, of commercials and militarists must be taken into consideration; but in the last instance it was the Kaiser who decided. To him, accordingly, must go the credit for the success of Germany's policy during the years that followed 1891, a policy marked by a subtlety, a diplomatic cleverness worthy of the founder of the Empire. For ten years he played the most delicate game, working for friendly relations with each of the new allies, diverting their attention from European matters which might give them an opportunity for working together against Germany, encouraging their feuds with other countries. The sovereign who was universally regarded as the man of war thus maintained the peace so essential to German commercial development, and at the same time preserved the dominating influence of the nation, the bequest of Bismarck.[23]

Instead of losing his temper over the Franco-Russian alliance, the Kaiser at once set to work to

[23] Bérard, *La France et Guillaume II*, 19-21. Dr. Sarolea (*The Anglo-German Problem*, 327) criticises the Kaiser for having no guiding principles in foreign policy, for being in turn Anglophile, Francophile, and Russophile, and imparting to German diplomacy an incoherence which has been its chief weakness. But in this the Kaiser has simply followed the very traditions of his race and practised Realpolitik. He has changed friends, but according as circumstances changed; they were merely the means to his end, and that end, German continental hegemony, he has unwaveringly pursued.

rob it of its force. This could only be accomplished by maintaining friendly relations with both France and Russia and controlling them through moral suasion; he constantly exerted himself to show a studied amiability towards each Power. At the same time he drew them both into extra-European adventures, often in company with Germany. France was encouraged to develop her colonial policy in Africa, which since the occupation of Tunis in 1881 had embroiled her with Italy, and since the affair of Egypt in 1882, with Great Britain. Russia was supported in her penetration of Manchuria, which embittered her relations with Great Britain and was to lead to the war with Japan. With their energies thus occupied, France and Russia had no opportunity for disputing with Germany her position of supremacy upon the Continent of Europe.

Both French and Russian diplomats allowed themselves to fall in with German plans. In 1894 Gabriel Hanotaux became Foreign Minister in France, and except for a period of a few months, remained at the Quai d'Orsay until June, 1898. Brought up in the school of Ferry he was an ardent advocate of colonial expansion, considered Great Britain as the inevitable enemy of France, and turned to Germany for support.[24] The Kaiser was not slow to respond and expressed on more than one occasion his desire for an understanding with France. In 1895 the common action taken in the Far East by Germany, France, and Russia

[24] See the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies, May 31 and June 10, 1895; also cf. an obviously inspired article in *Le Temps*, June 19, 1895; Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 90 sq.; Elkind, *The German Emperor's Speeches*, 48; Despagnet, *La Diplomatie de la Troisième République et le Droit des Gens*, 765.

seemed almost like the proof of a triple understanding between the Powers of the Dual Alliance and Germany.[25] At the same time the participation of the Russian and French fleets at the opening of the Kiel Canal emphasized the rapprochement of the two nations with Germany. In 1897 steps were taken towards a general settlement of African colonial questions; Togoland was delimited, and France and Germany seemed almost ready to develop their colonial accord into a general entente.[26] Russia and Germany, in the meantime, were going hand in hand in the establishment of their position in the Far East.[27]

This political understanding so anxiously sought by Hanotaux and the colonial party in France, and approved by the pacific Tsar of Russia, was strengthened by the tact and cordiality displayed by the Kaiser towards the defeated of 1870. On every possible occasion he assured the French of his sympathy and admiration; paid homage to their courage when he celebrated the anniversary of the victories over France; expressed his grief at the death of such opponents of Germany as MacMahon, Canrobert, and Jules Simon. He visited French training ships and telegraphed his congratulations "as sailor and comrade" to France; saw that the German exhibit at the Paris exposition was as brilliant as possible, invited French generals to visit him at the time of the German

[25] Pinon, *La Lutte pour la Pacifique*, 76, 79; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 82-86.

[26] Albin, *Le Coup d'Agadir*, 82-83; for the attempt of Germany to arrange a definite entente with France in 1898 immediately before Hanotaux' resignation, see Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, 53.

[27] Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, ii, 463; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 103.

manœuvres, and made of the French Ambassador at Berlin one of his closest intimates.[28]

The result of the political and sentimental rapprochement which the Kaiser maintained with France and Russia was to give to Germany a position of continental control. The practical effect of the Dual Alliance was destroyed by the willingness of France and Russia to follow the lines that Germany desired them to take. In France, at the inspiration of Hanotaux, the spirit of revenge was entirely forgotten in the ardor for colonies; and the development of this colonial policy seemed to demand an understanding with Germany.[29] Russia's attention was entirely directed towards the Far East. So far as its operation in Europe went, the Dual Alliance was a weapon without edge.

Hence, the Kaiser might fairly claim that the diplomatic burden that had fallen from the shoulders of Bismarck had been honorably and successfully

[28] Tardieu, "La Politique Extérieure de l'Allemagne," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère,* 1911, 76-79; Pinon, *France et Allemagne,* 86-90; Elkind, *The German Emperor's Speeches,* 50-51. Immediately after visiting the French training ship, *Iphigénie,* the Kaiser wired to President Loubet: "I have had the pleasure of seeing young French sailors on board the training ship Iphigénie. Their military and sympathetic conduct, worthy of their noble country, has made a deep impression on me. My heart as a sailor and comrade rejoices at the kind reception which was accorded me . . . and I congratulate myself on the fortunate circumstance which has allowed me to meet the Iphigénie and your amiable countrymen."

[29] Pinon, *France et Allemagne,* 97; Fullerton, *Problems of Power,* 28-29; General Dubarail, ex-Minister of War, wrote, "The peaceful intentions which the Emperor William has manifested since his accession to the throne make it our duty to take part in the celebrations at the opening of the Kiel Canal." And see also an article by Jules Simon filled with pacific spirit towards Germany, Elkind, *The German Emperor's Speeches,* 49.

carried. His methods and his attitude towards France were different from those of the great Chancellor, but they were no less effective. Bismarck had forced and maintained the isolation of France and Russia; the supremacy of Germany that was built up on their isolation he had made manifest constantly and at times with brutal frankness. After the fall of Bismarck, the young Kaiser had been powerless to prevent the alliance of Russia and France, but his tact and skill were sufficient to render it innocuous, and the new opposing combination forgot to oppose. From 1891 to the end of the century the hegemony of Germany was concealed, but it was none the less real, and German influence was still as fully in control of continental diplomacy as when Bismarck was the recognized dictator of Europe.

The significance of the position occupied by Germany during this period is realized when we come to consider the use that she made of it. Largely because of her diplomatic control of the Continent and the peace which she had assured under conditions most favorable to her growth, Germany was enabled to pass through an extraordinary material and moral transformation. From this transformation there resulted a change in international relations which led directly to the diplomatic crises that marked the first decade of the century and finally to the general war.

CHAPTER IV

GERMAN WORLD POLICY: ECONOMIC FACTORS

The significance of the period during which Germany occupied a position of virtual mastery in Europe can hardly be overestimated. It was the time when the young empire, having secured its military predominance by the defeat of Austria and France and won political primacy through the creation of the Triple Alliance, began to forge ahead as a great industrial and commercial Power and even to threaten the supremacy so long held by Great Britain. Bismarck never failed to recognize the necessity of economic prosperity to a great state, and his desire to preserve the peace after 1871 was actuated in no small degree by his ambitions for the growth of German industry and commerce. Largely for the same reason, the Kaiser William II believed it necessary to keep the destinies of Europe under German control.

Their hopes were fulfilled. During the period of almost unruffled calm that followed the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Germany passed through an economic transformation which, in conjunction with an equally significant moral transformation, was destined to exercise the most important effect upon the international diplomatic situation. The almost unparalleled growth of Germany's industries, the extension of her commerce, her skill and success in competing for

markets, could not be disregarded by the nations which had hitherto held economic control in the world at large. The demand for a strong navy, for the acquisition of colonies, and for political influence outside of Europe followed inevitably in Germany and did not allay the fears of Germany's neighbors. The jealousy of German economic success and the disquiet inspired by her ambitions played no small part in determining the diplomatic revolution which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, and which aimed at a restoration of the political balance of power in Europe.

The economic transformation of Germany which took place during the generation that followed the war with France surpassed in rapidity and extent any similar phenomenon that Europe had ever seen. In Japan and in certain districts of America changes as vast and as speedy were characteristic of the nineteenth century; but in the old world nothing comparable to the alteration of Germany had been experienced, not even when the loom of Arkwright and the steam engine of Watts had made of agricultural England the first of industrial communities. This transformation was effected in an infinity of ways; its most salient features, perhaps, were the growth of population and its shifting from the rural districts to the urban centres, the development of industry based upon applied science, the extension of foreign trade, and the creation of a gigantic mercantile marine.

The most obvious, and possibly the basic fact of significance in the economic development of Germany was the enormous growth of population. The number of inhabitants dwelling in the German Empire in 1871

was approximately forty-one million.[1] Because of the new advantages that resulted from national unity, this population could be supported by the natural resources of the country with greater ease and in a higher degree of comfort than before the war with France. The benefits of more uniform legislation, the improvement in the means of communication and transportation, the security afforded by a strong national government, tended to lighten the economic burden that rested upon the working people.

But these very factors combined to facilitate a rapid increase of population. The birth rate was higher in 1876 than ever before, and although the ratio of births has slowly descended since that year, the loss has been more than counteracted by the continual decrease in the death rate. Germany's population has thus grown with startling rapidity. By the end of the century, the Empire numbered more than fifty-six million souls, and after forty years of existence it had advanced to sixty-five million, thus increasing by more than half. Obviously, the problem that the Government was forced to meet was how to find means of support for this human increment; sixty million persons could not live upon the same resources that had been sufficient for forty millions.[2]

One obvious solution to this problem was the development of intensive agriculture; by subjecting the soil, which was often of a sterile and arid nature, to scientific treatment, it might be possible to increase vastly the agricultural output of Germany. Nor was

[1] *Statesman's Year Book*, 1873, 104-106.

[2] *Statesman's Year Book*, 1898, 1905, 1913; Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 13; 61st Congress, 2d Session, *Senate Documents*, no. 578, "Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 1867-1909," 151.

this line of development neglected, and the improvement of German agricultural methods has formed not the least of the Empire's economic triumphs.[3] But this solution was not wholly adequate, for the problem of an increased population was further complicated by the rapid shifting of population, the continual emigration from the rural districts to the towns and industrial centres. In 1871 less than a quarter of the German people resided in the towns; at the end of the century, the town population comprised nearly half of the whole. The country districts declined relatively in all parts of Germany, and in some quarters there was an absolute decrease of the rural population.[4] In this shifting of the centre of gravity from country to town there is to be found partly cause and partly effect of Germany's economic transformation; the problem of supporting the new town population led to the growth of new activities, which in their turn tended continually to increase the influx.

The rise of such new activities resulted inevitably from the growth of population. The surplus population might have sought a new home in colonies overseas, but when Germany looked abroad for spots suitable for the life of Europeans, she found that they had already been seized upon by older nations; nor was she in a position to demand that land should be granted to her for the use of her surplus population. Emigration to foreign countries or alien colonies was distasteful to Germany for sentimental and practical reasons. Germans could not endure that the Fatherland should suffer the loss of vigor and vitality that comes to an emigrating nation; they believed that the

[3] Dawson, *Evolution of Modern Germany*, 228-237.
[4] Dawson, *Evolution of Modern Germany*, 39, 41-43.

increase in their numbers was essential to the preservation of their military strength; and they could not bear that foreign countries should profit by the surplus energy that Germany herself was unable to support. Emigration, accordingly, was not encouraged and after 1870 the annual loss from this cause became continually less. In 1885 about 171,000 persons emigrated from Germany, but in 1898 there were only some 23,000.[5]

Under these circumstances there remained for Germany but one satisfactory means of supporting her increasing population, namely, the creation of new industries and the concurrent development of foreign commerce. The growth of such new industries, both causing and resulting from the opening of foreign markets, provided employment and support for millions who otherwise would have been forced to leave Germany. The increase in number and size of new industrial enterprises was thus the essential condition of Germany's ability to offer a living to her children; in the minds of Germans, the *sine qua non* of German national existence.[6]

Previous to the war with France and the consequent unification of Germany, her characteristics were without question agricultural. The establishment of the customs union and its inclusion of the chief German states between 1819 and 1842, proved a strong stimulus to industrial enterprise; but both political and financial conditions were unsuitable

[5] Rohrbach, *German World Policies* (trans. Von Mach), 16-17; Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 13; Tonnelat, *L'Expansion allemande hors d'Europe, passim.*

[6] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 14; Speech of Ambassador von Bernstorff, November 6, 1909 (published under title of *The Development of Germany as a World Power*).

for the encouragement of capital. So long as Germany remained divided and the jealousy of Austria and Prussia seemed to preclude any solid political settlement, it was hopeless to attempt the development of manufactures upon a large scale; nor were there any large banking institutions capable of standing behind industrial enterprises. Most of the manufactured articles which we now associate with the inscription, "Made in Germany," were then imported from England and France.[7]

But the national victory over France in 1871 affected the commercial no less than the political life of Germany. It led to the breaking down of the barriers that had hindered the exercise of that business initiative, acumen, and pertinacity characteristic of the German middle class. "For the first time the Germans as a nation became conscious of collective power and of the great possibilities which this power placed within their reach. A new youth—that unspeakable gift which the gods so rarely bestow upon mortals—was given to them, and with all youth's energy and ardor and audacity they plunged at once into a bold competition with neighbors of whom they had hitherto stood in a certain awe, and who in truth for their part had barely taken the young rival seriously."[8]

A clear index of the growth of German industry is to be found in the activities of the banks during the years that succeeded the war. The Deutsche Bank, which was a private institution unaided by the state,

[7] Schierbrand, *Germany: The Welding of a World Power*, 98; *Statesman's Year Book*, 1850-1870, *passim*.

[8] Dawson, *Modern Germany*, 37; Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 117.

more than quadrupled its capital in a decade, advancing from three millions of capital in 1870 to thirteen millions in 1880. In the former year it carried on a business that amounted to sixty millions; ten years later it had developed its business to 2500 millions and doubled its dividends; in 1890 it did a business of 7000 millions. The state banks were equally successful, and by the increase in their capital and by its productive employment not merely gave proof of the success of German industry, but made possible its further development.[9]

The astonishing growth of the mineral and metal industries is equally significant, for coal and iron are used in the other industries and the increase in the output of both is at once a cause and result of the great industrial development. The product of Germany's coal mines for the year following the war was tripled thirty years later and quadrupled in 1906; in Prussia this industry was sextupled between 1871 and 1905.[10] The production of iron ore showed a still more notable development, and the creation of the smelting industries was rapid and successful. The amount of pig-iron produced in 1871 was less than a fifth of that put forth in 1901. Forty years ago Germany's steel output was barely half a million tons annually; in 1895 it approximated three millions, in 1902 it had advanced to seven millions, and in 1907 to twelve millions.[11] The significance of this increase is easily appreciated, for the steel trade is the industrial

[9] Schierbrand, *Germany*, 100-101; *Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France*, 173 sq.

[10] *Statesman's Year Book*, 1873, 128; 1898, 552; 1907, 1000; *Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France*, 156, 157.

[11] *Statesman's Year Book*, 1873, 129; 1898, 552-553; 1907, 1001.

barometer. Other indications of the economic development of Germany may be discovered in the statistics of population. It is estimated that 61 per cent of the earning population in 1843 were engaged in agriculture, forestry, gardening, fishing, etc. In 1882 the percentage of persons dependent upon agriculture, etc., for their livelihood had decreased to 42 per cent, and in 1895 it had further declined to 35 per cent. Notwithstanding the growth of population, the absolute number of persons engaged in agriculture was barely maintained, and practically all the increment went into the new industries.[12]

This transformation is realized in more impressive fashion the more we study the growth of other economic activities, especially the electrical, textile, chemical, and toy industries. Nor can we overemphasize the fact that it was regarded by Germans as an essential element in the existence of the Fatherland as a great state. These industries, gigantic in size and infinite in number, were believed to be the sole means by which the nation could support her vastly increased population, which otherwise must perforce emigrate or starve. Germany must become a manufacturing state if she was to maintain herself upon an equality with the other Powers of Europe.

Just as the German people believed themselves to be thus dependent upon their industries, so in turn did they believe that those industries were dependent upon the extension of foreign trade. The complete success of German industrial energy could never be attained nor ensured, unless it were certain of a permanent position in the markets of the world; for Germany's industries were in many cases absolutely

[12] Dawson, *Modern Germany*, 44-46.

dependent upon the raw materials supplied by other countries, and free access to oversea markets was essential to the sale of her goods.

The extraordinary success of Germans in selling their goods has been no less marked than their success in producing them in the first instance. Although they came into the commercial race late and the established position of their competitors laid heavy handicaps upon them, they succeeded in outrivalling most of their economic opponents, and finally even threatened the commercial position of Great Britain. Their success has been ascribed by an authoritative writer as due in the main to one or all of three factors: the cheaper price of German goods; their superior or at least their more serviceable character; the more efficient arrangements which the German makes for reaching and attracting purchasers.[13]

All of these factors result in large measure from the fact that the German has made of his industry and commerce a science. The nations who entered the field first were not forced by competition to the development of scientific methods of production and distribution; their way being clear they proceeded in hit-or-miss fashion, and although they lost many opportunities of cheapening their goods without lessening their value, and neglected many prospective customers whom they might have secured, they still made their necessary profits. And as time went on, even with the advent of new trade rivals, they clung to their old-fashioned methods. But the Germans, if they were to overcome the start that had been gained by the older nations, were absolutely forced to the use of scientific methods both in the making of the

[13] Dawson, *Modern Germany*, 79.

goods and in selling them. This they realized definitely, with the result that the processes of manufacturing and selling developed by the Germans, have become models for the world. That which of late years has been so characteristic of German *Kultur* in general—"the application of a trained intelligence to the practical affairs of life"—has been preëminently true of their industrial and commercial methods.

Science in method has been, perhaps, the greatest reason for Germany's ability to produce goods more cheaply than her rivals. The development of mechanical labor-saving devices progressed further there than in any other country; and the Germans' skill in the coördination of the various processes of production has also enabled them to cut their costs.[14] Their application of the natural sciences, especially chemistry, was another factor making for economy in manufacturing methods. Every new discovery was at once investigated by the German manufacturers in the hope that it would lead to some improvement in the technical details of production and thus allow

[14] A correspondent wrote to the *Times*, April 7, 1906: "Among the chief reasons for the decrease in the British iron industry must be placed the tendency to adhere to antiquated methods of production among English manufacturers. As opposed to this the German ironmasters have known how to avail themselves fully of modern improvements in the technical details of the metallurgy of iron and in the practical operation of the blast furnace. In fact, though during 1905 there were fifty fewer blast furnaces in Germany than in Great Britain, the former country was able to produce no less than two million tons more of pig-iron than its rival, even with this great disadvantage in point of plant." Dawson shows (*Modern Germany*, 81) that in 1886 the average production of a blast furnace in Germany was 16,500 tons, but by the building of larger furnaces and improved methods the production in 1908 reached 40,000 tons.

them to undersell their competitors.[15] Moreover, they were assisted by the fact that in general they could pay lower wages to their laborers and lower industrial salaries to the officers of their companies. And in the last instance they were apt to be satisfied with smaller profits; their scale of living was lower in general than that of the French manufacturers, and almost invariably than that of the British manufacturers of their own station. The amount that in other countries would be spent upon luxuries was deducted from the price by the German manufacturers.[16]

Besides producing cheaper articles the German learned how to make them more to the taste of his possible purchasers. He watched the effect of foreign-made articles upon purchasers, and then either imitated them or improved them in the details in which they did not exactly meet the desires of the customers. It has been said with insight that the German is not an inventive genius but "he excells in adaptation, which under ordinary circumstances is a gift of even greater practical value than inventiveness. The great inventors have seldom become rich men; the prizes have generally fallen to the men who have had just enough originality to recognize a good idea when they saw it, to adapt and develop it, and to turn it to immediate success."[17] It is Lavoisier, Berthallet, and Berthelot who created organic chemistry, but Germany has exploited their discoveries and made the profits.[18]

In this respect the German manufacturer has been

[15] Stiegel, *Die chemische Industrie*, 8.

[16] Schierbrand, *Germany*, 106.

[17] Dawson, *Modern Germany*, 85.

[18] Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 120. Cf. Haller in *Revue générale des Sciences*, November 30, December 15, 30, 1912.

unrivalled. He has been kept in touch with the desires of his customers by his travelling agents, and according to their instructions has modelled his goods. His own tastes have been completely sunk in those of the persons to whom he wishes to sell. He has made it his business to discover the predilections of his prospective customers and to conform to them in the manufacture of the articles designed for that particular quarter. He realized, as some of his competitors did not, that the secret of industrial success lay not in forcing the purchaser to buy goods with which he was not satisfied, but rather in recognizing that the purchaser had the right to know what he wanted and making it his own business to supply it.[19]

Because of their adaptability the Germans had an enormous advantage over their British competitors, who were apt to refuse to change their models to suit the taste of the persons for whom they were designed. The attitude of the British was often that their articles had been made in such a style for a long time, and were not going to be changed; if the customer did not like them, he might leave them and look for what he wanted somewhere else. Especially in South American countries and in the Far East, the Germans secured many markets simply by ornamenting their goods in a certain style, or packing them in attractive boxes which pleased the purchasers. The British failed to understand that even though their own article might be superior, other factors might be of importance. In Europe itself and in quarters where the British had the advantage of long established trade, the Germans often ousted them by their appreciation of the tastes of the purchasers. "Our market,"

[19] Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 50, 51.

the British Consul at Cherbourg wrote in 1897, "is overrun with German hardware and toys. The region lives mainly by its trade with England; and yet the shopkeepers buy nothing in England. At the big bazaar, where I asked the reason of this, the manager handed me articles in wood and fayence made in Germany from models he had given, and in sizes suited to the taste of the population, with views of Cherbourg and scenes from Norman history."[20]

Even if the Germans had not possessed the commercial advantages resulting from cheaper goods and articles better suited to the tastes of their customers, they would have proved dangerous competitors because of their more expert salesmen. In the training of their commercial representatives, as in other respects, they took more pains and consequently achieved better results. The Government founded technical schools and mercantile colleges for the special purpose of equipping the young men with the qualities necessary for successful salesmanship. A thorough knowledge of foreign languages and a study of foreign characteristics and methods enabled them to enter their business career with a far better business education than that ordinarily given to young men of other countries. Upon leaving the mercantile college they were generally sent by the exporting house with which they were to be connected, on a trip around the world, or to remain for a term of years in some foreign commercial field in order to study the requirements of the country in which they were placed.[21]

In this way the German commercial houses secured a trained corps of salesmen of excellent technical

[20] Cited by Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 53.
[21] Schierbrand, *op. cit.*, 108; Dawson, *op. cit.*, 92-94.

education and well acquainted with the customs and needs of the foreign market. They kept the home firm in close connection with its customers and made it their task to persuade the manufacturers to satisfy the desires of the purchasers. We need not wonder that the Germans were successful in their competition when they met the traders who still held to the antiquated method of forcing the goods of the houses they represented upon the market, regardless of the tastes of their customers.

The German exporter also accommodated himself to the modes of payment habitual in foreign countries, differing from the British trader, who was apt to demand immediate settlement and through a British financial house. The German granted long credits and easy payments. Everything that could be done to win the favor of his customers was done. The British Consul at Havre wrote home: "The Germans have secured the contract for supplying the industrial school at Elbeuf with all its material. They have laid down all the machinery at a merely nominal price. . . . What was paid was for the sake of form only. . . . They have thus gained the town's good graces. And this gift will be amply requited by their obtaining the future custom of all the pupils leaving this school, who will have been accustomed to the articles, methods, tools, and skill of the Germans."[22]

By the exercise of trained intelligence and scientific methods in production and in salesmanship, the Germans thus won a secured position not merely in

[22] Cited by Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 54. For the German organization for influencing the press and public opinion of foreign countries in favor of German goods, see British *Parliamentary Papers*, 1914, no. cd 7595, Despatches of Sir E. Goschen.

the markets of South and Central America and the Far East, but in Europe itself and in the very homes of their competitors. We read in a book written by a man who cannot be suspected of favoring Germany: "In my home in Paris the elevator is German, electrical fixtures are German, the range in my kitchen is German, the best lamps for lighting are German. . . . My cutlery is German, the chairs in my dining room are German, the mirror in my bath room is German, some of my food products are German, and practically all the patented drugs, and some of the toilet preparations are German. . . . All these things have been purchased in the Paris markets, without the slightest leaning towards or preference for articles coming from the Fatherland. I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German things. They sold themselves—the old combination of appearance, convenience, and price, which will sell anything."[23]

The success that attended Germany's efforts to win a place in foreign markets is realized without difficulty when we recall the totals of German trade statistics. In 1878 German imports and exports amounted to about six billion marks; by 1892 her commerce had advanced to seven billions, and in 1900 to ten and a half billions, while in 1906 the total sum of her imports and exports was not less than fifteen billions.[24] These

[23] Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 50.

[24] From 1870 to 1900 Germany rose from fourth to second place in international trade; a decade later she had nearly quintupled the amount of exports and imports of 1870, whereas Great Britain's foreign trade was only about two and half times as great in 1910 as in 1870, Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, 66-81; Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 117; *Statistisches Jahrbuch, passim; Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France*, 153.

enormous figures, as von Bülow says, are lifeless, but they "assume a living interest when we consider how important they are for the welfare of the Germans, and that the work and very existence of millions of . . . citizens depends upon them."[25] Germany's vastly increased population found their means of support in her new gigantic industries, and those industries could never have been built up without the rapid and successful extension of Germany's commerce.

Just as Germany's industries were dependent upon her foreign trade, so that trade was, to a large extent, dependent upon her mercantile marine. And the speedy growth of the German shipping industry has marched abreast of the expansion in industry and commerce. Our attention is called by one writer to the Latin device over the portal of the Navigation House in Bremen, "Navigare necesse est."[26] The vast majority of Germans have believed firmly since 1890 that navigation was an absolute necessity to the existence of the new industrial state. It was necessary for the feeding of her enormous population; above all it was necessary for her trade, in order to ensure the importation of the raw materials which supplied the great industries, and to carry German manufactured products back to foreign markets.

The growth of German shipping first became notable in the nineties. Before the war with France, Germany could in no respect claim to be a seafaring Power; the Hanseatic ports, which in mediæval days were amongst the chief centres of European commerce, had languished ever since the Napoleonic blockade.

[25] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 14-15.

[26] Schierbrand, *Germany*, 131.

Hamburg, Germany's chief port, was in 1872 not so much a German as a British harbor: of the ships that put into that port the British vessels surpassed the German by two to one. But by 1887, the German ships entering Hamburg slightly surpassed the British in number and tonnage, and in 1900 the German shipping of Hamburg was more than double that of the British. A decade later the entire trading fleet of France was less than that of Hamburg alone.[27]

The increase in German shipping in this single port was typical of the general growth of Germany's mercantile marine. In the year of unification, her shipping was almost entirely confined to the Baltic and consisted chiefly of sailing vessels. By the end of the century she had quintupled her mercantile tonnage and possessed thirteen hundred steamers plying the high seas and entering all the ports of the world. With more than four thousand sea-going vessels, her mercantile marine was surpassed by that of Great Britain alone.[28] The development of certain lines was especially notable. In 1855 the Hamburg-American line had but two steamers, one of them built in England; at the beginning of the twentieth century this line was the largest in the world, no British or French company comparing with it either in size or in steamer connections. Besides its regular service to New York and other American, Mexican, Canadian, and South American ports, it had extended branch lines to Italy, the West Indies, around Africa, and to

[27] Schierbrand, *op. cit.*, 132-134; Clapp, *The Port of Hamburg, passim; Statesman's Year Book*, 1873, 177; *Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France*, 166.

[28] Dawson, *Modern Germany*, 70-71; Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 126-127; *Statesman's Year Book*, 1898, 555-558; 1907, 1007-1009.

the Far East. The North German Lloyd operated twenty-seven steamer lines to all continents, and possessed forty-six steamers engaged in Chino-Indian trade.[29]

The natural corollary to the growth of Germany's mercantile marine was the creation of her navy. It was inconceivable that the Germans should be willing to trust the security of their ships to the chances of fortune and the generosity of rival Powers; for they believed that their commerce and industry depended absolutely on the preservation of their mercantile marine. On this point von Bülow expressed the conviction of the German people with unmistakable lucidity: "We have entrusted millions to the ocean, and with these millions the weal and woe of many of our countrymen. If we had not in good time provided protection for these valuable and indispensable possessions, we should have been exposed to the danger of having one day to look on defencelessly while we were deprived of them. But we could not have returned then to the comfortable economic and political existence of a purely inland state. We should have been placed in the position of being unable to employ and support a considerable number of our millions of inhabitants at home. The result would have been an economic crisis which might easily attain the proportions of a national catastrophe."[30]

[29] For German pride in these lines, see Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, 100-101.

[30] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 17. Cf. also Professor Paulsen: "The German Empire has participated in the policy of expansion out of Europe—at first modestly, of late with growing decision. The enormous increase of its industrial production and its trade compelled it to take measures for the extension and the security of its overseas interests. In the course of a single generation Germany, as an indus-

Convinced of the economic necessity of a formidable navy, Germany, although she entered the race late, proceeded to make up for lost time. In 1888 the German naval estimates amounted only to some sixty-five million marks annually, and ten years later only to one hundred million; in the former year the navy was manned by fifteen thousand officers and sailors, in the latter the number was twenty-three thousand. In 1898 she possessed only nine armored ships of war. But in that year and two years later she adopted a far-sighted programme of naval development which, with the complementary law of 1906, promised her a fleet which would soon be of great defensive strength and by 1920 might hope to dispute even Great Britain's supremacy on the sea. By 1908 the annual naval estimates had risen from one hundred million marks to about four hundred twenty million. The number of officers and seamen in the navy had increased to over fifty thousand. The programme of 1900 was intended to bring the navy by the year 1920 to a strength of thirty-eight line ships and fourteen large cruisers. But the complementary laws of 1906 and 1908 gave notable increases so that Germany was promised at least eighty war ships of the latest type in 1920.[31]

trial and mercantile State, has worked its way into the second position in Europe; today England alone is ahead of it, yet by no great distance, and the distance decreases every year. The necessity of protecting this position by a strong naval force has during recent decades become a dominant factor in the political thought of the nation,'' *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst, und Technik,* October 26, 1907, p. 18. Cf. Usher, *Pan-Germanism,* 102.

[31] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,* 57-62; Dawson, *Modern Germany,* 351; the German Naval programmes are printed in Hurd and Castle, *German Sea-Power,* 328 sq.

The movement for a great fleet was supported by the enthusiasm of the people and above all by the determination of the Kaiser. "Our future lies upon the sea," said William II. And again, "As my grandfather worked for the reconstitution of this army, so I will work without allowing myself to be checked to reconstitute this navy."[32] The Naval League, organized to win popular support for Germany's new aspirations, soon included nine hundred thousand members and disposed of an annual budget of a million marks.[33] Aided by a wealth of human material, the great lack of which in Great Britain and France was undeniable, the new German navy rapidly approached the position where it could assure the safety of German commerce and German control of markets.

Correlative with the growth of the German navy was the hope of acquiring new colonies or at least spheres of influence in the undeveloped portions of the globe. Enthusiasm for colonies by no means equalled that for a great navy at the beginning of the century, but there were many who insisted upon the economic necessity of an active colonial policy. In their minds the acquisition of colonies which should furnish raw materials to German industries and in return purchase manufactured goods was an essential safeguard for the maintenance of the Empire's new industries.

The German Empire had come into political existence so late that the fairest portions of the globe had

[32] Speeches at Stettin, September 23, 1898, and at Berlin, January 1, 1900.

[33] By 1907, the Navy League's organ, *Die Flotte*, had a circulation of 275,000 and during the course of the year 700 lectures on naval subjects were delivered under its auspices, *Annual Register*, 1908, 293.

already been taken by the older states. In the early seventies Germany might have secured valuable territory in North and Central Africa had not Bismarck felt it necessary to restrict the scope of his policy to the European Continent. But both the Chancellor and William I were opposed to a policy of colonial aggrandizement; they considered that it would be a "political over-capitalizing" of the young Empire, and they feared the jealousy of Great Britain.[34] As Bismarck said, they valued British friendship more than the whole East Coast of Africa. We have also seen how Bismarck attempted to distract the attention of the French from the "gap in the Vosges" by encouraging Ferry in his colonial schemes, thereby foregoing any opportunity of winning territory for Germany on the North African Coast.[35]

But in the eighties Germany was caught in the wave of enthusiasm for colonies that swept over Europe, and the initiative of her traders secured certain territories for her. In 1882 a bay on the west coast of Africa was seized by Herr von Lüderitz, and two years later, as a result of a quarrel with the British at Cape Town, Bismarck declared the annexation of the West African coast and hinterland from the Orange River to Cape Frio. During the next two years Germany won territory in the Cameroons and Togoland, as well as on the East African coast. At the same time she secured various islands in the Pacific: Kaiser Wilhelmsland, Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands. In 1897

[34] Bismarck believed that Germany already had "too much hay on the fork" to make any large scheme of colonization prudent, Sir Bartle Frere, *How the Transvaal Trouble arose*, 258.

[35] *Supra*, chap. II.

the aggressive action of Germany in the Far East led to the acquisition of Kiau Chau, and in 1899 she secured the Caroline Islands and two of the Samoa group.[36]

The German colonies, however, were not of great value to the mother country, with the exception of Kiau Chau, which offered a fortified naval base in the Far East and gave to Germany commercial control of the province of Shantung. The others, regarded either as commercial ventures or as coaling stations and strategic points for the exercise of German political influence, were failures. Serious trouble developed in Southwest Africa and its latent resources were not developed. Elsewhere the colonial methods of the German administrators proved to be ill-suited to the problems they had to meet. The strategic value of the Cameroons and Togoland was nullified by the position of the British and French. The Pacific Islands were leftovers.[37]

We can therefore understand why, at the beginning of the twentieth century, German enthusiasm for colonies was not warm. They were regarded as a poor investment by the capitalists and the mass of the nation looked on them with indifference. But the rapid growth of the Pan-Germanist element tended to revive ambition for colonial success, and in 1907 the formation of a Colonial Office gave new impetus

[36] Zimmerman, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik, passim.* For a discussion of German colonies, Keller, "Beginnings of German Colonisation and Colonial Policy," *Yale Review,* x, 30; xi, 390; xii, 57. See also *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft Jahresberichte* and *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung.*

[37] For the failure of German officials, see Rohrbach, *German World Policies,* 152-156.

to the movement. The first Colonial Secretary, Dr. Dernburg, brought to his task abilities of the first order and the enthusiasm that proceeded from his conviction that the development of colonies was a "great imperial concern." In his opinion, they were chiefly important as capable of providing in future the raw products so necessary for German industries. He confined his colonial ambitions to the development of the territories that Germany already possessed into profitable plantation colonies.[38]

Others, however, allowed their aspirations to soar higher, and began to insist that colonies suitable for emigrating Germans should be demanded from the older nations. "For centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries and been lost to our Fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even today the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or which corresponds to the greatness of the German people and their intellectual importance."[39]

Immediate aggression that would lead to the acquisition of colonies suitable to the life of Europeans was not, however, favored by more than the smallest number of German chauvinists. Most of the influential classes resigned themselves to the alternative of opening and assuring new markets, sufficiently large to absorb the constantly increasing volume of German

[38] Dernburg, *Zeilpunkte des deutschen Kolonialismus* (Berlin, 1907).
[39] Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 76.

exports, upon which the new increment of German population depended for its support. "We must resign ourselves in all clearness and calm," wrote Rohrbach, "to the fact that there is no possibility of acquiring colonies suitable for emigration. But if we cannot have such colonies it by no means follows that we cannot obtain the advantages if only to a limited extent, which make these colonies desirable. It is a mistake to regard the mere possession of extensive transoceanic territories, even when they are able to absorb a part of the national surplus of population, as necessarily a direct increase of power. Australia, Canada, and South Africa do not increase the power of the British Empire because they are British possessions, nor yet because a few million British emigrants with their descendants live in them, but because by the trade with them the wealth and with it the defensive strength of the mother country are increased. Colonies which do not produce that result have but little value; and countries which possess this importance for a nation, even though they are not its colonies, are in this decisive point a substitute for colonial possessions in the ordinary sense."[40]

The value of commercial penetration which gave to Germany a share in important markets, although it did not lead to the acquisition of colonies, had already been proved, and it was clear that rich districts were still open to German industrial enterprise. This was especially true of South America, the Far East, Africa, and the Central East, and in each district extensive commercial penetration was planned by German individuals and societies.

[40] Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern*, 159, 160.

In Brazil, as early as 1849, Germans had begun to establish commercial houses, and a generation later serious plans were on foot for the acquisition of territory that might be developed into a sort of German colony. In 1908 it was said that there were no less than 400,000 Germans resident in Brazil. Commercial penetration, however, in this instance, could hardly lead to political control of any sort. The growth in power of Brazil itself blocked any such scheme, and behind Brazil stood the other South American States who showed clearly that they were not inclined to permit any European colonization.[41] The Monroe Doctrine, furthermore, could not easily be brushed aside. In the Far East the extension of German influence, which had been established by the acquisition of Kiau Chau in 1897, proceeded rapidly. The commercial penetration of the province of Shantung was developed, and the Pan-Germanists looked forward to winning political control of an enormous stretch of territory, of the utmost commercial and strategic value, should the break-up of the Chinese Empire not be arrested.[42]

But the best opportunities seemed to lie in Morocco, Persia, and Mesopotamia. In South America and the Far East German traders were confronted with the competition of British and Americans, a competition which they often met successfully by the superiority of their commercial methods but which made impossible absolute control. In the Near and Central East

[41] Sievers, *Südamerika und die deutschen Interessen;* Ballod, *Die Bedeutung von Südbrasilien für die deutsche Kolonisation;* Von Bernstorff, *The Development of Germany as a World Power,* 13.

[42] Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne,* 171-175.

Germany might hope to develop markets capable of absorbing vast quantities of German manufactured goods and win control of districts which could furnish the raw materials so necessary to German industries. Both commercial and political motives seemed to indicate the necessity of developing the friendship of the Turk and the extension of German influence in the Near East. The weakening of the Slav element in the Balkans and the inclusion of Austro-Hungary and Turkey in the understanding would open a path from Germany to Mesopotamia, where the Germans hoped to find a country of unrivalled resources, a monopoly of markets, and a strategic position of unrivalled importance in respect to the British dominion in Egypt and India.

Nor would it be long before Syria, Palestine, Persia, and Arabia might fall under German commercial control. Holding thus the shortest overland route to the East, the route of the mediæval traders, the Germans might hope ultimately to enter India and compete with the British for the fifty millions of commerce controlled by Great Britain. Such commercial penetration into Mesopotamia might first be of a peaceful nature. But ultimately the commercial control of Germany and her allies might be transformed into a political domination. Doubtless the more optimistic or the more aggressive hoped that the establishment of German influence in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates would be merely the first step in an attack upon the British Moslem colonies, which would be assisted by the revolt of all the Mohammedans subject to British rule. At all events the Bagdad Railway was planned for the development

of Germany's Mesopotamian policy and at the end of the century was definitely undertaken.[43]

It is clear that motives other than economic played their part in such aspirations. It was not merely the extension of commerce, but also of political influence that Germany was aiming at. Unquestionably her Mesopotamian policy as well as the almost universal enthusiasm for the navy rested largely, at least in their inception, upon economic grounds. The Germans believed that they had been forced by necessity to develop their industries upon a grandiose scale because of the growth of their population and because of the constant emigration from country to town. This industrial development compelled them in turn to extend their overseas commerce and to create a gigantic mercantile marine. Their success in commerce, which cannot be over-emphasized, seemed to them contingent upon the security of their mercantile marine and their commercial position in foreign markets. That security was to be assured only by a strong navy. Inevitably there began to grow up also a feeling that Germany's political position in the world at large ought to be extended for the sake of her trade interests. If she was to maintain her rapidly developing commercial empire, she ought to win for herself political influence in proportion to the economic influence that she held.

This sentiment, which towards the end of the century began to crystallize into a demand for a sort of political world empire, comparable to the German

[43] Rohrbach, *Die Bagdadbahn;* Chéradame, *Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad;* Mazel, *Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad;* Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,* 33; Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern,* 177. See *infra,* chap. IX.

commercial world empire, was thus in part based upon economic factors. But it would never have become of vital international importance, unless it also found support in the mental and moral transformation that was coming over Germany. The nation was calling for world empire, not merely in the interests of its commerce and industries, but also because it was filled with a vague desire for power in general. In 1900 the German Government definitely made plain this new aspect of Germany's ambitions: "We shall not let ourselves be thrust out from an equality with other Powers. We shall not suffer ourselves to be denied the right to speak as they do in the world. There was a time when Germany was only a geographical expression, when she was denied the name of a great Power. Since then, we have become a great Power; and with the help of God, we hope to remain so. We shall not permit the abolition or limitation of our claim to a world policy based upon reflection and reason."[44] The psychological factors which lay back of this new world policy have been, perhaps, of even greater importance than the economic, and to them must be ascribed in large measure the new status of international relations which characterized the first years of the twentieth century.

[44] Cited by Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 51.

CHAPTER V

GERMAN WORLD POLICY: MORAL FACTORS

The industrial and commercial transformation of Germany discussed in the previous chapter was obviously of enormous importance in determining the course of her imperial policy; the growth of her commerce and mercantile marine, upon which German industry largely depended, led naturally to a demand for the creation of a navy, the development of colonies, and the extension of political influence which would ensure the control of markets; the economic interests of the Empire must necessarily be taken into consideration by the diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse.

Of equal or greater importance was the moral transformation of Germany: the gradual assumption of a new attitude towards her neighbors and the growth of a new conception of the rôle that Germany ought to play in the world. The importance of this moral transformation it is almost impossible to overstate; for the diplomatic policy of Germany during the past fifteen years has resulted not merely from economic necessity, or what the nation believed to be economic necessity, but also from the frame of mind characteristic of influential Germans. Nor have the fears of other nations been aroused by the economic success of the Empire so much as by the new tone that she assumed in her international relations.

A specific definition of the attitude that was

becoming apparent towards the end of the nineteenth century can hardly be formulated.[1] It differed in different parts of the country and in different classes. It varied from time to time as the temper of an individual varies. The more aggressively minded enthusiasts, who came to be known as Pan-Germanists, laid down a clear-cut policy of acquiring colonies, or at least "spheres of influence," in Asia or Africa. Many others with varying degrees of intensity merely demanded that Germany should develop and maintain political influence in the world at large and not solely upon the Continent; an attitude typified by the Kaiser's remark that "nothing must go on anywhere in the world in which Germany does not play a part." With not a few, the new spirit remained simply a frame of mind, never crystallizing into proposals designed to lead to a specific course of action.

Even this frame of mind was by no means uniform throughout the Empire. There were those whose attitude was characterized by supreme contempt for the nations who already held the empire of the world and by unwavering belief that their imperialism was hollow and effete. Others were chiefly actuated by fear: the fear that Germany might not be allowed to keep what she had already acquired, and that her progress would be ultimately blocked. Some clamored for war at the first opportune moment; a large number, on the other hand, trusted that the conflict of force might be long postponed.

With all, however, or nearly all, there came to exist a sentiment almost unanimous, that Germany should play a part in the world proportionate to her wealth and population: Germany was a great nation and

[1] Cf. Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern*, 55.

must be acknowledged as such. This sentiment, furthermore, was accompanied by the belief that the recognition of Germany could come only through the exercise of force; it was also accompanied by the consciousness of military strength sufficient to support any demands she might make. No matter how insistent or sincere might be the German contention that the dictates of self-preservation inspired such an attitude, that the German policy was one of self-defence, the German frame of mind was becoming undeniably aggressive and defiant in the latter years of the century. It was then that the effects of Prussian hegemony in Germany began to be realized, and Prussian policy has ever been characterized by a longing for expansion, by aggression, and by trust in force.

This longing for expansion was, perhaps, first made manifest and found its satisfaction in the extraordinary industrial, commercial, and mercantile development that followed the unification of Germany. That development resulted largely from economic causes, but in it there is also to be found as motive force the German ambition for power. The demand for a navy also expressed Germany's ambition for greatness in the abstract, and the warm enthusiasm of the nation which supported that demand did not proceed altogether from economic causes. It is true that the industrial classes desired a strong navy chiefly for economic reasons, regarding money spent on armaments as an insurance premium paid for the safeguarding of German trade; but the unhesitating support given to the naval policy of William II by the influential "Intellectuals" was based on broader grounds, namely, the preservation and extension of

Germany's political interests in the world at large. The conference of professors and representatives of science and learning which listened to Dr. Dernburg's presentation of his imperialist programme in January, 1907, made plain the feeling that German greatness must find an expression in political as well as economic fields. Their formal resolution reads: "A great civilized nation like the German nation cannot permanently restrict itself to internal politics, but must take part with other great nations in colonial and world politics."[2]

Even the Socialists, despite their anti-militarist principles, were not as a party opposed to naval development, and it is a significant fact that they based their attitude primarily upon the necessity of Germany's maintaining her political prestige amongst other nations. "It cannot be expected of one's country," said an influential Socialist, "that it shall take an exceptional position. As matters are to-day, the prestige of a State abroad depends on its readiness for war, both on sea and land."[3]

The new attitude of Germany was shown still more clearly in the Kaiser's speeches, in which a different note was constantly struck after 1895, when the economic necessity of sea-power began to be overshadowed by more general political motives. "Imperial power," he said in 1897, "denotes sea-power, and imperial power and sea-power are complementary; the one cannot exist without the other."[4] Again in 1900 he spoke more plainly: "The wave-beat knocks powerfully at our national gates and calls

[2] Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 352.

[3] *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, November, 1905.

[4] "Reichsgewalt ist Seegewalt und Seegewalt, Reichsgewalt."

us as a great nation to maintain our place in the world, in other words to follow world policy. The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor. It is not my opinion that our German people conquered and bled thirty years ago under the leadership of their princes in order to be pushed on one side when great and momentous foreign decisions are come to. Were that so there would once for all be an end of the world power of the German nation and I am not going to allow that to happen. To use the fittest and if necessary the most drastic means to prevent this is not only my duty but my noblest privilege.'"[5]

Obviously the idea that was in the Kaiser's mind on this occasion was not specially connected with commerce or industry. The ambition for sea-power was based primarily not on economic motives, but rather on the belief that sea-power was to be the path leading Germany to an ill-defined but very actual position of political influence in every part of the world. The longing for expansion, first manifested in the field of commerce, was gradually being transferred to a broader field. Germany began to feel that she ought to exercise an influence in the world politically, commensurate with that which by 1900 she already exercised commercially. The strength of that sentiment was enforced by the fear that unless she secured her influence in the world at large, her influence on the Continent, possibly her national existence, would be jeopardized.

From the beginning of the twentieth century the

[5] Speech at Kiel, July 5, 1900.

feeling that Germany must win all in order to preserve what she already had was expressed with constantly increasing emphasis. A widely read author wrote in 1905: "The question for us is whether we shall devote all our strength in the determination to gain—or more truly regain—for ourselves a place by the side of those nations now ahead of us; whether we shall maintain our position amongst the nations by which in the twentieth century and later world-history will be made, or shall modestly agree to take second place in the concert of world policy."[6] And another writer, a few years later: "Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world."[7]

This longing for expansion, not merely economic in its bearing, this desire for world prestige, this tone of aggression and defiance was to be found more and more generally throughout Germany after 1900. To

[6] Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern*, 149.

[7] Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 79. Cf. also the same writer (*Ibid.*, 104): "We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the Powers of Europe; we must now decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a World Empire and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition that has hitherto been withheld from them."

understand it we must take cognizance of various characteristics of the German, and especially of the Prussian, mentality; for since 1870, despite her unpopularity in southern Germany, Prussia has undoubtedly exercised a moral as well as a political domination.

Foremost among the characteristics which account in some degree for the aspirations that began to take form at the beginning of the century is the German's belief in the destiny of his country. Since the days of Charlemagne he has been convinced that to him fell the mission of Rome in the ancient world: the spreading abroad of civilization and culture. From the early nineteenth century the idea of this mission has taken constantly stronger hold upon the German mind. "Not merely Alsace and Lorraine," wrote Heine, "but all France, Europe, and the whole world will be ours. Yes, the whole world will be German. I have often thought of this mission, of this universal domination of Germany."[8] "Germany has a particular task clearly indicated by Providence," wrote von Meisendorf; "she must pursue the accomplishment of the special mission which falls to her in the work of civilization."[9]

A study of the Kaiser's speeches leaves no doubt that he was penetrated with the idea of the German mission. Witness his famous speech at the Saalburg Museum in 1900: "I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman world empire was, and that just as in old times they said, *Civis romanus sum,* one may

[8] Lichtenberger, *Henri Heine,* 227.

[9] Von Meisendorf, *La France sous les Armes* (French translation), 12.

in the future need only to say, *Ich bin ein deutscher Burger.*"[10] A few years later at Bremen he said: "God has called us to civilize the world: we are the missionaries of human progress." Shortly afterwards, again: "The German people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to elevate and achieve the civilization of the world."[11] Nor in the German literature produced by the war has there been any lack of similar expressions indicating the sincerity with which this tenet of German faith was held.

Belief in the existence and necessity of Germany's civilizing mission was reinforced by the conviction, by no means universal but widely held, that the German race was different and on the whole superior to all others. Giesebrecht wrote: "Domination belongs to Germany because it is a superior nation, a noble race, and it is fitting that it should control its neighbors, just as it is the right and duty of every individual endowed with superior intellect and force to control inferior individuals about him."[12] "We are the superior race in the fields of science and of art; we are the best colonists, the best sailors, the best merchants."[13] Nor is it difficult to discover in the language of the Kaiser the belief that the spirit of Germanism was destined to dominate the world because of the superiority of the German nature. "Far away over the sea," he said in 1902, "our speech is spreading and far away flows the stream of our

[10] Speech at Imperial Limes Museum, Saalburg, October 11, 1900.

[11] Speeches at Bremen, March 22, 1905, and at Münster, September 1, 1907.

[12] Zeller, *Origines de l'Allemagne*, 27.

[13] Bley, *La Situation mondiale du Germanisme*, 21.

knowledge and research. There is no work in the realm of later research which is not written in our language and no thought is born of science which is not first utilized by us in order later to be taken over by other nations."[14]

Educators and scientific writers did not fail to impress the idea of German superiority upon the youth and the masses of the nation. The anthropologist Woltmann wrote that "the German is the superior type of the homo sapiens, from the physical as well as the intellectual point of view." Hartmann taught that the European family is divided into two races, male and female, of which the first was of course exclusively German, while the second included Latins, Celts, and Slavs. Text-books used in schools asserted that the best and strongest elements of all European races are German; Frenchmen are monkeys, and Russians are slaves, as is shown by their name.[15] "The proud conviction forces itself with irresistible power upon us," said Bernhardi, "that a high if not the highest importance for the entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German people."[16]

Doubtless similar quotations could be extracted from the literature of other nations illustrating their belief in their own superiority. But in no other nation has there been such a mass of literature on this point as in Germany during the past fifteen years. It is a fact that belief in the mission of the Germans, as a superior race, to civilize the world, was held by a large number of the influential classes and without

[14] Speech at Aix, June 19, 1902.

[15] Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 13; Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 29-30.

[16] Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 72.

question pervaded all classes to a greater or less extent. What rendered this belief significant was the complementary belief that to carry out the mission, the political empire of the world must be German. In the interests of humanity the German dream of world empire must materialize; it was a moral responsibility laid upon Germany: "The dominion of German thought can only be extended under the ægis of political power, and unless we act in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties towards the human race."[17]

That Germany had the right to carry out her mission even if it involved the use of brute force, was never doubted or questioned. Many were prepared to wait and had no wish to precipitate a conflict for world empire that might be long avoided: the security of peace, the desire for wealth, the fear of disaster, tempered their ambition. But by many others, whose influence constantly increased after 1900, preparation for the struggle was felt to be the most important duty of the German Government. "We must understand," said von der Goltz, "and make the youth of our generation understand that the time for repose has not yet come, that the prediction of a final struggle to assure the existence and grandeur of Germany is not a mere fancy born in the minds of ambitious fools, but that it will come one day inevitably, violent and serious as is every decisive struggle between peoples of whom the one desires to have its superiority over the others definitely recognized."[18]

[17] Bernhardi, *op. cit.*, 77.

[18] Von der Goltz, *La Nation armée* (French translation), 458. See also Bernhardi (*op. cit.*, 84, 103): "We must be quite clear on this point that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and

Often unconsciously, but none the less inevitably, the attitude of the German nation was becoming belligerent. World sovereignty of some kind or another was felt to be desirable not only on economic but also on moral grounds; it was to be won by force alone; it should be the State's first care to make Germany powerful enough so that she might inaugurate the conflict at the opportune moment when victory would be certain.

Such sentiments were natural to Prussians, who have been men of war since the beginning of their history. They were enforced by the lessons of the past: in no country has military strength or weakness played so important a part in determining national history as in Prussia. It was through brute force that Prussia was first built up in the days of the Great Elector and Frederick the Great; to her military weakness Prussia owed her bitter humiliation by Napoleon in 1807; to her military force again, in the time of Bismarck, both Prussia and Germany owed their glory, and, as Germans believed, their subsequent prosperity.

Belief in the necessity and morality of the use of force was also fostered by the universities and found invariable support in 'intellectual' circles. It is easy to exaggerate the influence of the professors, and it is by no means exact to state that they were of themselves responsible for the sentiment, always existing in Germany and latterly increasing, which favored the

hostility as ours. . . . What we now wish to attain must be *fought* for and won against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers. . . . Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may.''

exercise of force. Their teachings, however, reproduced, in general, the emotions and desires of the masses, and in the case of certain notable individuals undoubtedly did much to mould and create opinion. The significance of university sentiment cannot, therefore, be minimized, for the great German universities occupy a peculiar position, not dissimilar to that of the press in other nations: they mirror and they influence the thoughts of the masses.[19]

Whether regarded as an index or a cause, the teachings of the German professors have been characterized by their advocacy of force, and by their insistence that Germany could fulfil her destiny only by the use of force exerted at the proper moment. The motives underlying their doctrines differed. Some of the professors argued from historical premises and in admiration of the success of Great Britain, which they regarded as the model Power. The arguments of others were philosophical in their character, and many of them were distinguished by contempt for the British Empire, which was supposed to have resulted from blind fortune and trickery and therefore to be deserving neither of admiration nor fear.

The economic school of German professors based their arguments in favor of force largely upon examples drawn from the past. Almost without exception they taught that history proves definitely that physical might and its exercise at opportune moments is essential to material well being. In the

[19] Cf. Emery, "German Economics and the War," *Yale Review*, January, 1915, 248. Andrillon (*L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 52) points out that Nietzsche simply condensed in his system doctrines already understood and practised by statesmen: a decade before his writings appeared, his ideas were diffused about him by the actions of Bismarck.

government of states, facts must be faced; as Schmoller taught, a nation must be either "hammer or anvil," and it behooved the Government to see that the nation it ruled was not anvil. The professors did not attempt to justify the exercise of brute force nor did they contend that it was morally right. But they felt that it was useless to blink the "regrettable fact that in the history of the world too often moral ideas have been sacrificed to material advantage, and that right has been sacrificed to might. Since this is the brutal lesson of history, Germany, to survive, must meet the regrettable fact by action, not words."[20]

The economic prosperity that had resulted to Germany from the well-planned use of brute force by Bismarck was patent to everyone, and served to give point to the doctrines of the German economists. Looking abroad they contended that the greatness of England came from her exercise of force at the psychological moment. If Germany was to meet England successfully in the future, she must take a leaf from the English book and fight her with her own weapons.[21] German commerce must be carried everywhere, said Voigt, "under the protection of German cannon."[22]

[20] Emery, *German Economics and the War*, 258. See the contributions of German economists to *Handels- und Machtpolitik*, 1900. These essays "are in a sense a manifesto of the general school which believes that the economic prosperity of Germany and the actual daily comfort of her people depends upon the capacity of maintaining by force of arms the commerce of Germany both at home and in other parts of the world."

[21] "We have had frequent occasions to mention English ways as the pattern we should follow and . . . we should not shrink from going to school to England," Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, 205.

[22] Emery, *op. cit.*, 261. Cf. Seeley's remark, "Commerce leads to war and war nourishes commerce."

With equal intensity the philosophic historians preached the necessity of force, although they based their teachings upon different grounds. Foremost amongst the professors who have influenced German opinion in this respect stood Heinrich von Treitschke. Unlike Nietzsche, who preached force as a virtue in itself, as the sublime virtue leading to the annihilation of the weak and the ultimate creation of the superman, Treitschke never advocated force as an end in itself. The State must be guided by what is right and must always follow duty in its highest sense. "The State is not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and promote the higher interests." Like Kant, Treitschke believed that duty was supreme over all "interests," and that the State and commonwealth of States must be pervaded by the sense of law.[23]

But while for the individual the highest duty is self-sacrifice, for the State the first duty is self-preservation; hence the necessity of power and force for the State.[24] "Its highest moral duty is to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the higher community of which he is a member; but the State is the highest conception in the wider community of men, and therefore the duty of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, since there is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher."[25]

Since the State is supreme and what is right for it

[23] Treitschke, *Politik*, i, § 3. Cf. Hadley, "The Political Teachings of Treitschke," *Yale Review*, January, 1915, 242.

[24] Ernest Barker, *Nietzsche and Treitschke*, 18.

[25] Treitschke, *Politik*, ii, § 31.

is determined by its interests, any self-limitation that it may have placed upon itself is purely voluntary, and may be repudiated when the State considers it best. International treaties need not be kept and international law loses its stability. In the last instance, questions can only be settled by the sword; in the performance of what it conceives to be right the State must be prepared to carry out its duty with all possible force. "When a State sees its downfall staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A sacrifice made to an alien nation is not only immoral, but contradicts the idea of self-preservation which is the highest ideal of a State." And again: "Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost."[26]

We are less concerned with Treitschke's philosophy than with the way in which it affected the German nation. His audience was enormous and among certain classes, not the least influential, his ideas were accepted without question. But the nuances of his philosophy disappeared, as his doctrines were absorbed by the masses, and there remained only the idea most easily caught by the popular intelligence, namely that the be-all and end-all of a State is power, and that "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle in politics."[27] Those who already believed in the necessity and political value of war were not sorry to find what seemed to them a philosophic defence of the State's exercise of force through war.

The argument that war is an instrument of blessing

[26] Treitschke, *op. cit.*, i, § 3; ii, § 31.
[27] Treitschke, *op. cit.*, ii, § 28.

found ready acceptance in Germany, the more readily since it was not entirely new. Some years before, Moltke had said without arousing criticism: "Permanent peace is a dream and not even a beautiful one. But war is an essential element of God's scheme for the world."[28] And so far back as the sixteenth century, Luther had said: "It is very true that men write and say often how great a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly in the business of war, men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, the marches, etc.—that is what the petty and simple do, who only look with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful and as necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work." And Treitschke himself summarized the matter by saying, "God will see to it that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race."[29]

The doctrine of the beauty and grandeur of war was naturally taken up by a host of smaller writers, who found ready auditors; for this spirit has always lived in Germany. "It echoes the vigor of Norse sea-king

[28] Letter to Bluntschli, cited by Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 24. Cf. Moltke's speeches in the Reichstag of February 16, 1874, and January 11, 1887; also Bismarck's remark (Matter, *Bismarck et son Temps*, i, 160): "It is not by discussions that we can decide: sooner or later the God of battles determines."

[29] Luther, *Whether Soldiers can be in a State of Salvation*, cited by Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 55.

and Teutonic champion, of Siegfried and Arminius. It is instinct with the rude heroism of the Nibelung, the strength and cunning which enabled the early heroes to overcome their foes . . . It is *Heldenthum*, the spirit of war and adventure, of triumph through danger, conflict, and suffering."[30] Bernhardi was only reflecting ideas that had for many years inspired a large part of the German nation, when he wrote: "The inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words:

> 'Dreams of a peaceful day?
> Let him dream who may.
> War is our rallying cry,
> Onward to victory.' "[31]

These various elements in the German, and especially the Prussian, mentality, which we have briefly considered, help to explain the German attitude towards international affairs at the beginning of the twentieth century. The sense of their own superiority over other nations and of their world-civilizing mission impelled them to an ambition for world empire. The longing for expansion was gradually transferred from the economic to the broader political field. Germans were also acutely conscious of the necessity of force if they were to win their world empire, and they were largely convinced of the righteousness and

[30] Abbott, "Germany and the Prussian Propaganda," *Yale Review*, July, 1915, 666.

[31] Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 37.

beauty of the use of force. Inevitably the attitude of the nation began to assume an aggressive and at the same time a defiant character: aggressive, because with some, confidence in German strength and in the weakness of her enemies predominated; defiant, since with others, there existed the anxiety that Germany might not be allowed by the other nations to fulfil her dream.

Without question Germany had a right to have supreme confidence in her physical strength. The military force of Prussia was undeniable; whenever capably organized her armies have never been excelled and their success in war has been unbroken. In the latter part of the nineteenth century few questioned the worth of the German army, and its organization was the model for the world. In case of war Germany could draw upon a human supply far richer than could be found in France or England. In numbers, morale, and equipment she was incontestably supreme on land; and her power on sea threatened to become a factor of vital importance. Furthermore, there existed not merely this consciousness of strength, but a "consciousness of virtue—the consciousness of possessing a particular group of war-like virtues, the stern self-discipline, the thrift, the persistence and self-devotion, which had raised Prussia in spite of her poor and barren soil to be the foremost of German states, and which . . . had animated the German army in the great war of liberation from the Napoleonic tyranny."[32] Such virtues, according to the Germans, were peculiar to their own race and had never been displayed by any of their enemies.

To such general confidence in German strength was

[32] Sanday, *The Deeper Causes of the War*, 9.

added in many quarters the belief in the essential weakness of the Powers which threatened to block German expansion. France was decadent and effete, hopelessly pacific, inspired by the lowest ideals. Russia was a giant, but a giant that did not know his own strength nor how to use it. The day of English greatness had passed and Germany need not fear to measure swords with her whenever the opportune moment arrived. British strength in the past was due in large part to the weakness of her rivals and to the fortune of history: "It is not genius, it is not valor, it is not even great policy, as in the case of Venice, which has built up the British Empire; but the hazard of her geographical situation, the supineness of other nations, the measureless duplicity of her ministers, and the natural and innate hypocrisy of the nation as a whole. These have let this monstrous empire grow—a colossus with feet of clay."[33]

When the British Empire should be put to the test by Germany, so many Germans believed, it would fall to pieces. Already the native races in the Moslem colonies were on the point of revolt; the bond that held Australia and Canada to the mother country was one of sentiment and could not stand the force of material circumstances. The home government was hopelessly unfitted by its liberal and parliamentary principles for the control of an over-seas empire, and whatever governing qualities England had ever possessed had vanished in the era of peace and prosperity that had demoralized the whole nation. "Britain's world predominance is out of all proportion to Britain's real strength and to her worth and value, whatever that worth be considered in the political,

[33] Cramb (paraphrasing Treitschke), *Germany and England*, 94.

the intellectual, or the moral sphere." Her dominion was based on a myth and the first conflict with a Power willing to meet her would pitifully reveal her fatal weakness.[34]

But while such conviction of the weakness of the opposing nations filled the minds of many Germans and gave to their tone that timbre of confident aggression which we have noticed, in other quarters the German attitude was not untinged with fear. Not a few were unable to rid themselves of the feeling that there was a special Providence that looked after the affairs of England; and their study of history filled them with a respect for the success of British methods.[35] They feared lest Germany should find her path blocked in the expansion of her commerce and development of her marine and navy, lest the necessary markets should be closed to them.[36] More generally they feared

[34] Usher, *Pan-Germanism*, 19-36; Cramb, *Germany and England*, 93. Cf. Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern*, 67-164; and the secret report of a German agent dated at Berlin, March 19, 1913, published in the French *Yellow Book*, 1914, no. 2: "If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke."

[35] "The English empire as the creation of the English idea . . . is a thing of such grandeur that one cannot speak of it except with admiration," Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, 59.

[36] Emery (*German Economics and the War*, 249 sq.) discusses the profound dread that obtained in certain quarters in Germany, that the future of Germany was gravely endangered, and the feeling that every effort must be made to anticipate a final test. He describes Sering's opinion that Germany would fall to a subordinate position but only after the most strenuous exertions on her part and probably after a titanic conflict fought to prevent herself from being crushed.

lest the German nationality scattered over the world should be definitely lost to the Fatherland, and finally lest the Teutonic element in Europe itself should be unable to resist the Slavonic advance.[37]

Such fears, coupled with the belief in the inevitableness of the approaching conflict, gave to the tone of many Germans a certain ring of defiance.[38] It was the attitude of the man with his back to the wall, contending against odds, but thoroughly armed and determined to resist to the last. Paradoxically, the two opposing elements of confidence and fear thus tended to produce in Germany the tone of belligerence, which has been manifested during the past fifteen years.

This attitude was not of a year's growth and was

[37] The fear of the Slav appears clearly in the pamphlet, *Truth about Germany*, 1914, authorized by the most distinguished intellectual figures of Germany; it is also discussed sympathetically by J. W. Burgess in a letter to the *Springfield Republican*, dated August 17, 1914.

[38] Curiously enough this rather defiant tone is characteristic of persons who, because of their fear of a conflict, were certainly sincere in their desire for peace. "Not only our goods," said Rohrbach, "but also our national existence and the future of our national idea in the world are at stake when our defences by land and sea are insufficient to make our opponents look on an attack upon us as too great a risk. It does not occur to us to deny the superiority of the English fleet, and if the English people want very much to use the word 'supremacy' rather than 'superiority' they are welcome to do so. But when they interpret their supremacy to mean that our interests shall yield to theirs everywhere in the world, they compel us to fight with them for our future, that is to say for our national existence. If they wish to prescribe to us how far we may go in the world to spread our ideas, we should be fools and cowards if we were to acknowledge this foreign command as binding, without recourse to arms," *German World Policies*, 188; see also *Ibid.*, 195, 196. And von Bülow (Speech in the Reichstag, November 15, 1906): "A policy which aimed at encircling Germany in order to isolate us and paralyze us would be very dangerous for peace. The formation of such a ring is not possible unless pressure is exercised; pressure creates counter-pressure; pressure and counter-pressure may easily produce explosions."

definitely influenced and accentuated by the opposing attitude of the other nations, in particular, after 1905, of Great Britain. There was comparatively little of it during the Bismarck régime, except in certain cliques. During the early years of the present Kaiser's reign and concurrently with the growth and success of German world commerce, it began to develop. At the beginning of the twentieth century it had become so general as to be almost characteristic of the German nation. But it was only during the two or three years that preceded the war that the aggressive and defiant attitude of Germany became definitely marked, largely in reaction to what she believed to be the hostile designs of her enemies.

Nor, as we have seen, was this attitude invariably translated into a definite scheme of policy, notwithstanding the term "world policy" generally applied to it. The more aggressive certainly insisted upon the necessity of seizing colonies. This was their interpretation of the policy of obtaining a "place in the sun." The rapid growth of Pan-German societies continued and their conferences discussed the possibility of reclaiming and absorbing the Teutonic elements in the countries bordering the German Empire: Holland, Switzerland, and Poland. Development of German enterprise in Africa was encouraged and the expansion of German influence in Mesopotamia was sedulously cared for.[39]

But on the whole "world policy" remained a rather

[39] For the aims of Pan-Germanists, see Class (ed.), *Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe* (Leipsic, 1910). This is a collection of reports, addresses, and papers delivered at meetings of the Pan-Germanist Society. See also, Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 80 sq., 204-236.

indefinite expression. As understood by the individuals and classes which controlled the diplomatic actions of Germany, it meant simply the development of the fleet, the protection of commerce, and the preservation of free access to all markets, accompanied by the demand that Germany's right to a share in the settlement of all questions be universally acknowledged.[40] It was believed by such classes that Germany's development could best be maintained by preserving peace, at least for the present, always provided that the prestige of Germany on the Continent of Europe remained undimmed.

The pacific attitude of the Government, which continued until 1905, was often assailed by the Pan-Germanists with violence, and at times by the commercial classes. But it was insisted upon as a necessity to German success by influential diplomats, such as von Bülow, and by the Kaiser himself.[41] "Only so long as peace reigns," said the latter, "are we at liberty to bestow our earnest thoughts upon the great problems the solution of which in fairness and equity I consider the most prominent duty of our

[40] "England herself offers the instance of a country much more densely populated than Germany, with insignificant numbers of emigrants and enjoying the acme of economic prosperity and political power because it is able to provide its people with safe access to the markets of the world. This and nothing else is what we need. If we can have a navy which will keep our commerce from destruction we have no need of an outlet for our population either now or in the immediate future. . . . The policy of the German idea in the world does not contemplate, according to our view, any conquest or violence. . . . We must realize the idea of national expansion on which our ability to exist as a nation of the first rank depends, by making ourselves so strong in the first place on land and sea that nobody will attack us," Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, 202-204.

[41] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 36-40.

time." And again: "It will be my sole task for the future to see to it, that the seeds which have been sown may develop in peace and security."[42] Nor did the Kaiser in any of his speeches on the necessity of world empire for Germany, or in his demands for a "place in the sun" commit himself to any specific means of attaining his end.

But notwithstanding the fact that no official seal was placed upon the Pan-Germanist propaganda and that German world policy remained wholly indefinite in its meaning, and despite the stress laid by the Kaiser on the necessity of preserving peace, the other nations of Europe could not fail to be affected by the new spirit manifest in Germany. They were naturally troubled by the probable effects of German success in the development of industry and commerce and by the rapid increase in size of the German mercantile marine. The demand for colonies and the startling growth of a navy that threatened soon to become formidable troubled them yet more. "If the German fleet were destroyed, the peace of Europe would be assured for two generations"; "there are many people, both in England and on the Continent, who consider the German fleet the only serious menace to the preservation of peace in Europe." Such expressions attest the anxiety felt by the older nations because of the rise of this youngest but possibly strongest of Powers.[43]

The chief cause of anxiety, however, was not so much the growth of German commerce and the creation of a navy that might prove dangerous, as the new spirit that was believed to lie behind these outward mani-

[42] Speech at Hamburg, June 18, 1901.

[43] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 35.

festations of strength and ambition. Although the Government, at least until 1905, reiterated its desire for a lasting peace, it was plain that the almost universal demand for expansion and political influence in the world at large must soon bring Germany into conflict with the nations which already held predominant power in the world outside of Europe. With the passing of each year, the attitude of belligerence and defiance became more and more pronounced.[44] Not merely the military party, but the nation as a whole were believed to be ready to take any steps that would lead to the attainment of the ideals of German expansion.[45] Not even the Socialists could be counted upon as a definitely moderating factor.[46]

Great Britain was the nation that seemed to be most directly menaced, and with the first clear indication

[44] Characteristic of the feeling is the fact that in May, 1906, a manufacturer left a legacy of 6000 marks to the military administration, which was to accumulate until Germany entered a war with a European Power. Two-thirds of it was then to be given to the first soldier who captured a flag from the enemy, and the rest to the first soldier who took a cannon. A popular subscription for aerial craft started in March, 1909, amounted, a month later, to six million marks, Andrillon, *op. cit.*, 61.

[45] "It would be no exaggeration," wrote a former French Ambassador, "to say that if the German Government were of a democratic character, the most unfortunate consequences would result. It is a very curious phenomenon to see the Government, and the Kaiser himself in front line, obliged to restrain the manifestations of disgust and anger which constantly appear in the press and in the daily conversation of citizens. Anything the Government would do to bother England or France is sure to be applauded by the people," *La Revue*, August 15, 1907.

[46] At Essen, in 1907, Bebel made it clear that the German Socialists were nationalistic and would take no steps in conjunction with Socialists of other countries which might harm German national interests. "We have need of the country where we were born," he said, "the land where we live, of the tongue we speak, to make our country the most

of the new attitude of the German nation, British statesmen did not hesitate to take steps to meet it. In order to understand the significance of the diplomatic revolution that resulted and its reactionary effect upon German diplomatic policy, we should first consider briefly the relations of Great Britain with the continental Powers previous to 1900.

beautiful and perfect in the world.'' In January, 1906, before the Socialist Congress at Amsterdam, during the discussion of the use of the general strike as a means of preventing war, he asserted that German Socialists would definitely refuse any such proposition; and in 1911, before the Congress at Jena, he said: ''French Socialists can, if they want, declare the general strike, but German Socialists consider the general strike out of the question, if war should arise,'' *La Dépêche*, January 24, 1906; Andrillon, *op. cit.*, 63.

CHAPTER VI

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

The success of German foreign policy during the generation that followed the creation of united Germany depended largely upon two conditions. It was essential that the Franco-Russian combination should be kept innocuous: French policy must remain passive and the attention of Russia must be distracted from the European situation to the Far East. It was also of vital importance to Germany that her control of continental diplomacy should not be disturbed by the opposition of Great Britain. Towards the close of the century, therefore, when Germany began to conceive her schemes of world policy, the attitude of Great Britain was of the greatest concern to German diplomats.

British foreign policy, since the time of Elizabeth, has been determined mainly by colonial and maritime interests; underneath all the apparently contradictory manifestations of Great Britain's policy, this single motive is to be found. At times, as for example during the reign of Louis XIV and the eras of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, a concern for the maintenance of the continental equilibrium has been the chief characteristic of Great Britain's attitude. At other times, she has rigidly excluded herself from continental complications, and taken up a position of isolation. The superficial contradiction in her policy

has, furthermore, been accentuated by her frequent changes in alliances. Friendship with France in the sixteenth century was exchanged for the bitter hostility with which she regarded Louis XIV in the seventeenth and Napoleon in the nineteenth centuries. After the fall of Napoleon her foreign relations were characterized by rivalry with Russia; while in the first decade of the twentieth century her ancient feuds with France and Russia were entirely forgotten in the growing enmity manifested towards Germany.

Such contradictions are more apparent than real. They have been determined by a single aim—the greatness and security of the British Empire. That has been the sole object of her policy, and her systems of alliances have been merely the means toward that end. History shows that there are two methods of diplomacy: "The one is a policy of system; alliances are the object, particular questions are the means. In *Realpolitik,* on the other hand, alliances are the means, national questions the object."[1] *Realpolitik* has always been the method employed by Great Britain, as it was by Bismarck and Cavour. Her supremacy on the seas and the security of her colonies has been her guiding principle. Her policy has thus been successively anti-French, anti-Russian, and anti-German; for in the last hundred years she has had to fear the French in Africa, the Russians in the Near, Central, and Far East, and finally the competition of the Germans all over the world. She has travelled towards her goal "by the shortest route, and has changed friends on the way."[2]

[1] René Millet in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère,* 1911, 61.
[2] Millet, *op. cit.,* 61.

Since the collapse of the Empire of the first Napoleon the relations of Great Britain with France have been outwardly pacific. There has been no break in the diplomatic connection of the two nations and the not infrequent rumors of war have never materialized into actual hostilities. But it was a very thin veneer of official friendliness that covered the underlying traditional enmity. Relations were strained during the period when Napoleon III was attempting to carry out a policy of action, and after 1870 the colonial aspirations of the Third Republic inaugurated an era of Anglo-French rivalry which threatened at times to develop into an open break. This rivalry centred chiefly around the question of domination in Africa.

Both France and Great Britain had interests in Egypt: France was concerned over her trade with the Levant, and because of her protectorate in Algeria could not afford to be indifferent to anything that related to the North African seaboard; Great Britain considered that Egypt was the key to India. In 1875 Great Britain fortified her position in Egypt and obtained a decisive voice in the control of a highway that was of vital importance to her interests, by purchasing from the bankrupt Khedive his shares in the Suez Canal Company. The shares had been offered to the French Government and had been declined, owing to the timidity of the French statesmen, who were at the moment distracted by the German war scare. But although France had thus through her own fault missed her opportunity, she could not but feel that Great Britain had unfairly stolen a march on her; and the diplomatic assistance rendered by Lord Derby

in the continental crisis of 1875 did not entirely remove the sense of injury that resulted.[3]

French ill-feeling was not alleviated by further developments in Egypt. The financial paralysis of the Egyptian Government led in 1876 to the establishment of the "Dual Control" by France and Great Britain, and shortly afterwards to the deposition of the Khedive. A nationalist rebellion under Arabi Pasha flamed forth, culminating in an outburst of Moslem fury in Alexandria that seemed to call for the intervention of the controlling Powers. But France hung back; Gambetta had just fallen and the new Ministry feared to involve the country in complications, so long as her continental position was threatened by Germany. Great Britain therefore proceeded alone to the rather unwelcome task of crushing the rebellion and restoring order. Alexandria was bombarded on July 11, 1882, and in September, Sir Garnet Wolseley forced Arabi and his followers to lay down their arms.[4]

The difficulty of bringing order out of a state of financial and administrative chaos, and of reducing the turbulent nationalist spirit to a condition of quiescence, was not lessened by the anomalous status of the British Government in Egypt, for England refused to assume a protectorate and declared that her function in Egypt was confined to the giving of advice to the Khedive. The meaning placed upon the word "advice," however, was such that the rivals of

[3] *Annual Register*, 1873, 1875, *passim;* Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 42; Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la Troisième République*, 410-443; Freycinet, *La Question d'Egypte*, 99-205.

[4] Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, i, 149-348; Freycinet, *La Question d'Egypte*, 205-325; Wallace, *Egypt and the Egyptian Question*, 62-108.

Great Britain recognized clearly that Egypt had become for practical purposes an essential part of the British Empire. "It should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and governors of provinces," wrote the British Foreign Secretary, "that the responsibility which for a time rests upon England, obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their office."[5]

This position of the British in Egypt, although it resulted mainly from the unwillingness of the French to assume new burdens, could not fail to accentuate the ill-feeling already existing between England and France. The French felt that they had been robbed of a sphere of influence essential to their position as a Mediterranean and Far Eastern Power; and their vexation was not lessened by the realization that the result was largely due to their own timidity. For half a generation every difference between the two nations was embittered by French jealousy of England in Egypt; and finally the smouldering embers of colonial rivalry and national hatred were almost fanned into open war at Fashoda, in 1898.

Fashoda is a fortress on the upper Nile in the Soudan, where a British force under Kitchener met with a French expeditionary corps commanded by Marchand, September 19, 1898. The Soudan had formerly been a dependency of Egypt, but in 1883 had revolted under the leadership of a religious

[5] Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, 559; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 43; Milner, *England in Egypt*, 24 sq.

fanatic known as the Mahdi. He had proclaimed a religious war and completely annihilated the Anglo-Egyptian troops sent against him. Gladstone, who was at the head of the British Government in 1884, decided to abandon the Soudan, but sent Chinese Gordon up the Nile to investigate the situation and report upon the best method of withdrawal. Gordon, whose heroism and chivalry are unquestioned, but whose judgment is not above reproach, allowed himself to be confined in Khartoum by the rebellious Mahdists; the British Government was dilatory in the despatch of a relief expedition, and two days before its arrival Gordon was massacred with eleven thousand of his men (January 26, 1885).[6] For ten years the horror and disgrace of Khartoum remained unavenged, and the Soudan was left to the Dervishes.

In 1896 an expedition for the recovery of the upper Nile was sent out under Kitchener. The belief that control of the Soudan was essential to the stability of the British régime in Egypt combined with the fear of French expansion in Central Africa to force the Government into a policy of action. Kitchener advanced slowly up the Nile, and on September 2, 1898, crushed the Dervishes at Omdurman. But British control of the Soudan was not to be uncontested, for a simultaneous attempt to reach the upper Nile was being made by the French; and when Kitchener, proceeding up the river, reached Fashoda, he found the fort flying the French flag and occupied by Marchand and his small force. Neither the British nor the French would retire, the former being superior

[6] Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, i, 349-592; ii, 3-18; Blunt, *Gordon at Khartoum*.

in numbers and having assured communications, the latter having been the first on the spot.[7]

The diplomatic tension that resulted from the ensuing crisis was extreme, for there seemed to be no possible compromise between the claims of Great Britain and France. Sir Edward Grey had shortly before declared that any intervention in the Soudan on the part of a foreign Power would be considered an "hostile act." On the other hand, France looked forward to linking her possessions in East and West Africa by the control of the upper Nile, and M. Hanotaux had insisted that France would preserve full liberty of action in that quarter. The danger from the clash of interests in Central Africa was the greater because France feared the ambitions of the British in Morocco, which adjoined Algeria; in the Far East also, Franco-British rivalry had been rapidly becoming acute during the years immediately preceding. For the moment it seemed likely that the whole question of French and British colonial antagonism and national bitterness would be settled by the sword.[8]

The situation was saved by the surrender of the French claims and the recognition by France of the British and Egyptian control in the Soudan. The military situation in France left her in no condition to prosecute a general war, and little assistance could be expected from Russia, which was deeply engaged in Far Eastern affairs, and was also, in the person of the Tsar, advocating a general system that would ensure international peace. Great Britain on the

[7] De Caix, "La Politique Anglaise," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère*, 30; Hanotaux, *Fachoda*.

[8] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 43-45.

other hand, although the struggle with the Boers was imminent, seemed to be in a position to carry on a colonial war against France with all chances of success.

The diplomatic victory of Great Britain in the Fashoda crisis did not tend to ameliorate her relations with France. The latter country manifested more clearly than ever sentiments of jealousy and hatred towards the nation across the Channel, and during the Boer War a press campaign of the utmost virulence was directed against her rival. It was even whispered that France made overtures to Germany which might have led to a continental coalition, with the destruction of the British colonial empire as its object.[9] In England, France continued to be regarded as the national enemy, and the nineteenth century closed with Franco-British relations strained to the limit and with the hope of a reconciliation apparently excluded from the realm of possibility.

The intense hostility that existed between France and England was equalled or surpassed by that which had grown up in the nineteenth century between Russia and England. In general the interests of the two nations have conflicted in three quarters: in the Near East, in Afghanistan and Persia, and in the Far East. In the Near and Central East, the hostility of Great Britain towards Russia was largely determined by her fear for the security of India: the advance of Russia towards Constantinople endangered her communications with her most valuable colonial possession; Russian intrigues amongst the border tribes in Afghanistan and Persia threatened India

[9] Interview with the Kaiser, published in *Daily Telegraph*, October 28, 1908.

directly. In the Far East the rivalry was chiefly commercial in character.

On more than one occasion Great Britain has proved the chief stumbling block to the fulfilment of Russia's ambition of securing control of the Balkans and Dardanelles. The foresight of Canning in 1827 brought England into the war of Grecian independence in order that Russia might not unduly exploit the defeat of the Turks. In 1841, the Treaty of the Straits, for which Great Britain was largely responsible, closed the Dardanelles to ships of war. Again in 1855 Great Britain, in conjunction with France, defended the integrity of Turkey against Russia and inflicted a striking defeat upon the Slav Power in the Crimean War. Nor was the action of Disraeli in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, although it was confined to the diplomatic field, less vigorous in its opposition to Russian influence in the Near East.[10]

The result was that Russian ambitions, blocked in this quarter, turned to the Central East, where for more than a generation the advance of the Slav occasioned the British in India the utmost anxiety, for it seemed a matter of certainty that the intriguing agents of the Tsar were preparing for a descent upon India, or at least for the control of the Persian Gulf. During the sixties, Russian armies took possession of Bokhara and established themselves upon the borders of Afghanistan; should that country fall under their control, the passes leading into India itself would be open to them.

During the next ten years Russia's threats became more direct. Her representatives secured the favor of the Ameer, who was alienated from Great Britain

[10] Driault, *La Question d'Orient, passim.*

by the vacillation of her policy, which under the direction of Gladstone was anæmic, and under that of Disraeli, hasty and ill-considered. In the late seventies, a Russian army was on the march for the frontier and General Skobelef had drawn up two plans for the invasion of India. But Russia's determination faltered, and her attention was distracted by difficulties at home; in the following year she lost much of her advantage when a British force under Roberts was sent into Afghanistan and largely reëstablished British influence.[11]

But notwithstanding the fact that Russia declared explicitly that she would not interfere with the special position of Great Britain in Afghanistan, British statesmen continued to regard the presence of Russian merchants there as indicating that the danger had not passed. And at certain times it was undeniable that the Afghans showed themselves restive under British influence and were doubtless not unready to accept Russian assistance whenever opportunity offered. Until the beginning of the twentieth century British suspicion of Russian intrigues in this quarter maintained the atmosphere of hostility between the two nations. In 1905, Mr. Balfour identified the "problem of the British Army" with the defence of Afghanistan.

In Persia, Russia carried on a successful commercial and financial development which did not tend to lessen British fears or jealousy of Russian influence in the Central East. Russian trade with Persia doubled during the last decade of the nineteenth century, and

[11] Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India,* chs. 43-44, 46-51, 60-62; Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la Troisième République,* 521; Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie,* 705, 776, sq.; "O. K.," *Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause,* 320-337.

through the skill of Russian financiers, the Russian Loan Bank became the sole creditor of Persia, a position which naturally secured for Russia important political advantages. Lord Curzon's attempts to offset the influence thus gained were not entirely successful and served to increase Anglo-Russian enmity.[12]

In Thibet the ambitions of the two nations also clashed. In this quarter the British had constantly shown a disposition to advance. Finally in 1903 Lord Curzon despatched Colonel Younghusband on a mission which might have been commercial in character as asserted, but which Russia regarded as likely to lead to British political supremacy over the "Roof of the World." For the moment, Russian attention was directed to the war in Manchuria and she could do no more than express her displeasure at the Younghusband mission. But the British penetration of Thibet was not the least amongst the factors that seemed to be making for a conflict between Great Britain and Russia.[13]

In the Far East, Russian and British ambitions clashed no less directly than in the Central East, and at the end of the nineteenth century the rivalry was such in this quarter as to make imminent the danger of open conflict. Russia's interests on the Pacific seaboard date back to the seventeenth century, when in her expansion eastwards, she founded the town of Okhotsk. It was only in the middle of the nineteenth

[12] De Caix, "La Politique Anglaise," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère*, 1911, 19; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 243-245; Whigham, *The Persian Problem*, 332-378.

[13] Fraser, *India under Curzon and After*, 78-146; *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, 490.

century, however, that, in the pursuit of an ice-free port, she sought to extend southwards her possessions on the Pacific, and began the attack on the integrity of China. In 1860 she acquired from China a strip of territory to the east of Manchuria, known as the Maritime Province, at the southern end of which she established the naval base of Vladivostok. Here she was stopped for the moment. But Vladivostok is not an ice-free harbor, and Russia looked to the south for further accessions of territory; she especially hoped to acquire Korea, Port Arthur at the head of the Yellow Sea, and also the province of Manchuria, which would give direct communication between Korea and Siberia.[14]

The interests of Great Britain in the Far East were first established in 1842. Previous to that time China had preserved her isolation from the rest of the world; foreigners had been permitted to trade in a single port, Canton, but under such restrictions that no country was able to carry on regular commerce; no foreign ambassadors or consuls were allowed to reside in China. In 1840 this wall between the Celestial Empire and the modern world was broken down. A quarrel between Great Britain and the Chinese Government over the smuggling of opium culminated in the so-called Opium War of 1840, in which China was speedily crushed. By the treaty of Nanking, Great Britain forced China to open to British trade four ports besides Canton; she also secured for herself the island of Hong Kong.

During the next two decades the British acquired further rights, including that of maintaining consuls

[14] Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, 681-682; Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie*, 780 sq., 853.

in the treaty ports, and rapidly extended their Far Eastern trade and their influence on the Pacific. In the meantime, other Powers established trading centres in the Chinese Empire, and China's commerce with Europe increased by leaps and bounds. But Great Britain remained the predominant Power in the Far East, partly because of her possession of Hong Kong, the most important naval and commercial base on the Pacific coast, partly because of her initiative and activity.[15]

Acute rivalry between Russia and Great Britain in the Far East was long postponed. Russia was far to the north, Great Britain to the south, and so long as the integrity of China was maintained there was little chance of a clash. Russia had no ports which would allow her to develop commerce likely to rival that of Great Britain, and the latter Power regarded Russia's possession of the ice-bound coast of the Maritime Province with indifference. But in the early nineties the sudden rise of Japan and her successful war with China produced effects that gave to Russia an opportunity of winning Korea and acquiring a position of predominance on the Pacific, which seemed to Great Britain dangerously threatening.

Japan's policy of isolation, to which she had long adhered, was broken down as a result of Commodore Perry's visit in 1854. The request that a port be opened to American trade was accompanied by a naval demonstration. Japan heeded the request and entered into relations with foreign nations. There followed an internal revolution disposing of the feudal system and introducing European institutions. The national transformation which resulted finds no parallel in

[15] Innes, *England and the British Empire*, iv, 218.

history. Within two decades Japan made of herself a modern Power, whose material efficiency was proved conclusively by the victories over China in 1894 and Russia in 1904-1905.

The first of these wars resulted from the ancient quarrel of China and Japan over Korea, which was coveted by Japan because of its strategical position and agricultural fertility, and also because it offered markets to Japanese industry and a home for her surplus population. The struggle resulted in an easy victory for the army of Japan, trained by European officers and equipped in occidental fashion, and China quickly agreed to a peace, which was recorded in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895). According to this treaty China recognized the independence of Korea, but on such terms that Japanese commercial control of the peninsula would be possible; and also ceded to Japan the peninsula of Liao Tung, situated to the west of Korea, with Port Arthur at its southern extremity, and the island of Formosa.[16]

But Japan was not allowed to enjoy the fruits of her victory. Her triumph over China was displeasing to Russia and Germany, since it interfered materially with their own Far Eastern policy; and three days after the Chino-Japanese treaty had been signed, the European Powers intervened. Together with France, Russia and Germany invoked the principle of Chinese integrity, declaring that Pekin was threatened by Japan's possession of Port Arthur and that Korea's independence would be merely nominal. Their language was courteous, but they made it plain that the treaty must be revised. Japan swallowed her dis-

[16] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 82; Hazen, *op. cit.*, 694-696; Vladimir, *The China Japan War*.

appointment, yielded to their demands, and renounced the acquisition of the Liao Tung peninsula and Port Arthur.[17]

It was easy to understand Russia's desire to prevent Japan from winning a foothold on the Continent and especially in Korea. Since the early nineties she had begun practical operations which she hoped would enable her to secure a strong commercial and strategical position on the Pacific. In 1891 she began the Trans-Siberian railway, which was destined to link St. Petersburg with Vladivostok, and a few years later planned a branch line running across Manchuria and terminating in the Liao Tung peninsula.[18] With such ambitions, the Japanese terms dictated at Shimonoseki directly conflicted.

The Power chiefly responsible for the tearing up of that treaty, however, was Germany. The Kaiser, as we saw, was at this time beginning to evolve plans of world empire and the moment seemed opportune for the German Government to establish its political influence in the Far East. Furthermore the chance of securing a trading post and naval base similar to that of the British at Hong Kong won the approval of the Pan-Germanists, who enthusiastically supported German intervention in Eastern affairs. But the most important reason for German action in China was doubtless to be found in her European policy. During the nineties Germany was constantly working to rob the Dual Alliance of European significance by directing the attention of France and Russia away from Europe, and fostering their desire for colonial power. Russia especially she sought to "tempt Asia-

[17] Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie*, 861.
[18] Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie*, 884 sq.

wards, with a view to getting rid of her influence in Europe." It was eminently desirable for Germany that Russia should be involved in distant and dangerous adventures, and that Russian expansion should embitter the Anglo-Russian rivalry. The position of Germany on the Continent of Europe was clearly strengthened by every new clash of interests between Russia and Great Britain, no less than by the Anglo-French feud.[19]

The hopes of Russia and Germany were realized for the time being, although they were destined to ultimate failure, in the one case in 1905, in the other in 1914. But for the moment both Powers secured their desired position on the Pacific. Germany took advantage of the murder of two missionaries in 1897 to send out an expedition which forced China to lease for ninety-nine years the bay of Kiau Chau and a zone of fifty kilometres around it. She thus won a naval and commercial base that might in the future rival Hong Kong.[20] She was equally successful in the "egging-on" of Russia. The latter Power secured in 1898 the lease of the all-important Port Arthur, which, as she herself had declared to Japan, allowed the possessor to threaten Pekin. This was to be the terminus of the Trans-Manchurian Railway, which connected Russia in Europe with an ice-free port on the Pacific. The railway itself, under an agreement made in 1896, was to pass ultimately to China; in the meantime, Russian soldiers were allowed to guard it, and Russia already treated Manchuria as though it were her own.[21]

[19] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 213-216.

[20] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 108-115.

[21] Hawkesworth, *The Last Century in Europe*, 409; Krahmer, *Russland in Asien*.

The advance of Russian influence in China had long been a cause of anxiety to British statesmen, and in 1900 they realized that British commercial supremacy in the Far East was directly threatened. The trade of Northern China was falling into Russian hands, and even in the valley of the Yang-tse-kiang Russian merchants and commission agents were replacing British agents. In the meantime Russia was strengthening her military hold on Manchuria, and despite her promises seemed likely to make of it a Russian province. England could not fail to see that Russian annexation of Manchuria meant not merely the acquisition of a strategic position invaluable to Slavic development on the Pacific, but also the closing of Manchuria to British trade.

At the moment the attention and resources of Great Britain were occupied by the Boer War, and she realized the necessity of an ally in the Far East upon whom she could depend to oppose the Russian advance. She turned naturally to Japan, whose interests had been trampled upon by Russia and Germany in 1895 and who was also searching for some ally that could furnish her the necessary capital for her new industrial development. Circumstances thus brought Great Britain and Japan together, and on January 30, 1902, the Eastern and Western Powers signed a defensive alliance, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and equal opportunity for the commerce of all nations in those countries.[22]

The Anglo-Japanese treaty did not provide that Great Britain should assist Japan in a war against Russia alone, but it naturally resulted in an increase

[22] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 217-221.

of hard feeling between Russia and Great Britain. The mutual hostility of the two countries became more acute with the carrying out of the Russian policy of aggression in Manchuria in 1903 and the protests raised against it in the British press. Finally in January of the next year, the Russo-Japanese War broke out as a result of Russia's refusal to come to terms over the occupation of Manchuria, and although England took no part in the war, her sympathies were frankly with her Japanese Ally and against her "hereditary enemy," as the newspapers called Russia. The possibility of war between Russia and England seemed to be more imminent than at any time since the Berlin Congress. Russian newspapers accused Great Britain of having caused the war by the moral and financial assistance given to Japan, and also of instigating Russian revolutionaries. British feeling was excited to a pitch of frenzy by the cannonading of British trawlers by the Russian fleet off the Dogger Bank. Collision between the two nations seemed inevitable.[23]

The avoidance of war between England and Russia was due in part to the skill and temper of the diplomats who represented each state; it was also due in large measure to the importance of Anglo-Russian trade, which had grown constantly and was too valuable to each nation to be imperilled by war. Another factor of equal, or possibly greater weight in the arrangement of their differences was that both Russia and England realized the enormous advantage that Germany would draw from an Anglo-Russian war. In the extraordinary development of Germany is to be found the explanation of the continual and successful

[23] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 228-229.

efforts of the diplomats to avoid an open break between Russia and England.

England's fear of Germany, which thus led to a settlement of her quarrel with Russia as well as of that with France, did not arise until the beginning of the twentieth century. Her relations with Germany had always been determined by the principle of British policy which we have already observed, namely, the security of the British Empire. During the generation that followed the Franco-German War, Germany was a land Power, and did not threaten the maritime and colonial supremacy of Great Britain. Hence the latter Power viewed the development of German strength with equanimity and friendliness. Personal affection between the two nations was by no means strong, and the tone of the British press was not always cordial to Germany. But official relations were in general perfectly correct and a close understanding between the two nations was desired by the Governments of both. So long as Germany remained the land-rat, as Bismarck said, there was no danger of a quarrel with her British cousin, the water-rat.

During the years that immediately preceded the formation of the Triple Alliance, Great Britain and Germany were on terms of increasing intimacy. The action of Lord Derby in 1875 in joining with Russia to prevent Germany's rumored attack upon France was soon forgotten, and the policy of the two countries at the Congress of Berlin brought them more closely together. When in 1882 Italy entered into alliance with the Teutonic Powers, the cordiality of Anglo-German relations was enhanced by the friendliness of England and Italy, which had existed without a break since 1860. To England went the gratitude of

Italy for the moral support she had received during her struggle for independence; England, who had not raised her finger for Italian freedom, benefited by the distrust and bitterness felt in Italy towards France, and after the French occupation of Tunis the Anglo-Italian understanding was of the most cordial sort. Considered in the light of the whole international situation, this understanding was almost a Mediterranean prolongation of the Triple Alliance.[24]

The tendency of Great Britain to draw closer to the Triple Alliance was strengthened by the colonial crises which took place in the early eighties. It was with France that England was contesting for colonial supremacy, and she naturally turned for support to the enemies of France. That support she received, and Germany constantly took the British side in the Egyptian question, possibly because of hatred for France, possibly because she desired to have a claim on British gratitude.

It is true that at times the ambitions of the German colonial party brought a temporary cloud over the mutual cordiality of Anglo-German relations and the path of friendship was not always smooth. The British were disturbed by Germany's policy of conquest and expansion in Southwest Africa, Togoland, and the Cameroons. German ambitions directed towards the vacant islands in the Pacific also seemed to impugn the assumption of Great Britain that she was legitimate

[24] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 13; Schiemann, in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. II, no. 4, 785-786. "As regards England," said Bismarck, "we are in the happy situation of having no conflict of interests, except commercial rivalry and passing differences such as must always arise; but there is nothing that can bring about a war between two pacific and hardworking nations," d'Avril, *Négociations relatives au Traités de Berlin*, 325.

mistress and had a sort of presumptive claim on all the islands of the sea. Such an assumption was characteristic of all the British diplomats. "Although the authority of England has not been proclaimed," said Lord Granville, "the affirmation by a foreign government of rights of sovereignty or jurisdiction would be considered an affront to the legitimate rights of England." And Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice also spoke of territories "which without being actually British were nevertheless British by their character and history." It was inevitable that such an attitude should arouse the heated protests of the colonial party in Germany. On the other hand, the British considered themselves threatened by Bismarck's attitude at the conference over African affairs held at Berlin, where he declared that effective occupation was the sole criterion of sovereignty.[25]

But although public opinion in both England and Germany was at times aroused to mutual hostility, the Germans protesting against the British assumption of domination, and the British vexed by the new pretensions of Germany, the relations of the Governments remained almost invariably friendly. "England," said Bismarck, "is more important for us than Zanzibar and the whole East Coast." And after the disgrace of the old Chancellor, Caprivi, who replaced him, emphasized the fact that in this respect his foreign policy would follow on the lines laid down by his predecessor: "We have before everything, sought to assure our understanding with England."[26]

That understanding was sealed by divers treaties,

[25] Fitzmaurice, *Life of the Second Earl Granville,* ii, chap. X.

[26] De Caix, "La Politique Anglaise," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère,* 1911, 24.

notably in 1886 and again in 1890. By the latter agreement Germany recognized the legitimacy of British pretensions to the whole basin of the upper Nile and thus set her seal of approval upon British supremacy in Egypt. Again in 1893 British sovereignty in West Central Africa was acknowledged by a treaty between the two Powers which delimited Nigeria and the German Cameroons and excluded certain disputed districts from the German sphere of influence. Such sacrifices of German colonial ambitions were not made without the quid pro quo; for while British colonial interests were thus furthered, the position of Germany on the Continent was strengthened when Heligoland was ceded to Germany by Lord Salisbury, in return for the recognition of British rights in Zanzibar.[27]

Curiously enough the Boer War tended on the whole to bring about a new affirmation of the Anglo-German understanding. Public opinion in each country was hostile at the time. In England the memory of the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger rankled; in Germany sympathy was openly expressed for the Boers. But Germany's official attitude during the war was undoubtedly friendly. At the moment, England was absolutely isolated and it was in the power of the German Government to embarrass her effectively. But the Kaiser preferred to keep his hands free and await the outcome of the war. If England were victorious, he could claim payment for his benevolent neutrality; if she were defeated, then would be his opportunity for action.[28]

[27] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 38-51.

[28] De Caix, *op. cit.*, 33-34; interview with the Kaiser, *Daily Telegraph*, October 28, 1908.

It was during the Boer War that the most important of all the treaties between England and Germany was signed, namely, that of 1899, when Germany secured the chief island of Samoa. The accord of this year supplemented that of 1898, when the possibility of dividing the Portuguese possessions in Africa was considered, and it assured the German colonials that any railway from Rhodesia to the Atlantic would pass through their territories.[29] Lord Salisbury himself emphasized the importance of this understanding of 1899 as a new link in the chain of friendship which bound the two nations: "This morning you have learned of the arrangement concluded between us and one of the continental states with whom more than with others we have for years maintained sympathetic and friendly relations. The arrangement is above all interesting as an indication that our relations with the German nation are all that we could desire."[30]

In some quarters there even existed the hope of extending this Anglo-German understanding into a definite alliance, possibly including the United States so as to form a new triple "Teutonic" alliance. Germany had come into close relations with the American Power at the time of the Samoan settlement and the hard feelings that resulted from Germany's sympathy with Spain in 1898 had disappeared; the relations of Great Britain with the United States were placed on the most cordial footing by their treaty of February 5, 1900, which abrogated the old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to the advantage of the United States. "There was a dream of a sort of *Tugendbund,* an alliance of the supposedly Teutonic and virtuous

[29] Reventlow, *op. cit.,* 135 sq.

[30] Speech at Lord Mayor's banquet, November 9, 1899.

countries against the decadent nations, whose heritage might arouse conflicting ambitions amongst the strong states."[31] In his Leicester address, Chamberlain spoke distinctly of this triple Teutonic alliance, and in February, 1900, Rosebery recognized the reality of the attempt made to bring it about. "The Government," he said, "made pressing overtures to Germany and the United States for an alliance last December."[32]

Thus at the close of the nineteenth century there was little hint of the coming rivalry and bitterness that was destined to characterize the relations of England and Germany during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. Intent upon the preservation of her maritime and colonial supremacy, England did not yet perceive the new danger that threatened, and continued to maintain her traditional hostility towards France and Russia. The centuries-old conflict with France had lost none of its venom, and the jealousy of the two nations in Africa had nearly precipitated open war in 1898. The fear of Russia, in the Near East, in Central Asia, and on the Pacific, kept alive the feud which seemed destined certainly to involve the two nations in another war. With Germany, on the other hand, England seemed to be on the best of

[31] Schiemann, in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. II, no. 4, 787; De Caix, *op. cit.*, 35.

[32] Chamberlain said: "At bottom the main character of the Teutonic race differs very little from the character of the Anglo-Saxon, and the same sentiments which bring us into close sympathy with the United States of America may also be evoked to bring us into close sympathy and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world," *Annual Register*, 1899, 227. Cf. Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 146.

terms. The clouds that had arisen between the two nations had been dissipated; and if public opinion in each country was none too cordial at times, the diplomats and Governments seemed determined on a close and friendly understanding, if not alliance.

But at the very moment when relations between Great Britain and France and Russia were most strained, and connections with Germany closest, British policy was about to pass through an extraordinary transformation. The diplomatic revolution that took place during the first years of the twentieth century gave a totally new direction to that policy. Whole centuries of hatred and rivalry were forgotten and quarrels of long standing obliterated. Great Britain, for years the implacable foe of France and Russia, within three years concluded conventions with those Powers; and after maintaining friendship with Germany for a generation, discovered in the young and ambitious empire her most dangerous enemy. The character and scope of that diplomatic revolution forms the subject of the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER VII

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION

The student of recent diplomacy can find no period of such significance as that extending from 1898 to 1907, for during these years took place the diplomatic revolution which culminated in the Triple Entente, and radically altered the character of the whole international situation. Rarely has there been a time when the course of coming events depended so closely upon the policy of the diplomats in power, and of which we can say with equal confidence that if these statesmen had not been in office, the history of Europe would have been different. Broadly speaking, there are two aspects to this diplomatic revolution. The one is to be found in the new attitude of independence assumed by France. The other lies in the emergence of Great Britain from her magnificent isolation, and the liquidation of her ancient feuds with France and Russia. The result was a combination of Great Britain, France, and Russia in an entente of doubtful solidity, but pregnant with significance and destined to restore the balance that Bismarck destroyed.

The most striking aspect of the change is certainly Great Britain's reversal of policy when she entered into conventions with her traditional foes, so soon after the sharpest of diplomatic encounters. But the new course of British policy would hardly have been possible except for the new spirit that began to inform French diplomacy, and which was personified by Théophile Delcassé, who entered the cabinet as Foreign

Minister in 1898 immediately before the Fashoda crisis. Delcassé came into power too late to avert the crisis or alleviate immediately the hard feeling that resulted, but the new direction that French foreign policy assumed under his guidance, made Fashoda the last of the incidents that endangered Franco-British relations.

We have already seen that so long as Bismarck remained in power, France was isolated and impotent. The domination of the Triple Alliance, and the friendly connections which Bismarck maintained with Great Britain and Russia, prevented her from reclaiming the position in European councils that she had lost in 1871. Even the disgrace of Bismarck and the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1891 had not given France an opportunity for adopting a policy of initiative and independence. Russia soon made it plain that the alliance was, on her side at least, intended merely to preserve the status quo. The German Kaiser and diplomats had also robbed it of political weight, partly by their successful conciliation of French and Russian sympathy, partly by directing the attention of each nation to distant colonial ventures. France thus found that her ally was devoting all her energies to Far Eastern interests, and that she herself was continually involved in quarrels with Italy and Great Britain. Germany, by following Bismarck's policy of embittering the feeling between France and Great Britain, and France and Italy, on every occasion, successfully kept the victim of 1871 in diplomatic leading-strings.[1]

[1] Millet, *Politique Extérieure, 1898-1905*, 227; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 25, sq.; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 12-25.

So long as Gabriel Hanotaux guided the foreign policy of France, Germany was able to carry out the Bismarckian idea. His acquiescence in the Far Eastern schemes suggested to Russia by the diplomats of the Wilhelmstrasse practically nullified the value of the Dual Alliance; his hostility towards England, combined with Lord Salisbury's German tendencies, put the game in Germany's hands. But with the advent of Théophile Delcassé in June, 1898, the foreign relations of France were entrusted to a statesman of remarkable insight, who realized clearly the factors responsible for French impotence in foreign affairs, and who believed that he saw the means by which French foreign policy might be regenerated.

Delcassé aimed above everything else at two lines of action: French expansive energy should be concentrated in her natural field of influence, the Western Mediterranean; and French diplomatic independence of action should be established by a reconciliation with Italy and Great Britain. By many he was branded as a dangerous reviver of the "revanche" policy, certain to embroil his country with the Kaiser and bring about a conflict that must result in new prostration for France and new strength for Germany. Others, constantly increasing in numbers, approved his plans as the sole means of breaking down the hegemony of Germany and restoring the European balance.[2]

Whatever one might think of his policy, no one could deny Delcassé's unconquerable will, the lucidity of his insight, and the charm of his personality. His

[2] Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 97-110, 128-152 (unsympathetic); Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, 52, sq.; Jaray, *La Politique franco-anglaise*, 153; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 126-128.

meteoric career gave proof of his qualities. He had come to Paris from the South, poor and without friends, but equipped with a facile pen and a marvellous capacity for making foreign affairs intelligible to the man in the street. Entering the Chamber of Deputies at the age of thirty-seven, his assiduous study of colonial matters marked him out for the post of Colonial Secretary, which he received in 1894. Four years later, at the time of the most serious crisis of the decade, he entered the Quai d'Orsay as Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post which he was to hold continuously during the next seven years.

His road had not been easy. Insignificant in appearance, deprived of the physical proportions which count for much in French politics, with a thin voice so often fatal to a speaker in the Chamber of Deputies, lacking the gift of improvisation, he had to prepare his speeches with the utmost care and forethought, often only to see them utterly drowned in the tumult of the session. But his energy and tenacity in party politics were as notable as his brilliance in the handling of foreign affairs. In less than a decade from the time he had entered the Chamber he had won the authority which comes to most only after a long struggle. Similar to Thiers in person, manners, and clarity of method, he was now to exercise as definite an effect upon French history as did the first President of the Republic.[3] Without hesitation he proceeded to carry out the diplomatic revolution: first by completing the understanding with Italy; next by inaugurating political friendship with Great Britain.

Previous to 1896 the reconciliation of France with Italy seemed to be excluded from the realm of political

[3] Albin, *Le Coup d'Agadir*, 23.

possibilities. From 1878 to 1896 the predominant figure among Italian statesmen was Crispi, who was filled with an ardent hatred of France, regarding that Power as the friend of the Pope, and therefore Italy's worst enemy; he "scented the Vatican in every breeze from the Riviera."[4] Crispi was also susceptible to Bismarckian influence, whenever the Chancellor chose to exert it, and Bismarck took care that Italy should be encouraged in her dreams of colonial expansion, which were bound to bring her into conflict with France. In 1882, Italy acquired a port on the Abyssinian coast, and three years later began to develop the colony of Eritrea. French colonial influence in West Africa seemed to be threatened thereby and French jealousy was immediately aroused.

The relations between the two countries were not improved when Italy repudiated her commercial treaty with France and began a tariff war. A series of unfortunate incidents accentuated the animosity: in 1886 Italian workmen in the south of France were maltreated; in 1887 the Florentine police, supported by Crispi, broke open the French archives; in the following year there was a quarrel over the status of French citizens in Massowah, and in 1888 the rumor was current that the French fleet was on the point of attacking the Italian coast.[5] In 1891 a Frenchman wrote *Vive le Pape* in the book lying near the tomb of Victor Emmanuel, in the Pantheon, with the result that feeling against France rose to an unprecedented degree of warmth. In the same year, when Italy renewed the Triple Alliance, she pledged herself in

[4] Feiling, *Italian Policy since 1870*, 6.

[5] *Annual Register, 1888*, 243, 258, 259, 262; Reventlow, *op. cit.*, 17.

case of German demand, to send two army corps through the Tyrol to attack France.[6]

With the fall of Bismarck in 1891 the diplomatic tension was slightly relaxed and the chance of preserving a peace which seemed so fragile, became greater. A monument to Garibaldi was inaugurated at Nice, a French fleet visited Genoa in 1892, and in 1895 a statue of MacMahon was unveiled at Magenta. Most important of all was the failure of Crispi's colonial schemes and the end of that policy of adventure which had irritated France. On March 1, 1896, the Italian army sent to penetrate into Abyssinia, was annihilated at Adowa by the Abyssinian Emperor Menelek, and Italy was forced to abandon the protectorate she had claimed. Crispi's career was doomed and he immediately resigned.[7]

The fall of the aggressive anti-French statesman and tool of Bismarck opened the door for a reconciliation with France. Such a reconciliation was endorsed by public opinion in Italy as well as by all the commercial interests. Italy, by her pro-German policy had gained only doubtful advantages. She had sacrificed her dream of winning the Trentino and Trieste and was forced to limit her ambitions in Albania, out of deference to the wishes of Austria. She had exposed herself to the danger of a continental war and had not received guarantees from Germany against a naval war, nor had she strengthened her position in the Mediterranean. The economic consequences of the break with France were nothing less than disastrous to Italy's young industries. The

[6] Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, 100.

[7] Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, 382-383; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 86-87.

repudiation of the French commercial treaty had, within a space of two years, diminished trade to a ruinous extent; Italian exports to France decreased by 61 per cent; and in a single year French capitalists withdrew seven hundred million francs from Italian industrial enterprises.[8]

Thus economic circumstances, as well as the disappearance of Bismarck and Crispi, facilitated a settlement of the Franco-Italian quarrel. Even before Delcassé's accession to office, conditions were ripe for his plan of an understanding between the two countries, and a manifestation of Italian willingness was given in September, 1896, when Italy accepted a revision of the Tunisian treaties, implying a recognition on her part of the French protectorate in Tunis. Immediately after entering the Quai d'Orsay, Delcassé began further negotiations, and in November, 1898, carried out the first step in his policy by arranging a treaty of commerce with Italy.[9]

So great were the immediate advantages of this treaty, especially to Italy, which, according to her own writers, was thereby saved from economic ruin, that the Franco-Italian rapprochement might safely have rested upon a purely commercial basis. Italy would have gained from it the economic benefit she was seeking, while France would have secured the political advantages she hoped to find in friendship with Italy. But Delcassé was anxious to give the understanding a rather more definite political character, and with this in mind he entered into diplomatic negotiations with Rome. In 1900, 1901, and 1902, by the exchange of notes and in verbal conversations, the political

[8] Reventlow, *op. cit.*, 53-54.
[9] Feiling, *op. cit.*, 9.

understanding was completed. France promised to refrain from any interference with Tripoli, in which quarter Italy was to have free hand; and Italy in return gave France the assurance that she would do nothing that might hamper French policy in Morocco. It was furthermore understood that the character of the Triple Alliance, so far as Italy was concerned, was entirely defensive; and that in no case could Italy become "either the instrument or the auxiliary of an aggression" against France.[10]

The understanding with Italy marked an important step towards the fulfilment of Delcassé's double purpose; it was essential to the security of French power in the Western Mediterranean, and it helped to restore the independence of French diplomatic action in Europe. Morocco is contiguous to Algeria and the stability of the French régime in the latter quarter could not be guaranteed if Morocco fell into the hands of a hostile Power, or if France were not allowed to develop her interests there. Both for the preservation and the extension of her Mediterranean influence, France must have a free hand in Morocco. By winning the assent of Italy to her proposed expansion westwards on the African seaboard, France averted all difficulty that might have arisen with her chief Mediterranean rival. The rapprochement with Italy also facilitated the future autonomy of French diplomacy by blunting the edge of the Triple Alliance. The feud between the two nations, which was so long a characteristic feature of the international situation, had been one of the chief factors of French weakness

[10] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 88-91; on Italian schemes in North Africa, see Bérard, *l'Affaire marocaine*, 61; *Journal des Débats*, December 30, 1905; Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 128-139.

and German strength. The intensity of Italian feeling against France was the club that Germany held over her conquered rival; with its disappearance the diplomatic hegemony of Germany was no longer secure.

The second phase of Delcassé's policy was accomplished with equal success and with results of even greater importance. His plan of freeing France from German influence and of strengthening the French position in the Mediterranean was assisted in the highest degree by the second reconciliation that he effected, and which resulted in the Anglo-French Entente of April 8, 1904. Except for this rapprochement with England, the stability and value of the Franco-Italian understanding would have been questionable; French expansion in Morocco would have been difficult if not impossible; and Germany's domination on the Continent would not have been broken.

As in the case of the Franco-Italian understanding, the personalities of the leading diplomats were of great importance in determining the Anglo-French reconciliation. So long as men like Hanotaux and Salisbury were in office, such a reconciliation was out of the question; only with the entrance of new figures upon the diplomatic stage could the settlement of the ancient feud be attempted. Delcassé's accession to power in 1898 may be regarded as the first step in the formation of the Entente. Even in the midst of the Fashoda crisis, he attempted to appease the general hostility of French feeling towards Great Britain, believing firmly that France must win British friendship if she were to regain a position of influence in Europe. "I should be sorry to leave office," said he, in November, 1898, "before I had established a

good understanding with England.'"[11] He saw in England a "potential ally, in Germany the only enemy.'"[12] And the new French Ambassador to St. James, M. Cambon, left for his post with similar intentions.

On the other side of the Channel new personalities were coming into control of diplomatic policy, who were less closely bound by the traditions of the British Foreign Office. In October, 1900, Lord Salisbury ceased to be Foreign Secretary; for half a generation, with the exception of one brief interval, he had conducted British foreign relations on the principle that France was Great Britain's natural enemy, and he had concentrated his energies on British expansion in Africa at the expense of France; invariably he had worked to affirm the understanding between Great Britain and Germany. Salisbury was succeeded by Lansdowne, who although he was no enemy of Germany, soon showed himself anxious to restore the European balance and end the diplomatic situation which Germany had long exploited.

Only three months later Queen Victoria, who was noted for her German tendencies and her inability to understand the French, was succeeded by Edward VII. England was fortunate in her new ruler. Already past middle age when he mounted the throne, he showed immediately that the long years during which his mother had kept him at arm's length from political affairs, had by no means been wasted. Although he was allowed access to State papers only during the years that immediately preceded the

[11] Bérard, in *Revue de Paris,* July 1, 1905, and *France et Guillaume II,* 21.

[12] Rose, *The Origins of the War,* 69.

Queen's death, it was clear that he had made the most of his opportunities, for he displayed an ability to grasp international questions worthy of an experienced diplomat.[13]

Furthermore the time spent by him in apparently frivolous occupations had brought him into touch with men of all classes and shades of opinion. He had acquired a broad and, with the help of his extraordinary memory, a singularly accurate knowledge of trade, finance, and politics. His natural magnetism and geniality had not withered under the stress of his wearisome social duties; rather had it developed until there were few who could resist the charm of his personality. That England should have possessed a sovereign of such a type at the moment when her interests pointed to a reconciliation with two traditional enemies, is an instance of the special providence that seems to watch over the British Empire.

The new monarch, at first under the influence of his imperial nephew of Germany, was not slow to realize the advantages that England would draw from a close understanding with France, and the dangers that would result from a continuation of the quarrel at the time when Germany was looking forward to world empire. Desirous of effecting a reconciliation, and bringing to his task qualities of the highest value, the impression which his personality produced in France proved to be one of the chief factors in his success. Well liked across the Channel and understanding the French people, "he did that which no Minister, no Cabinet, no Ambassadors, neither treaties, nor protocols, nor understandings, which no debates,

[13] Cf. Lord Redesdale, *Memoirs, passim.* Sidney Lee in his article in the *Dictionary of National Biography* is less appreciative.

no banquets, nor speeches, were able to perform. He, by his personality alone, brought home to the minds of millions on the Continent . . . the friendly feelings of the country over which King Edward ruled.'"[14]

The new diplomats on both sides of the Channel thus desired an understanding. They were warmly supported by the commercial interests. England was France's most valued customer, capable of appreciating the French articles of luxury and, with her capital, capable of paying for them. The exports of French production competed only to the smallest degree with those made in England. But owing to the political relations between the two countries commerce had not developed to its natural limits, and French traders believed that the establishment of more friendly political connections would materially assist the extension of their export trade. In London, the commercial classes considered that friendship with France would be the best means of meeting the German competition, the effects of which were plainly discernible. In 1901 and the following years influential traders began a campaign with the purpose of ameliorating the relations of the two countries. Barclay travelled through France and meeting the various Chambers of Commerce brought them to the point of vigorous advocacy of an economic entente. And in England, the Associated Chambers of British Commerce passed a resolution favoring a Franco-British treaty of arbitration.[15]

But the real explanation of the Entente of 1904 is to be found less in the friendly spirit of the diplomats

[14] Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons, May 11, 1910.

[15] Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminiscences*, 175-229.

and the material interests of the commercial classes, than in the fear of Germany which seized the British people at the beginning of the twentieth century. The economic transformation of Germany which led to the building up of her mercantile marine and overseas trade was an ever-increasing cause of anxiety to the British commercial classes. German commerce, as we saw, doubled in value during the decade following 1895. Consular reports emphasized the success of the Germans in winning markets, and expatiated upon their superiority over the British in technical education and in methods of salesmanship. Every year came word of British ports declining in importance as a result of German initiative, of the growth of German ship-yards and docks, of mercantile companies purchased by the Germans from the British, and of the displacement of the British flag by the German in the seas of China and the Levant. Even in London City, Cockneys were being replaced by German clerks, who furnished greater efficiency at a lower wage.[16]

At the same time the British watched with consternation the development of the German naval plan. The first scheme of 1898, in itself sufficiently disquieting to Great Britain, was speedily judged by the Germans to be inadequate and was complemented by the programme of 1900, which was clearly designed to render Germany capable of coping alone with any adversary upon the sea. The cousin land-rat of Bismarck's day was learning to swim and was turning water-rat. With a clarity that was as unmistakable as it was unpleasant, Great Britain began to perceive that the danger of the future was likely to proceed not

[16] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 86, sq.; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 54-60.

from France or Russia, but from the empire founded by Bismarck, which was now passing beyond the scope of Bismarck's dreams.

As early as 1897 a bitter article in the *Saturday Review* dilated upon the danger that must threaten Great Britain if Germany were allowed to proceed upon her path of expansion unchecked. "England," the writer says, "with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but perhaps with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever—and where has it not?—the flag has followed the Bible, and trade has followed the flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished tomorrow, the day after tomorrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession. Must they not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of commerce?"

The article does not stop with pointing out the conflict that existed between German and British interests but goes on to show that England could make

war upon Germany with every prospect of success. "Her partners in the Triple Alliance would be useless against England; Austria because she could do nothing; Italy because she dare not lay herself open to an attack by France. The growth of Germany's fleet has done no more than to make the blow of England fall on her more heavily. A few days and her ships would be at the bottom, or in convoy to English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and her Baltic ports would lie under the guns of England waiting until the indemnity were settled. Our work over we need not even be at the pains to alter Bismarck's words to Ferry and to say to France and Russia, 'Seek some compensation. Take inside Germany whatever you like. You can have it.' "[17]

Here is a spirit no less fiery and belligerent than that of Bernhardi a decade later, although it is safe to say that it represented the feeling of the mass of the nation far less accurately than did the German soldier. But if such sentiments were held by only a small minority in 1897 the German naval programme of the next years converted many to the creed of the writer. And if few spoke out so plainly it was because the reality of the peril was so clearly recognized that plain speaking could no longer safely be indulged in.

Nor were British fears alleviated by the moral transformation that was taking place in Germany, which demonstrated to the more clear-sighted in England that the menace was not merely of an economic character. Germany's dreams of world policy, of extending her political as well as her commercial empire throughout the world, could not but disturb

[17] *Saturday Review*, September 11, 1897.

British imperialists. The rather indefinite schemes for the acquisition of colonies, the beginning of the Bagdad Railway, the money spent upon fortifications at Kiau Chau, seemed to Great Britain to indicate a carefully conceived plan of expansion on Germany's part. The belligerent and defiant attitude of Germans, which we have noticed, increased British nervousness. Little by little the conception of a German imperialism making use of German continental hegemony to raise a European league against England and destroy her colonial dominion, became current. To the British, the future seemed to be fraught with another struggle like those they had formerly waged against Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. They remembered the words of Chatham, "Our first duty is to see that France does not become a naval, commercial, and colonial Power," and they applied them to Germany.

Under these conditions a continuation of the understanding with Germany which had seemed so solid in 1899, was clearly impossible. As we have seen, British policy has followed invariably a single principle, the security of her colonial and maritime empire, and in the first years of the new century British diplomats remained true to this principle. So long as Germany remained a land Power they could afford to be indifferent to German diplomatic hegemony on the Continent. But with Germany menacing their maritime empire, it was imperative that the continental balance of power should be restored. The obvious method of restoration was an understanding with France. Splendid isolation was no longer even dignified, and it threatened to become perilous in the extreme.

To Edward VII must go much of the credit for the

successful termination of England's ancient quarrel with France. The efforts of the diplomats were greatly facilitated, it is true, by the eagerness of the commercial interests as well as by the new friendship of France and Italy; but it was the King who paved the way for serious negotiations by his visit to Paris. With Fashoda only five years away and the attitude of the Parisians by no means certain, Edward VII risked no little when he tested French sentiments in 1903; he was at first received unenthusiastically, but immediately awoke in Paris and in all France the warm and kindly feelings for the genial monarch that have ever since persisted. With the return visit of M. Loubet, definite conversations became possible. Negotiations lasted eight months, and on April 8, 1904, the agreement was signed.[18]

The arrangement, which came to be known as the Entente Cordiale, settled once and for all the conflicts which had arisen between England and France as a result of their policies of expansion. Of these, the most serious had related to Africa and especially to the position of the British in Egypt and the possible development of French schemes in Morocco. In each quarter the nation chiefly interested was granted a free hand by the other. France recognized the British position in Egypt and promised not to thwart the British Government by asking that a date should be set for the British occupation to cease. In return, Great Britain recognized the special interests of France in Morocco, promising that she would do nothing to hamper her liberty of action in carrying out necessary reforms. The two signatories further

[18] Barclay, *op. cit.*, 230-236.

agreed to lend each other mutual help diplomatically for the execution of the clauses of the declaration.[19]

The direct effects of the Entente Cordiale are obvious. For France it completed the second phase in Delcassé's policy. In return for her recognition of the British position in Egypt, which was no more than an acknowledgment of actual facts, France received the necessary guarantee of the development of her Western Mediterranean policy. Delcassé, by narrowing the scope of French colonial activities and surrendering claims which could be enforced only with the greatest difficulty, cleared the path for French control in Morocco, and increased the chance of sovereignty in her natural sphere of influence. The position of France in Morocco was further assured a few months after the Anglo-French Convention, by an understanding with Spain (September, 1904), according to which the spheres of influence of each nation in Northern Africa were delimited.[20] Taken in conjunction with this Spanish understanding and the earlier convention with Italy, the Anglo-French Entente apparently gave to Delcassé the full liberty of action in the Western Mediterranean for which he had been striving since his accession to office.

But the Entente Cordiale had a wider significance for both France and Great Britain than lay in the settlement of African questions. It was a general arrangement of the national quarrel which had long been considered an axiom of international diplomacy;

[19] The terms of the convention are printed in Price, *Diplomatic History of the War*, 274. On Europe and Morocco see Pinon, *L'Empire de la Méditerranée*. On the bearing of the convention as it affected African questions, see Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, ii, 388-396.

[20] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 95-106; the terms of the Convention are printed in Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 286, 291.

it destroyed the tension between the two countries which had been the "postulate of European policy, the favorite instrument of the policy of Germany. By putting an end to this state of things, the Cabinets of London and Paris introduced a new weight into the international balance of power. They mutually freed themselves from preoccupations that had long been a burden; and they guaranteed each other a liberty of action which was equally precious to both."[21]

Delcassé thus won for France a diplomatic autonomy which the alliance with Russia had not given her. Her feuds with Italy and England ended, she could hope to escape from the diplomatic domination that first Bismarck and then William II had imposed upon her, and which French ministers such as Hanotaux had accepted. Henceforth she might hope to transform her policy from one of passivity and impotence to one of initiative. For Great Britain, oppressed by the fear of Germany, the liberation of France was of the utmost advantage, because it lessened the chances of success in what was believed to be the great German "design." So long as Germany held the hegemony of the Continent there was always possible the creation of a continental league against the British Empire, which would revive the perils of the Napoleonic age. The Entente with France, as a step in the restoration of the continental balance and the breaking down of German primacy, offered the best defence of Britain's maritime empire against the German menace.

One factor in the European situation, however, continued to maintain Germany's position of supremacy on the Continent after the conclusion of the Anglo-

[21] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 66.

French understanding, namely, the mutual antagonism of Great Britain and Russia. So long as these two nations were on bad terms, little practical effect could be expected from England's new friendship with France, a nation which was at the same time the ally of Russia. We have seen how the interests of Russia and Great Britain conflicted in the Near and Central East, and how the danger of an open break became acute during the years of Russia's aggression in Manchuria and China. But as in the case of Franco-British relations, the tension was greatest immediately before it relaxed entirely.

Curiously enough, the defeat of Russia by Japan on the plains of Manchuria did much to render a reconciliation possible. Great Britain had no intention of allowing Japan to dominate the Pacific, and after 1905 was willing to make friends with Russia, who might be found useful as a counterweight against an ally that was too strong; it was to Great Britain's obvious interest that neither Japan nor Russia should secure a position of control in the Far East, and if Russia could be brought to an understanding with herself and Japan, a safe balance might be struck.

In the Near East the causes of Anglo-Russian hostility were also disappearing. With the development of Germany's world policy and the beginning of the Bagdad Railway, British statesmen perceived that Teutonic control in the Balkans and on the Dardanelles threatened India and the route to India far more seriously than did the aspirations of Russia; and they believed that an essential condition of defence against German development in the Near East and Mesopotamia was an understanding between Great Britain and Russia. Thus of the three quarters where

Anglo-Russian rivalry had been acute, there remained only one, the Central East, in which possible cause for conflict might arise in the future. In 1907 a convention between the two nations settled disputes relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and established an understanding which was destined to keep the general policies of the countries in harmony.

The sudden and surprising reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia was chiefly facilitated by the attitude of each nation towards Germany. Great Britain was consumed with fear of the economic development of that nation and believed herself threatened directly by its world policy; the same factors that had led to her reconciliation with France made for an understanding with Russia. Russia, on the other hand, after seeing her dream of Far Eastern domination shattered, was not grateful to Germany, who was largely responsible for the aggressive policy of Russia in China and Manchuria. Furthermore, the activity of Russia, checked in the Far East, must inevitably be turned towards the Balkans and Constantinople, and in this quarter Russian ambitions conflicted with Germany's purpose of controlling a sweep of territory extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. It was unthinkable that the interests of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism should not clash in the Near East.

The settlement of the Anglo-Russian feud was also facilitated by the example of the Entente Cordiale, which demonstrated the ease with which a long-standing and bitter rivalry might be terminated. The arrangement of the dispute which had arisen between England and Russia over the Dogger Bank incident, further proved that there was no serious

reason why the two nations should not proceed to a general settlement of their differences.

Almost immediately after the conclusion of the Japanese War the press of both countries assumed a cordial tone and the new Foreign Ministers, Sir Edward Grey in England and Isvolsky in Russia, demonstrated their firm determination to bring about an understanding.[22] For the discussion of bases of agreement the Conference of Algeciras, in 1906, furnished an excellent opportunity, and the Russian and British plenipotentiaries held long conversations, which served materially to clear the ground for definite negotiations.[23] In March, 1907, a semi-official note announced the carrying on of negotiations by the two Governments and the prospect of speedy success. Finally, on August 31, 1907, the convention was signed.[24]

It dealt with the one quarter in which the interests of the two nations might conceivably clash, Central Asia. Persia, into which Russian influence had steadily penetrated during the previous decade, was divided into three zones of influence: a British one to the southeast, a Russian to the north, and a sort of neutral zone between. Arrangements were also made to provide for financial reform and control in Persia, in which the British and Russian Governments were to act together. In Afghanistan, the preponderant influence of Great Britain was recognized, and Russia gave up her right of sending diplomatic agents to Cabul. Great Britain was to maintain commercial

[22] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 239-240.

[23] Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras*, 284.

[24] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 288-296; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 242-253.

liberty and the political status quo. Both nations recognized the territorial integrity of Thibet and the suzerainty of China over that province, and agreed not to interfere with the domestic concerns of Thibet or attempt to secure special concessions.

The Anglo-Russian understanding of 1907 was important as providing a *modus vivendi* for Great Britain and Russia in the Central East, which had long been a breeder of trouble. It was still more important as a general settlement of the ancient quarrel between the two countries, and, regarded as a complement to the Anglo-French Entente, forms the final phase of the diplomatic revolution. Taken in conjunction with the conventions signed in June and July, 1907, between France and Japan, and Russia and Japan, respectively, it made an essential part of a system of arrangements which tended to remove all risk of complications arising from an Asiatic conflict. It was fortified a few months later by the understanding reached by England and Russia in 1908 relative to Near Eastern affairs.[25] The three Powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, were thus united in an entente of less solidity than a hard and fast alliance, but possibly of equal diplomatic value. France and Russia were bound by the Dual Alliance of 1891; France and Great Britain by the Entente of 1904; Great Britain and Russia by the Convention of 1907. The permanent character of the Triple Entente that resulted, was enhanced by the understanding reached in 1907 between the ally of Great Britain, Japan, and France and Russia.[26]

[25] Pinon, *L'Europe et l'Empire Ottoman*, 183.

[26] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 304; Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 230-237.

The international situation in 1907 was thus far different from that of 1898, when Delcassé entered the French Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In that year Germany still held the position of primacy in continental diplomacy which had been won by Bismarck and maintained by William II. France and Russia had allowed themselves to undergo the domination of German influence to such an extent that the effect of their Dual Alliance was practically nullified. In response to German suggestions France had apparently forgotten the gap in the Vosges and was busily devoting herself to extra-European interests; she was paralyzed by her rivalry with Great Britain. Russia had been quietly directed to the East where she was working hand in hand with Germany. England so far as her relations with continental nations extended was on the worst possible terms with both France and Russia; with Germany she was on the best of terms, British statesmen were talking of an Anglo-German alliance, and in the British Foreign Secretary Germany saw her best friend. "There was left for Germany the simple task of sitting peacefully on her bulging coffers, while her merchants captured the trade of England and her diplomatists guided the diplomatists of England into perpetual bickerings with other countries."[27]

In 1907 it seemed like a different Europe. For the scene had changed abruptly from that moment in 1898 when the tension between France and Great Britain had been so great that it seemed as if it could no longer last without a war. The appearance of Delcassé and the foresight of British statesmen had ruined the position of Germany. For a moment, in 1898, France

[27] *Saturday Review*, September 11, 1897.

and England had stood "silent and face to face, blinking in the new light that illuminated the dread cross-roads of Fashoda and Ladysmith. Simultaneously they saw the sardonic grin and heard the triumphant chuckle of Germany. France and England were face to face like birds in a cock pit, while Europe, under German leadership, was fastening their spurs and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They had decided not to fight and the face of European things was changed."[28]

France by the settlement of her traditional quarrel with Great Britain, coming after the reconciliation with Italy, had taken a long step towards emancipating herself from German influence. Russia, having tasted the perils of the East, had begun once again to direct her attention to European problems; it was certain, in view of the necessary rivalry with Austria, that she should oppose the ally of Austria. Most important of all, Great Britain had frankly entered the field of continental diplomacy and on the side opposed to Germany. She had sunk her differences with France and Russia, and had formed a diplomatic combination with them which seemed likely to prove a factor of the utmost importance in the future.

It is true that the various conventions that settled so many national quarrels were not aimed directly against Germany, although the fear of German domination had unquestionably played an important part in the conclusion of the understandings. But if they were not designed to isolate Germany and could not be said to manifest openly hostile intentions, they restored the balance of power that had been

[28] Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, 56-57.

destroyed by the Treaty of Frankfort and the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. Germany could no longer dominate Europe by means of the diplomatic feuds that had existed between Italy and France, France and Great Britain, and Great Britain and Russia. The Bismarckian system had passed and the European equilibrium was restored. It remained to be seen whether or not Germany would accept the new international situation that resulted from the diplomatic revolution.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES

The effect upon German foreign policy of the diplomatic combinations and understandings that took place from 1898 to 1907 was immediate and violent. It was inevitable that the retirement of Great Britain from her position of splendid isolation so favorable to the German position on the Continent, should be a cause of anxiety at Berlin. It is true that the British understanding with France was at first not taken too seriously, but it indicated future difficulties for the German Foreign Office; and the Convention of 1907 with Russia placed further obstacles in the path of German diplomacy. Equally significant, in the minds of Germans, as a sign of the growing opposition to Germany was the new spirit of initiative manifested in French diplomacy. The altered international situation, suddenly realized by Germany, led that Power to change its tone from one of conciliation to one of bellicose brutality, and resulted in the atmosphere of diplomatic tension characteristic of Europe during the past decade.

We may remind ourselves that German foreign policy from 1870 to 1900 was essentially pacific in character. Bismarck was undoubtedly sincere when he emphasized the "satiation" of Germany and the necessity for her of a period of unruffled international calm. The Kaiser Wilhelm II also, despite his

unguarded statements that seemed to indicate an aggressive spirit, worked constantly for peace. Peace was necessary for the economic development of Germany, for the extension of German commerce, and for the unhampered building up of the navy that was to assure to Germany her position in the world at large. Nor did the aggressive attitude that began to be characteristic of the German people, find, previous to 1904, a reflection in Germany's official diplomatic tone. But in the minds of both Bismarck and the Kaiser there was another condition of still greater importance for Germany than peace, namely, that German prestige on the Continent, first secured by the victory of 1870, should be constantly maintained. This was always the great preoccupation of the Kaiser, and was regarded by him and by his ministers as the *sine qua non* of Germany's further development as a world power.

Until 1900 German prestige was successfully maintained. Largely by methods of moral suasion in dealing with France and Russia, Germany retained her hegemony on the Continent and preserved intact the position that Bismarck had bequeathed to the Kaiser. The German eagle could afford to pose as the dove of peace: there was no need for threats or violence, since the rest of Europe complaisantly accepted her sway.

But the opening years of the twentieth century forced Germany to the conclusion that a continuation of her pacific policy was impossible. One of the most important factors in the German position of supremacy was the incapacity of France to practice or even conceive a policy of action. The principle of French passivity seemed to Germans the surest guarantee of German continental power, especially when taken in

conjunction with the Anglo-French feud. So long as Germany could count upon British friendship towards herself and hatred towards France, and thus upon French weakness, her position was ensured. But the Entente Cordiale of 1904 proved not only that Great Britain was coming to regard Germany as a Power that must be watched, but also that France was assuming a new attitude and one that could not fail to arouse the fears of the Kaiser. The understanding with Great Britain seemed in itself like a claim on the part of France to independence of action such as Germany could not tolerate; and it appeared the more dangerous as being but one of many indications that France was conceiving a policy of initiative. In quick succession France had come to an understanding, first with Italy, then with Great Britain, then with Spain; and each of these Powers had guaranteed the new French policy of colonial development.

There was naturally something disquieting to Germany in these conventions concluded between other nations, delimiting colonial interests at the very moment when Germany herself was indulging in dreams of empire overseas. But the uneasiness of the German diplomats was at bottom caused by the fear that German control of continental diplomacy was vanishing. Europe was organizing herself without the permission of the Kaiser, perhaps against him. France, so long passive, was beginning to assume diplomatic autonomy, weakening the practical force of the Triple Alliance by her understanding with Italy, threatening to become formidable by her combination with England. Germany was suddenly seized with the nightmare that Europe was escaping from her grasp; it was time to strike a blow for German prestige,

to show the world that no affair could proceed without Germany's participation and seal of approval. The diplomatic control she had so long exercised by moral suasion must be maintained by more active measures if necessary. The German eagle that had so long posed as the dove of peace must ruffle its feathers and unsheathe its talons.

The necessity of preserving German prestige by all effective means was recognized by even the firmest adherents to the cause of peace. For without the firm basis of German hegemony on the Continent, the projected world empire, even if it became a Colossus, would have "feet of clay." Von Bülow, who is by no means a fire-eater, emphasized this point: "Our world policy is based upon the successes of our European policy. The moment the firm foundation constituted by Germany's position as a great European Power begins to totter the whole fabric of our world policy will collapse . . . it is unthinkable that a sensible diminution of power and influence in Europe would leave our position in international politics unshaken. We can only pursue our world policy on the basis of our European policy . . . The new era must be rooted in the traditions of the old."[1]

It is this principle that to a large extent determined the threatening and bellicose tone of German diplomacy during the years that followed the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. Germany was consumed with the

[1] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 48. Tardieu points out (*Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère*, 1911, 70-71) that in the eight hundred public speeches of the Kaiser there is always to be found the same idea: that Germany must preserve the material and moral position acquired in 1871. "We would sacrifice our eighteen army corps," said the Kaiser in 1888, "and our forty-two millions of inhabitants rather than let one stone fall of the edifice raised by William I."

fear that her position on the Continent was being shaken by the new combinations; she was unalterably convinced of the necessity of maintaining that position. Three distinct blows were struck for the maintenance of German prestige, and at intervals of three years. The first was in 1905 in Morocco. The second was in 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The third was in 1911 when the gunboat *Panther* was sent to Agadir on the African coast. It was a similar attempt to strike a blow for German prestige, after another interval of three years in 1914, that was largely accountable for the outbreak of the general war. In each of the crises that resulted, the colonial and commercial interests of Germany played an important part in determining her action; the vital motive, however, was her desire to reinforce her prestige at all costs. The crises were *Machtfragen*—trials of strength—to decide whether or not Germany was to maintain her position of continental dictatorship.

It was becoming clear early in 1904 that Germany was meditating some *coup de force* that would enable her to assert her authority and put an end to the new French policy of initiative, at the same time that it demonstrated the hollowness of the new friendships of France. It is true that German diplomats rather ostentatiously proclaimed their indifference to the establishment of the Anglo-French Entente and to the French policy of expansion in Morocco.[2] But it was possible to deduce from the language of the Kaiser

[2] Von Bülow had taken the Franco-Italian reconciliation lightly: "We have no gable front on the Mediterranean; we are pleased to see that France and Italy, who each have important interests there, have come to an understanding on the question." On April 4, 1904, commenting on the Entente Cordiale, he said: "We have nothing to object to in it from the point of view of German interests." The

that these developments were producing a profound discontent at Berlin. Three weeks after the conclusion of the Franco-English Accord the Kaiser, speaking at Karlsruhe said: "Let us think of the great epoch when German unity was created, of the combats of Woerth, Weissenberg, and Sedan. Present events invite us to forget our domestic discords. Let us be united in preparation for the occasion when we may be constrained to intervene in the policy of the world." And three days later, when dedicating a bridge at Mainz, and when no military allusion was apt to the occasion, he said: "This bridge, designed to develop pacific relations, may have to serve for more serious purposes." Such language was far removed from the tone used by the Kaiser only some few months previously, when he "rendered homage to the adversaries of 1871."[3]

For ten months, however, his menacing words were not translated into action. The moment was favorable for the striking of a blow so far as France was concerned, for the Combes Ministry seemed to be at the mercy of socialists and pacifists; and as Germany well knew, Delcassé in his development of an active colonial policy had not seen to it that the military and naval resources so necessary to such a policy, were equally developed. France was in no position to resist any strong demand made by Germany. From England, little was to be feared; the Conservatives had been losing steadily at every bye-election and the advent

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (semi-official) said on March 25: "There is no need, so far as Germans are concerned, to take umbrage at the Franco-English understanding which is at present in force," French *Yellow Book*, "Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905."

[3] Tardieu, "La Politique Extérieure de l'Allemagne," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère*, 1911, 85.

of the Liberals was already foreshadowed. Germany did not believe that France would receive effective assistance from such men as Campbell-Bannerman and Lloyd George. But before acting, Germany must be sure of the position of Russia, France's ally. The war with Japan was still indecisive in the spring of 1904, and Germany must wait until the exact situation defined itself. In September the Russian armies underwent their first check at Liao-Yang, and in March, 1905, they were definitely crushed at Mukden. It was the moment for Germany to act.

The blow was struck in Morocco, on March 31, 1905, when the Kaiser disembarked at Tangier and declared himself ready to support the Sultan in the maintenance of his complete independence. In language that hardly veiled a threat he referred to the efforts of the French to secure a monopoly and to their hopes of annexation; he insisted that their policy must be blocked.[4] It was a declaration of diplomatic war, for the acceptance of Germany's veto on French expansion in Morocco meant the crumbling of Delcassé's whole policy, the renunciation of the new French attitude of diplomatic independence, and the demonstration of the practical uselessness of the Entente Cordiale. As such a declaration rather than as an aspect of a colonial question, the action of the Kaiser was regarded by the more acute minds in both Germany and France.[5]

To give force to the intended humiliation of France,

[4] The Kaiser's speech is printed in Gauss, *The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances*, 242. See also Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 254-265.

[5] Tardieu reports a personal conversation with von Bülow (*France and the Alliances*, 190) in which the German Chancellor made it plain that the Kaiser's Moroccan policy resulted from general diplomatic motives rather than from commercial ambitions: "In the incidents

Germany further insisted upon two points: an international conference was to be called to settle the questions at issue, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was to present his resignation. In other words France must appear before the court of Europe to answer for her actions, a humiliation which later, in 1908 and 1914, Germany declared to be impossible for the national honor of Austria, and Delcassé, the personification of the new French policy, must be dismissed. On the latter point the personal representative of the Kaiser spoke in no uncertain language: "We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person, but his policy is a menace to Germany and you may rest assured that we shall not wait for it to be realized. . . . If you are of opinion that your Minister of Foreign Affairs has engaged your country in too adventurous a course, acknowledge it by dispensing with his services and especially by giving a new direction to your foreign policy. . . . Give up the minister whose only aspiration is to trouble the peace of Europe, and adopt with regard to Germany a loyal and open policy, the only one which is worthy of a great nation like yours, if you wish to preserve the peace of the world."[6]

which have arisen during the past six months or so there are two distinct things to consider. Morocco is the first; general policy is the second. In Morocco we have important commercial interests: we intended and we still intend to safeguard them.

"In a more general way we were obliged to reply to a policy which threatened to isolate us and which in consequence of this avowed aim assumed a distinctly hostile character with regard to us. The Moroccan affair was the most recent and most clearly manifested example of such policy. It furnished us with an opportunity to make a necessary retort (*riposte*)." Cf. also Rachfahl, *Kaiser und Reich*, 233.

[6] Interview given by Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck and published by the *Gaulois*, June, 1905, cited by Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, 183.

The immediate success of Germany was complete, for the French Government yielded everything. Conscious of her military weakness and of the prostration of her ally, Russia, France was in no state to resist. Delcassé left the ministry and the French Government agreed to the calling of an international conference that would take up the whole Moroccan question. The humiliation of France was absolute, and Germany made it plain to the world that her claim to the diplomatic mastery of Europe was no mere academic formula, but as much a reality under William II as in the days of Bismarck.[7]

The victory of Germany, however, was only temporary. When the Conference of Algeciras met, before which Germany had hoped to register the principle that no country could act without German consent, she found that she could by no means impose her absolute will upon the other Powers. During the six months that had elapsed, the international situation had changed essentially. France had spent large sums upon ammunition, equipment, and railways; if pushed too far she was capable of fighting. Russia had signed peace with Japan, and despite the chaotic condition of her finances and domestic politics, was able to bring invaluable diplomatic assistance to France. And England had had time not merely to realize the immensity of the danger that threatened from Germany, but to draw up military plans in case Germany should push the matter to war. Furthermore, it soon became apparent that Italy would not play the rôle of second which Germany had counted upon. Without denying the value of the Triple Alliance to her policy, she soon made it plain that she

[7] Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 152-167.

would not sacrifice her understandings with France and with England at the behest of Germany. Even Austria, although she was later to receive the personal thanks of the German Kaiser for her assistance, adopted at times an independent attitude and by no means played the part of German agent.

The result was that the essential demands of Germany were refused by the Conference of Algeciras and the approval of Europe was practically granted to the French policy of expansion. All the vital interests of France in Morocco were safeguarded by the powers of policing North Africa that were given her in conjunction with Spain. On none of the crucial issues discussed during the Conference, did Germany receive the support of the other Powers.[8]

The effect of the humiliation imposed upon France in 1905 was not entirely effaced by the setback to German policy administered by the Conference of Algeciras in the following year. The striking effect of the German threats was not forgotten and the prestige won by Germany was not entirely dimmed. Nevertheless the real failure of Germany to maintain her success in 1906 was generally recognized by the German press. The Kaiser had brought France before the court of Europe, but he had not succeeded in putting a stop to French expansion; the Entente Cordiale with England had not been dissolved, but had rather acquired weight; "it had changed from the static to the dynamic condition."[9] And by a curious irony, Germany in demanding the Conference

[8] Bérard, *L'Affaire Marocaine;* Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras;* Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,* 265-280; *Annual Register,* 1906, 304.

[9] Tardieu, *France and the Alliances,* 204.

of Algeciras had brought English and Russian representatives together upon a common ground, and thus paved the way for the Anglo-Russian Accord of 1907.[10]

We have already remarked that one of the chief qualities of William II is his capacity for making the best of an unpleasant situation. This self-restraint he exercised admirably during the months that followed the Moroccan crisis. The utmost care was taken to indicate Germany's entire satisfaction with the results of the Conference, and an utter indifference to the understandings into which France had entered. With an almost suspicious vehemence von Bülow disclaimed any idea of attempting to cause a rupture of the newly formed friendship between France and Great Britain.[11] For the moment, French expansion in Morocco, despite the wails of the Pan-Germanists, was regarded with equanimity. All that Germany had striven to demolish in 1905 she proceeded to accept in a spirit of the utmost good-nature.

But it was not to be expected that Germany would definitely accept the check placed upon her diplomatic position. The chief aim of the Kaiser had always been to preserve the situation which Bismarck had bequeathed to him. The new combinations that had

[10] Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras*, 284.

[11] "We have no thought of attempting to separate France and England. We have absolutely no idea of attempting to disturb the friendship of the western Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance has never proved a menace to peace; on the contrary it has acted like a weight which regulated the smooth working of the clock of the world. We hope that the same thing can be said of the Franco-English entente. Cordial relations between Germany and Russia have not in any way disturbed the Franco-Russian alliance; cordial relations between Germany and England are in perfect consonance with the entente, if the latter combination follows pacific purposes," Speech in Reichstag, November 14, 1906.

grown up since 1900 disturbed that situation, and he was not likely to neglect any opportunity of restoring it. Nor was his determination weakened by the Anglo-Russian understanding which, as we saw, was arranged in 1907 and which seemed to indicate more clearly than ever the termination of German diplomatic supremacy. In the Bosnian crisis of 1908 Germany believed that she had the opportunity for which she sought, and once again struck a blow for the rehabilitation of her prestige.

The origin of this crisis dates back to the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It will be remembered that after the Turkish defeats suffered in the war against Russia, the Treaty of San Stefano parcelled out among the Balkan States the greater part of Turkey in Europe. But England and Austria, fearing the predominance of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula, combined to prevent the proposed arrangement from going into effect. The revised treaty, signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878, left a large part of the peninsula in the hands of Turkey and tended to offset the advance of Russian influence in that quarter by granting the administration of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. It also authorized Austrian troops to occupy the district of Novi Bazar, which separates Montenegro from Serbia.[12]

During the generation which followed the Treaty of Berlin, Austria busied herself in reducing the two provinces to order, and worked constantly in the hope of definitely subjecting them to Hapsburg rule. Because of the large number of malcontent Slavs with which the provinces were peopled, the immediate annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not desir-

[12] *Supra*, Chap. II.

able; but they opened a pathway to the Adriatic and it was of importance that they should not be taken over by Serbia nor complete sovereignty be reassumed by Turkey. In view of the nationalist spirit of the Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Serbia, if she should win the provinces, would threaten the peace and integrity of Austria, as well as her political and economic influence in the peninsula. It was essential that Turkey should not resume her rights in Bosnia, for despite the friendship of the Teutonic Powers with the Porte, Turkish policy was not to be entirely trusted.[13]

In 1908 came the Young Turk Revolution, which led Austria to a fateful step. The Young Turks aimed above everything at a regeneration of their country's foreign policy and especially at a strengthening of Turkish power in the Balkans. Austria and Germany favored a strong government at Constantinople, since Turkey was guarding the Dardanelles in their interests. But a Turkey predominant in the whole Balkan Peninsula was undesirable, for it would threaten Austria's road to the Adriatic and Ægean. Furthermore it seemed likely that the Young Turks would not hesitate to demand the termination of Austrian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the provinces legally belonged to Turkey, and if the new Government could prove its capacity, the Porte would have every right again to assume direct administration over them.[14]

Under the circumstances, Austria decided to antici-

[13] Jaray, "La Question d'Autriche-Hongrie," in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère*, 1911, 109-171.

[14] Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie*, 149-193; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 311, sq.

pate any action on the part of Turkey, and determined to tear up the Treaty of Berlin. Without consulting the other signatories of the treaty, the Austrian Government, on October 3, 1908, proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[15] It was the official declaration of Treitschke's doctrine that international treaties need not be considered binding when they conflict with the higher political interests of the State.

Austria's action was directed most obviously against Turkey and at once brought forth a strong protest from the Porte as well as retaliatory measures which culminated in a general boycott of Austrian goods. The annexation was also a blow to Serbia and more generally to Slavic interests in the Balkans. To Russia, guardian of the Slavs, it was a direct affront and one that could not be disregarded. From St. Petersburg came a protest, cautious in language but clear in its firmness, setting forth the international bearing of the question and demanding that it should be laid before a European congress, as had been done in the case of the Moroccan question in 1905. To the protest of Russia was added that of France and England.[16]

But Russia's capacity for enforcing her protest was regarded by Austria with contempt. Russian military resources had been shattered by the disasters in

[15] *Annual Register,* 1908, 309-310; Moulin et de Messin, *Une Année de Politique Extérieure;* Printa, "La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine," in *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales,* February 16, 1909; Reventlow, *op. cit.,* 324; Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns,* 151; for Aerenthal's policy, see Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy,* 224-230.

[16] *Annual Register,* 1908, 323; 1909, 314, 326; Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie,* 203-214; Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes,* 180; Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns,* 156-170.

Manchuria, and the weight of her opinion in international affairs was shaken by the political chaos that had resulted from the internal revolution of 1905. The financial disorganization of Russia had prevented the outlay of sums necessary for the development of her military power, and it seemed improbable that she would have the courage or the foolhardiness to resort to arms. It is certain that Russian weakness was taken into consideration by Austria before she embarked upon her aggressive course of action; as a French publicist remarked, "The annexation of Bosnia was the direct corollary to the battle of Mukden."[17]

Hence it was that the demand for a congress made by Russia was evaded by Austria: the latter Power was willing that a congress should be held, but the annexation of the provinces must first be considered a *fait accompli*.[18] The congress might be allowed to register and approve the action taken by Austria, but it was not to discuss it. For the moment, Russia, supported by France and England, held firm, and the crisis assumed a more serious aspect. Instead of a local phase of the Near Eastern question, it suddenly became a matter of European concern, and very clearly began to appear as a conflict between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.[19]

The moment the crisis was transported to the broad field of continental diplomacy, Germany realized that in it was to be found a second occasion for a manifestation of German prestige.[20] It was all the more

[17] Paul Deschanel, lecture, 1909.

[18] Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie*, 203, 208.

[19] Tardieu, *Le Prince de Bülow*, 199, sq.

[20] See the speech of von Bülow in the Reichstag, March 29, 1909.

opportune in that Germany was desirous of humiliating Russia, as a punishment for her understanding of 1907 with England. France had been taught in 1905 that she could not assert her diplomatic independence with impunity, and a similar lesson administered to Russia would not be amiss. Furthermore, Germany's diplomatic temper was ruffled over the Casablanca incident, when certain German deserters from the French Foreign Legion had been arrested by France, and no apology satisfactory to German pride subsequently offered.[21] German political and economic interests, also, coincided in this instance with those of Austria, and the Balkan policy of the latter Power received Germany's cordial approval. But even if that had not been so, the larger diplomatic interests of Germany would have impelled her to support her ally with all her resources.

The result was that when the Entente Powers showed themselves persistent in the demand for a congress, they were briefly notified of Germany's determination that there should be no congress until the annexation of Bosnia was first recognized as an accomplished fact. Their surrender meant the humiliation of Russia, the exaltation of German prestige, and a serious defeat for the Triple Entente in the second year of its existence. Nevertheless when the German sword rattled in its sheath they refused to accept the risk of a settlement by force of arms. France and England, seeing in the crisis merely an issue of the Eastern question, and not considering its broader bearing, would not imperil themselves for the sake of Russia. And the latter Power, weakly sup-

[21] *Annual Register*, 1908, 298-299; Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 184; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 308.

ported and in no condition for a war, did not dare face Austria and her ally, the latter, as the Kaiser said, appearing "in shining armor." The annexation was recognized by the Powers that had signed the Treaty of Berlin, Serbian protests were unheeded, and Turkey was mollified by pecuniary compensation.[22]

The success of Austrian aggression supported by German threats apparently fortified the prestige of the Teutonic Powers as fully as they could have desired. Every point in the German policy seemed to have been gained. German and Austrian commercial and political interests in the Near East were ensured, and the alienation of Turkey, which was threatened for the moment, was avoided. It is true that a rift in the Triple Alliance was foreshadowed by Italy's discomfiture at the annexation of Bosnia; but this was more than offset by the incapacity or unwillingness of the Triple Entente to take common action. Russia's weakness was made manifest by the deep humiliation which she had been forced to undergo, and the rising tide of Pan-Slavism had received a very obvious check. Most important of all, Germany, by her simple statement that she would support Austria in her high-handed action, had imposed her will upon Europe. The hegemony of Germany in Europe was reëstablished.

For a year or more German diplomats seemed to be confident that the European revolt against the German overlordship had collapsed. The triumph of 1908 appeared to them to be conclusive. Germany had no further need of insisting upon her position,

[22] *Annual Register*, 1909, 311; Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie*, 229-231; von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 50-61.

and for a period her tone became almost one of benevolence. By the accord of February 8, 1909, she recognized the exceptional position of France in Morocco and admitted that the political interests of the French in that quarter gave her special rights.[23] Having established the fact that she possessed the controlling voice in European councils, Germany seemed inclined to allow her opponents to go ahead about as they pleased.

In another quarter Germany apparently reinsured her diplomatic position by her accord of 1910 with Russia. The result of the Bosnian crisis had been a humiliation for Russia and a set-back to Russian interests. But the skill of the Kaiser, who had inflicted that humiliation seemed to be sufficient to alleviate the rancour of the Tsar. In November, 1910, Nicholas visited William at Potsdam and after discussing international affairs apparently came to a complete reconciliation. He agreed that Russia should not oppose the Bagdad Railway scheme and even promised to link up the railway with Persian lines. Germany, on her side, agreed to recognize that Russia had special interests in Persia. The German and Russian Governments further agreed that each would enter into no engagement that might prove unfavorable to the interests of the other.[24] Thus Germany not merely won a diplomatic triumph in 1908 and weakened the Triple Entente, but by this special

[23] *Annual Register*, 1908, 296; 1909, 310-311; Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 185-187; Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, 1-25; Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, Chap. X.

[24] Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie*, 243-250; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 367-369; Rachfahl, *Kaiser und Reich*, 331-332.

agreement with Russia seemed to have completely emasculated it.[25]

The triumph of 1908, however, like the Potsdam Accord of 1910, did not permanently satisfy German diplomats, and early in 1911 the German Foreign Office began to consider the advisability of reinforcing their prestige by another victory. Russia no longer threatened directly, but on the other side, France was displaying an attitude not dissimilar to that which had resulted in the first conflict of 1905. In December, 1910, an influential French writer declared, with the approval of a cabinet minister, that Germany had failed in her attempt to preserve her continental supremacy, and expressed confidence that she would not draw the sword to regain it.[26] Such was not the attitude liked by Germany.

Again, in March, 1911, Delcassé was recalled to the Ministry, and his mere official reappearance seemed to indicate that France was minded again to embark upon her aggressive and adventurous course. Such fears on the part of Germany were largely justified by the trend of events. Taking advantage of a Berber revolt, a French army entered Morocco in April, and on May 21, took possession of the capital, Fez. The Sultan of Morocco, threatened by his brother, who assumed the rôle of pretender, saw himself forced to accept the protection of the French. It was the end of Moroccan independence.[27]

Germany had only slight economic interests in Morocco, and she had admitted that she possessed no

[25] *La Revue des Questions diplomatiques*, January, June, 1911.

[26] Tardieu, in *Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère*, 1911, 98.

[27] Reventlow, *op. cit.*, 349, sq.; Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 75-77; Picquet, *Campagnes d'Afrique*, 290, sq.

political interests at all in that quarter. But she could not allow France to proceed unhindered, if she cared to maintain the principle that the German seal of approval must be secured before France took up a policy of initiative. And that principle was believed at Berlin to be as all-important in 1911 as it had been in 1905.

Furthermore the moment was propitious for another diplomatic success. The Government in France was weakened by domestic difficulties and could not be expected to take a strong position on foreign affairs at the moment when it was harassed by opposing factions. On June 23, the parliamentary crisis came to a head and the Monis Cabinet was overthrown. To it succeeded one led by Caillaux, who was known as a skillful financier and expert politician, but whose capacity in dealing with foreign questions was as little known as were his sentiments. At the Foreign Office appeared de Selves, well considered as an administrative official, but who lacked the experience and special knowledge in diplomatic matters such as would enable him to guide France triumphantly through a delicate international situation. Delcassé, it is true, was in the new Ministry, but merely as Minister of Marine, and his influence on Caillaux in matters of foreign policy seems to have been discounted. The industrial situation in France, also, was believed to preclude the possibility of a strong attitude on the part of France in the face of the projected action of Germany. The great railway strike had been terminated with difficulty, and had resulted in acts of *sabotage,* which to German minds must have appeared immediate precursors of an internal revolution.[28]

From Great Britain, Germany believed that she had

[28] *Annual Register,* 1911, 301-311; Albin, *Le Coup d'Agadir,* 7, sq.

nothing to fear. The Government, in which the supposed pacifist, Lloyd George, exercised preponderating influence, appeared to have little interest in foreign questions. British policy seemed to have become a "policy of parochialism. The Imperial Idea seemed to have vanished from the brains of British politicians."[29] The British Empire was apparently falling apart, and the suggested reciprocity of Canada with the United States looked like the first step in the process of dissolution. On May 18, Haldane said, "We are going to leave . . . the British Empire to hold together by bonds of sympathy."[30] In such a spirit as that, Germans could see no possible danger of British interference on the Continent.

Furthermore, the industrial discontent in England, as in France, had culminated in a gigantic strike, and the inability of the Liberal Government to control its own political allies, seemed to Germany the clearest manifestation of weakness. The country was torn by the question of Home Rule, and the political situation was marked by a constitutional crisis which surpassed in importance and danger anything that England had seen since 1832.

Doubtless German diplomats were of the opinion that a better opportunity for disrupting the Triple Entente would never again present itself. Russia they believed to be wavering in her allegiance to the combination, and if the German blow were delivered in Morocco, she would probably take small interest in a dispute over an African province. France might be brought to perceive the futile character of her

[29] Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, 178.

[30] Speech in House of Lords, May 18, 1911.

understanding with England, and, if bribes were judiciously mingled with the German threats, might be again drawn into the orbit of German influence. England, immersed in domestic difficulties, would be again isolated. A German victory under the circumstances would almost certainly result in a revival of the conditions that had existed from 1891 to 1900, when German diplomacy was supreme.

At the moment when it was least expected, Germany struck her blow. At noon of July 1, 1911, the German Ambassador to France called upon M. de Selves and informed him that disturbances in Morocco threatened the interests and lives of German citizens, and that to give them protection the German gunboat *Panther* had been despatched to the port of Agadir. The meaning of the action was clear, namely, that France must cease her policy of expansion until such time as she had given satisfaction to Germany and received German approval.[31]

The peril of German traders in Morocco was obviously a pretext. Agadir was a town that had never been opened to foreign commerce and where Europeans entered at their peril; if Germans risked their lives by going there it was their own fault. Furthermore, German trade in Morocco was so small as hardly to warrant such brusque action on the part of the German Government; the total sum of German commerce in that quarter could hardly have amounted to fifty thousand marks a year. Everyone perceived that the despatch of the *Panther* did not result from Germany's commercial policy, but was rather another attempt to enforce the position of Germany as arbiter

[31] *Annual Register*, 1911, 312, 339; Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, 423, sq.

of European affairs, and equally designed to break up the Triple Entente. Germany had apparently lost faith in the policy of conciliation inaugurated after 1908, and had again reverted to that of intimidation.[32]

During the first weeks of the crisis the demands of Germany amounted to practically a partition of Morocco between herself, France, and Spain. Such a partition would satisfy the colonial aspirations of the Pan-Germanists, and would achieve the diplomatic purpose of Wilhelmstrasse by humiliating France. But Germany miscalculated the international situation. She counted on a France which, as in 1905, would succumb at the first threat, on a Government unsure of its position, and on a nation riddled with socialism and willing to make all sacrifices in the cause of peace. The news of the despatch of the *Panther,* however, followed by the extreme demands of Germany galvanized France into a spirit of resistance. All parties agreed that no concessions should be made to Germany that would touch the national honor. The French Government, with the most correct attitude, consented to discuss the demands of Germany, but yielded nothing, and made it plain that France would undergo no humiliation like that of Russia in 1908.[33]

To the surprise of Berlin, France found strong support across the Channel. In the heat of the parliamentary struggle over the Lords' veto, Asquith announced publicly that England would not allow Germany to ride rough-shod over France in the Moroccan affair. And the "pacifist," Lloyd George,

[32] Fullerton, *Problems of Power,* 173-175; Albin, *op. cit.,* 11.

[33] Turner, "The Morocco Crisis of 1911," in *South Atlantic Quarterly,* January, 1912, 5-8; Albin, *op. cit.,* 173-226.

who had risked his career in the previous decade by his opposition to the Boer War, warned Germany that she must not count upon British passivity as a result of party quarrels; the British Empire was still intact and the security of Great Britain's international position was not a party question. Shortly afterwards the leader of the Opposition strengthened the firm attitude of the Ministry by also insisting that party differences had no place in foreign affairs. "If," said Mr. Balfour, "there are any who supposed that we would be wiped from the map of Europe because we have difficulties at home, it may be worth while saying that they utterly mistake the temper of the British people and the patriotism of the Opposition."[34]

In the face of such an attitude on the part of both England and France, the easy diplomatic victory that Germany had expected was out of the question. The reawakening of the French national consciousness and the realization on the part of England that her own position was endangered, destroyed the value of German threats. We may well ask ourselves whether, if circumstances had been propitious in Germany, the Great War might not have begun in 1911 instead of 1914. Indeed at various moments during the crisis the probability of war seemed great. Even after Germany moderated her first demands, she continued to insist that special economic privileges in Morocco should be given her, as well as certain political rights which would have made French authority in that quarter merely nominal. On the other hand, France, supported by England, would hear of nothing but absolute political control and would grant no special

[34] Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, 456-469; Turner, *op. cit.*, 9.

privileges to Germany. It seemed like a deadlock that could only be broken by force.[35]

But the situation in Germany was not such as to favor the desires of the militarist party. The mass of the nation cared little about Morocco, and were by no means eager to fight France; the fear of the Slavs, which in 1914 affected all classes profoundly, was not a factor in 1911. The Socialists protested against a war waged solely in the interests of German prestige and for the sake of the Pan-Germanists. Furthermore, the financial condition of Germany was unsatisfactory. French bankers began to call in their loans from Germany, bank reserves were low, the Berlin Bourse was weak, discount rates were raised, and a colossal panic threatened. Almost without exception the capitalists exercised their great influence against war.[36]

Under such circumstances the German Government decided to yield, and after the beginning of September bent all its efforts towards covering up its diplomatic defeat. In this task it was assisted by France, who showed herself ready to grant such territorial compensations as would enable the diplomats of Berlin to justify their efforts at home. In return for Ger-

[35] Tardieu, *op. cit.*, 476; *Annual Register*, 1911, 313, 339.

[36] Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, 483, sq.; Turner, *op. cit.*, 11. See also, Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, 219, for the attitude of Austria and Italy. Army officers themselves did not believe that Germany was ready. A secret report, dated March 19, 1913, speaking of the Agadir crisis, says: "At that time, the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army," French *Yellow Book*, 1914, No. 2.

many's recognition of the French protectorate in Morocco, she was given extensive territories of doubtful value along the Congo, in the southern and eastern Cameroons.[37]

But the accession of territory thus resulting to the German colonial empire could not hide the fact of Germany's failure in her *Coup d'Agadir*. It was in vain that official communications dilated upon the advantages that Germany had won; the Berlin press could not restrain its intense disappointment and covered the diplomats with invective; even the more staid journals fell into hopeless melancholy over the set-back to Germany. The nation had not wanted to fight in the summer of 1911, but discontent at the final settlement was general and profound. Germany had set out to win a diplomatic victory over France and to separate her from Great Britain; her diplomats had led the Pan-Germanists to believe that a coaling-station or even a sphere of influence in Morocco would result. But France had refused to be humiliated, she had drawn closer to Great Britain, and had definitely excluded Germany from any political position in Morocco.[38]

Remembering the stress laid by German diplomats upon the necessity of maintaining German prestige, and the blows struck for this purpose in 1905 and 1908,

[37] *Annual Register*, 1911, 340; Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, 304-323; Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, 535, sq.; the terms of the convention are printed in Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, 260, 267.

[38] Tardieu, *Le Mystère d'Agadir*, 599, sq. The German Chancellor made an attempt to show that Germany had not undergone a humiliation, but his speech was received in dead silence except for derisive laughter. He was followed by the Conservative leader, who in a furious and chauvinistic speech, contended that the settlement had put France in complete mastery of Morocco and that Germany's compensation was of questionable value. He was bitter in his denunciation of England,

it was easy for the more far-sighted to judge that the defeat of Germany in 1911 would not be the last of the conflicts of the alliances. If, after carrying her point in the Bosnian crisis, she had felt it necessary to reinforce her position by another blow in 1911, how much more important was it for her, after her failure in that year, to regain the ground then lost! It was a matter of certainty that at the next favorable opportunity she would strike another blow, similar to those delivered in 1905, 1908, and 1911.

The occasion presented itself in 1914 and under circumstances which were propitious for the most energetic action. The financial state of Germany was such as to enable her to take any steps that might seem desirable. The crisis involved the fear of the Slav, a sentiment which united the whole nation.[39] Furthermore, since 1911 there had occurred changes in the Balkans, so that in 1914 there was at stake the most vital purpose of Germany's economic policy, which unlike the Moroccan venture inspired the commercial and capitalist classes with the utmost enthusiasm. Then if ever was the time for Germany to insist upon the peculiar diplomatic position that she had claimed since the days of Bismarck.

The crisis found the Kaiser and his Ministers ready to risk everything, even the long-dreaded war, provided that German prestige could be regained and the path to Asia Minor reopened. William II had long

calling Lloyd George's speech a "humiliating challenge of a kind that German people would not put up with." The Colonial Minister resigned almost immediately, and even the Socialist press denounced the Government, *Annual Register*, 1911, 342; Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 65.

[39] See especially the pamphlet, "Truth about Germany," in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 2, 244, sq.

and sincerely striven to keep the peace. His action in the three preceding crises had been restricted to threats. But because of his failure in 1911, because of the influence of his son and that militarist class to which he instinctively turned for advice, he was resolved that next time his threats should, if necessary, be supported by arms.[40] The occasion which forced Germany to action and which led to the crisis of 1914 and to the outbreak of the Great War, arose from conditions and events in the Near East. These conditions are obviously worthy of special consideration.

[40] For the change in the Kaiser's attitude, see the letter of Jules Cambon, dated at Berlin, November 22, 1913, published in the French *Yellow Book*, 1914, No. 6.

CHAPTER IX

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION

Of the great international problems which were prominent during the first part of the nineteenth century, the Near Eastern Question was one of the few which had not found its settlement by 1871. We have already had occasion to refer to it at various times, and its importance in affecting the policy of the Powers is obvious. The irreconcilable interests of Russia and Austria in the Balkans were largely accountable for Bismarck's failure to realize his dream of transforming the League of the Three Emperors into a definite alliance. The Balkan crisis of 1887 furnished impetus to the movement for the bringing together of France and Russia into the Dual Alliance. And it was the clash of Russian and Austrian interests in the Near East that produced the international crisis of 1908-1909, which was so skillfully utilized by Germany. For a generation after 1871 European policy was "dominated by the Balkans," and it is not surprising that when the long-feared conflict broke forth, its occasion was to be found in a phase of this ever vexatious problem.

Historians have frequently pointed out that the Near Eastern Question is as old as history or legend. Achilles and Hector fighting on the Trojan plain, Spartans at Thermopylæ, Athenians at Salamis, Octavius' victory over the fleet of Cleopatra at

Actium—all represent various phases of the Eastern Question. Richard Cœur de Lion warring against Saladin, and Prince Eugene defending Vienna from the attacks of the Ottoman Turks, may likewise be regarded as the protagonists in the twelfth and seventeenth century aspects of this never-ending problem. In fact whenever occidental civilization has conflicted with near-oriental, the world has witnessed some manifestation of the Eastern Question.

In recent times the Near Eastern Question has taken on a more exact connotation and is subject to more specific definition. In the sense in which the term is generally used, it means the problem or group of problems that result from the occupation of Constantinople and the Balkan Peninsula by the Turks. Regarded broadly the problem may be said to have two main aspects: the one concerns the position of the Christian nations of the Balkans, which, previous to the nineteenth century, were subject to Turkish domination; the other concerns the attitude taken by the great European Powers towards the Balkans and Dardanelles, and their control. The solution of the problem thus has depended upon the answer to two questions: Was Turkey to be excluded entirely from Europe, and if so, how was her territory to be distributed? Was Russia, or Austria, or any other Power to win practical mastery of the Danube and Dardanelles by establishing a semi-protectorate over the Balkan nations or Turkey?

The crumbling of the Turkish dominion in Europe began early in the nineteenth century. The revolt of Serbia in 1804 led to a long and bitter struggle for autonomy, which was finally conceded by the Sultan in 1815. Six years later a far more serious rebellion

in Greece inaugurated an eight years' war, in which Great Britain and Russia finally participated. The final result was the absolute independence of Greece, which was granted by Turkey in 1829. The dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, thus begun, could not be arrested. In 1862 the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia received practical autonomy under the name of Rumania, and in 1878 they were granted complete independence. The rebellion which flared out in 1876, led two years later to the autonomy of Bulgaria, which was in 1908 extended into absolute independence.[1]

Finally in 1912 and 1913 a successful war waged by the Balkan States upon Turkey robbed her of Thrace, Macedonia, Albania, Crete, and the islands of the Ægean. With the exception of Albania and some of the islands, the territory won at that time was distributed between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. But the answer to the first question still remains incomplete. Turkey has not been driven from Europe, although her territories have been greatly diminished and she has been ousted from the Balkans. And the distribution of the conquered territory has not been sufficiently satisfactory to all parties to assure the permanency of the settlement.

The second question, namely, which of the great Powers should exercise predominant influence in the Balkan Peninsula, has been the one most difficult of solution, possibly, of modern times, and has been productive of numerous diplomatic crises as well as wars. In the first half of the nineteenth century the rivalry of Great Britain and Russia in the Near East was acute, and was perhaps the most striking char-

[1] Driault, *La Question d'Orient, passim;* Hazen, *Europe since 1815,* 601, sq.

acteristic of the situation. This rivalry accounted for the joint intervention of those Powers on behalf of Greece in 1827, for Great Britain feared that if Russia were allowed to act alone, she would secure an unassailable position on the Dardanelles. It also led to the Crimean War of 1854, when Great Britain combined with France to protect the Turkish Empire from the attack of Russia. Again in 1878, Great Britain, under Beaconsfield, found herself ranged with Austria to prevent the complete dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, which seemed likely to result in the mastery of the Slavs over the Balkans.

Since 1878, however, Great Britain has come to believe that the extension of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula would be comparatively innocuous to British interests, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry has been effaced by the more serious conflict of Austrian and Russian ambitions. Germany has stood behind Austria in this conflict, and it may fairly be said that during the last decade the international aspect of the Eastern Question has been the struggle of the forces of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.

The interests of all the great Powers in the Eastern Question are obvious. Certain of the European states have desired that Ottoman power should be weakened if not destroyed, while others have desired that it should be reaffirmed. But to none of them has the fate of the Turkish Empire been a question of indifference. For Russia it has always been a matter of vital importance that the Dardanelles should not be held by a strong nation. Every symptom of convalescence on the part of the Sick Man has caused tremors of agitation at St. Petersburg. To secure

Byzantium for herself has been the dream of Russia since the days of Peter the Great and Catherine II.

Sentimentally, the Russians look to Byzantium as the source from which their civilization has been derived, and they regard themselves as the natural legatees of Justinian and Theodosius. Strategically, the control of the Dardanelles would give them absolute mastery of the Northeast Mediterranean; it would transform the Black Sea into a Russian lake, from which in time of war their vessels might emerge, perfectly equipped at their Crimean base, and in which they might take refuge, safe from pursuit. And economically, the control of the Straits would give to Russia a protected outlet for those vast supplies of food-stuffs exported from Odessa. South Russia has become the granary of Europe, and the closing of the Straits means economic paralysis to an important part of the Russian Empire.

Another factor has vitally affected the desire of Russia to win Constantinople. Nature has been bounteous to her in many respects, but in one, has laid a tremendous handicap upon her; for Russia has no outlet to the open sea that is available during the whole year, and notwithstanding all her efforts has never been able to secure one. Russia has seen her attempts to win an ice-free port frustrated one after the other; her history has been the endeavor to reach the ocean waterways, and she has always found herself blocked. It was in vain that Peter the Great moved his capital from Moscow to the Baltic, for the Baltic has been closed by the rise of Germany. Hope of gaining access to the Pacific, except on an ice-bound coast, has been cut off by Japan. And the Russian ambition of reaching the Persian Gulf was

sacrificed to the Convention of 1907 with Great Britain. For these failures, one success will atone: the winning of control over the Dardanelles.[2]

For Russia, the extension of her influence in the Near East has thus become more important in recent years. Great Britain, on the other hand, has exchanged her fear of the Russian advance in this quarter for a complaisance almost kindly. Before the last years of the nineteenth century, Russian control of the Balkans and the Dardanelles seemed to threaten the path to British India. The Turk was thus the protegé of Great Britain, and received British support, military and diplomatic, in 1854 and 1878. But when Great Britain purchased the controlling interest in the Suez Canal and a few years later established a practical protectorate in Egypt, she began to consider that the route to India was safe. Egypt is the key to the East, and so long as British influence in Egypt was assured, Russian power in the Balkans or even on the Dardanelles might be regarded with comparative indifference. Furthermore, as the century came to a close, Germany began to appear as a more dangerous rival than Russia, and British statesmen believed that the advance of Germany in the Near East could best be met by encouraging or at least not contesting the claims of Russia. Hence when Russia and Great Britain compromised their claims in Afghanistan, Persia, and Thibet in 1907, Great Britain made no objection to Russia's renewed interest in the Balkans.

Instead of Anglo-Russian rivalry, the conflict of Slav and Magyar, with the Teuton in the background,

[2] Von Bülow, *Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn und die Balkanstaaten*, 30, sq.

tended to dominate the Near Eastern Question. The interest of Austria in the Balkans and Dardanelles has always been keen. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Austria was on the defensive against the Turks. So long as the Ottoman power was militant and aggressive, she acted as the bulwark of Europe against the advance of Islam. When the Turkish flood receded, Austria began to take great interest in the control of the Danube, as a vital outlet for Austrian trade. But the trade of the Danube depends ultimately upon the Dardanelles. Were Russia to control the Straits, Austrian control of the Danube would be meaningless. Austria has accordingly watched Russia's attempts to extend her influence in the Balkans with jealousy; in 1855, at the time of the Crimean War, notwithstanding the debt that she owed to Russia for her invaluable assistance in the Hungarian rebellion of 1848-1849, she mobilized against her, and without actually entering the war, helped to determine its outcome. Furthermore, Austria has always looked forward to free access to the Ægean and Adriatic Seas, and her desire to clear the path to Salonika or Avlona has determined her interest in the Balkan settlement.

After 1866 Austria's Balkan policy received new impetus. Her defeat by Prussia established the fact that she could no longer hope to pose as a great German Power, and that she must seek compensations in Southeastern Europe for loss of influence in Central Europe. In 1867, furthermore, the Magyar and German elements reached a settlement of their claims to power in the Hapsburg Empire; the resulting compromise, which excluded the Slav element, gave the Magyars opportunity for extending their domination

over the Slavs of the Danube. But such domination could be made firm and permanent only if the Slavs of the Balkans, outside of the Austrian boundaries, were also brought under Hapsburg influence. The Austrian Empire would never be safe from disintegration so long as the disaffected Slavs of the Empire were encouraged to intrigue and revolt by their kinsmen across the border.

Extension of Austrian influence in the Balkans, or preferably a sort of protectorate over the Christian nations of the peninsula, thus became a cardinal point in Austrian policy. But at every turn she met the resistance of the Slavs, and behind the Slavs stood their protector, Russia. For each nation the question was of the most vital importance. Russia could not afford to forego her ambition of winning control of the Straits and extending her influence in the Balkans. Austria must keep the Dardanelles free from Russia unless her position on the Danube was to be without practical value; Russian influence in the Balkans meant the blocking of her path to the Ægean and the Adriatic; and Slav power in the peninsula threatened the integrity and existence of the Austrian Empire.[3]

Germany's interest in the Near Eastern Question dates from more recent times. It is, in fact, only since Germany began to conceive the possibility of world empire that the solution of the problem has been for her a point of vital concern. Prussia took no part in the Crimean War, and it will not be forgotten that Bismarck observed that the whole Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. So long as the scope of Germany's policy

[3] Von Bülow, *Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn und die Balkanstaaten*, 87, sq.

was restricted to the Continent, she had no axe to grind in the Balkans. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck's action was, if not disinterested, at least confined almost altogether to the support of Austria. As a ground of conflict between Austria and Russia, the Eastern Question was forced upon the attention of Germany; but until the accession of William II her attitude towards the problem was that of an outsider.

Towards the end of the century, as we have seen, Germany began to search for new markets, in order to provide for the demands of those growing industries upon which the life of the nation seemed to depend. In most of the markets of the world she had to meet the long-established trade of the British. Such was the case in the Far East and in South America. By superiority of commercial methods German competition often proved successful, but at best it was a fight against cruel odds, and German traders looked for a region in which their commercial penetration might find a free field. Such a district was to be found in the great valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, which were still largely untouched by alien commerce, and from both the economic and strategic point of view appeared to be of the greatest value. It was in this direction therefore that Germany turned, and the commercial penetration of Mesopotamia received enthusiastic support from both the Government and the capitalists.[4]

The first definite disclosure of the German plans appeared in 1899, when a concession was granted for the construction of a railway from Konia, a point in

[4] Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*, 236-243; Verney et Dambmann, *Les Puissances au Levant;* René Henry, *La Question d'Orient* and *Des Monts de Bohême au Golfe Persique.*

Mesopotamia, to the Persian Gulf. This was the extension of a line projected a decade previously by a group of German financiers who received the support of the powerful Deutsche Bank. It was the beginning of the Bagdad Railway and revealed the ambitions of Germany. Four years later the Bagdad Railway Company was formed. The line was designed so as to connect Haidar Pasha, one of the Asiatic suburbs of Constantinople, with one of the harbors conceded to Germany on the Persian Gulf. German engineers drew up plans for the connection of the Asiatic terminus, by means of a tunnel, with the European side of the Bosphorus and with the European railway, which was under German management.

The railway was to follow the route of Cyrus and the Ten Thousand in the Anabasis, over the Taurus and down into the plains of Mesopotamia. Two branch railways of the utmost importance were secured by the German company: the one was the most direct trade route to Smyrna; the other gave connection with the port of Alexandretta. Furthermore, the Germans later obtained the concession of the line planned to run between Aleppo, Damascus, and Mecca, the route which would naturally be taken by all Moslem pilgrims.[5] "Even the Holy Land will become a German province. The network of German railways will radiate from Mecca to Constantinople, and from Smyrna to the Persian Gulf. One terminus will be within twelve hours of Egypt, another terminus will be within four days of Bombay."[6]

[5] See especially, Rohrbach, *Die Bagdadbahn;* Chéradame, *Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad;* Mazel, *Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad;* Fraser, *The Short Cut to India;* Chirol, *The Middle East;* Martin, *Die Bagdadbahn.*

[6] Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem,* 266-267.

At the moment when German plans were taking shape, Russia was so closely involved in the Far Eastern problem that she could offer no effective resistance; she did, however, prevent the construction of a line following the most convenient and cheapest route along the imperial road of the Romans and passing through the plain of Nineveh, which would have threatened her Transcaucasian possessions directly. France not merely did not oppose the German plan, but her financiers offered precious assistance and subscribed large and necessary sums. M. Rouvier himself, who allowed Delcassé to be ejected from his cabinet in 1905 at the behest of Germany, was said to be financially interested.[7] Great Britain, by her influence over the Sheik of Koweit, hoped to close the most desirable terminus on the Persian Gulf to the German line; but the Germans evidently hoped to overcome British opposition.[8] At all events they never faltered in their determination to win an open path from Hamburg to the Gulf, with a branch line and terminus on the Mediterranean.

The constitution of the Bagdad Railway Company may be said to be an event of the first importance in the history of European diplomacy. It was the first step in Germany's southeastern policy which was designed to win for German traders complete economic control over the Turkish dominions and ultimately, possibly, a political protectorate; Germany was to "add to her sway the ancient empire of Semiramis and Nebuchadnezzar, of Cyrus and Haroun al

[7] Chéradame, *Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad*, 275.

[8] Rose, *The Origins of the War*, 83-84; *Spectator*, November 8, 1902, April 4, 1903, June 5, 1909; *Nineteenth Century and After*, June, 1909. For the feebleness of the opposition of the French and British, see *Nineteenth Century and After*, May, June, 1914 (articles by M. Géraud).

Raschid.'"[9] It gave Germany an outlet for her expanding industries and her teeming population. Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are districts which have been among the most prosperous and productive in the whole world. It is true that stupid deforestation on the part of Turkish governors has led to climatic changes and lessened the fertility of the soil. But the science of German agriculturists would soon revive the prosperity of regions which because of short-sighted exploitation have become arid. The natural resources of the country are rich and merely waiting for development.[10]

But the Germans were attracted not so much by the commercial and industrial opportunities which the Bagdad Railway was to open to them, as by the political advantage which control of the Ottoman Empire would offer. If in the future there should arise a struggle with Great Britain for the control of the seas and colonial empire, German domination in Mesopotamia would threaten the British Empire in two vital points: India and Egypt. This was the point of view adopted by Rohrbach, whose views on German policy were accepted as sound and who by no means belonged to the belligerent party in Germany. "One factor," said he in 1911, "and one alone will determine the possibility of a successful issue for Germany in such a conflict: whether or not we succeed in placing England in a perilous position. A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question; the prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England

[9] Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, 250.
[10] Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 59-60.

in a vulnerable spot—and here we come to the point where the relationship of Germany and Turkey and the conditions prevailing in Turkey become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England . . . England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place—Egypt.

"The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, and of her connections with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss also of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power like Turkey would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. The Turkish army must be increased and improved, and progress must be made in her economic and financial position . . . The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous does she become for England . . . Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England.'"[11]

At the moment then when Great Britain had come

[11] Rohrbach, *Die Bagdadbahn*, 18, 19.

to the conclusion that Russia was no longer dangerous and had given up her rôle of protector of the Porte, Germany was stepping forward to save and strengthen the Ottoman Empire. "She saw that in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia there was a great field open for German influence, organizing power, and capital. The key to this was in the hands of the Turkish government. Germany would give her support to the maintenance of Turkish power; Turkey would grant the necessary concessions by which her Asiatic possessions would be opened up to German enterprise. And behind was a more grandiose conception: Germany, the ally and patron of Turkey, might become the organ for a general reassertion of Islam which would be the strongest weapon against England and France. Here at least was a field for expansion in which sea power would be useless; once let a reorganized and powerful Turkish government, with an army disciplined and trained by German officers, be established in Syria and Bagdad, and then would come the time for a move from the most vulnerable side on Egypt and on India."[12]

From the beginning of his reign William II had realized the necessity of winning and preserving friendship with the Turk.[13] His first official journey in 1889 was to the Holy Land when he inaugurated that understanding with the Porte which has since been broken only once and for a brief period after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. German influence was solidified by the reorganization of the Turkish

[12] Headlam, "The Balkans and Diplomacy," in *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1916, 124-125.

[13] Friendship between Prussia and Turkey had been traditional since the days of Frederick the Great.

army by von der Goltz. German diplomacy saved the Turk from reform at the hands of the Powers. Germany not only enabled Turkey to crush Greece and restore her military prestige, but also enabled her to reap the fruits of victory.[14] Public manifestations of German regard for Turkey were made upon every possible occasion by the Kaiser, and he stirred the world by his proclamations of affection towards Islam: "Say to the three hundred million Moslems of the world that I am their friend." With skill and tenacity German agents worked at the Sublime Porte, exploiting the affinity that exists between Prussian and Turk, an affinity which German writers themselves have pointed out, more and more replacing British and French by German influence.[15]

If Germany was to carry her Mesopotamian and Turkish policy to success, another aspect of the Near Eastern Question concerned her very closely, namely, the position of the independent Balkan States. Should those nations become powerful and diplomatically autonomous the security of the path from Germany to Constantinople would be threatened. They must, therefore, be subjected to the domination of Germany, or better still, to that of Germany's ally, Austria; for Austria has always had greater success than Germany in dealing with the Slavs. In no event could the Slavs be allowed to control the Balkans, lest Germany's communications with Asia Minor be cut. Thus a regenerated Turkey must guard the Straits while Austria dominated the Balkans. With her ally,

[14] Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, 263.

[15] Sir H. Rumbold, *Final Recollections of a Diplomatist*, 296; Headlam, *The Balkans and Diplomacy*, 125; Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 61, 62-64.

Austria, supreme on the Danube, and her friend, Turkey, in control of the Dardanelles, Germany might reasonably hope to be master of a sweep of territory extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. She would cut Russia from her Mediterranean trade, hold the shortest route to the East, and threaten the position of the British in Egypt and India.[16]

Broadly speaking, the attitude of the Great European Powers towards the Eastern Question in 1907 was thus about as follows. Great Britain, relieved of her fear of the Russian peril, was willing that the Tsar should make what profit he could out of the weakness of Turkey; even the possibility of Russian control over the Dardanelles was regarded by Great Britain with equanimity. Russia, pushed back in the Far East, was pressing with the greater eagerness upon Constantinople and seeking to throw her influence more and more into the Balkans. Pan-Slavism, a shadowy but a potential force, was aiming at supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, and looking forward to driving the Turk across the Straits. But for Austria and Germany, the position of Turkey as their protegé guardian of the Dardanelles must remain unassailed. The turbulent Balkan States must be discouraged and restrained, and the influence of the Slav in the peninsula eliminated. Germany was replacing Great Britain as the Power that protected Turkey and prevented the Russian advance on Constantinople, and was at the same time replacing Russia as the Power that threatened the British dominion of India and the route to India.

For a generation after 1878 the not infrequent

[16] Bauer, *Der Balkankrieg und die deutsche Weltpolitik*, 45, sq.; Bérard, *Le Sultan et l'Islam*, 225; Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, 235.

crises of the Eastern Question were localized and the Powers were able to prevent an open clash of the states of first importance whose interests conflicted. The acquisition of Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria in 1885 and the defeat of Greece by Turkey in 1897 were not allowed to precipitate serious trouble and set fire to the heap of combustible material that was gathered in the Near East.[17] But in 1908 came the capital event which carried in its train a whole set of circumstances, and was destined ultimately to bring about the inevitable contest of arms. This event was the revolution of the Young Turks.

For many years there had existed in the Ottoman Empire factors productive of lively dissatisfaction. The inefficiency of Turkish administration, the corruption prevalent among the official classes, and especially the anæmia of the Sublime Porte in its relations with foreign Powers, led to a feeling of humiliation and disgust. A large number of Turks gradually came to believe that Turkish decadence resulted in great part from the despotic régime of Abdul Hamid and trusted that her recrudescence might be found in the introduction of western liberal institutions. Amongst the civilian class the liberal element was not large, inasmuch as the Government had sent into exile or imprisonment every one suspected of liberal views. In the army, however, there were to be found many officers who had received their training in Germany or France and had there imbibed ideas of western civilization and become convinced of its benefits. That such officers really understood the principles of western liberalism may be questioned;

[17] Hawkesworth, *The Last Century in Europe*, 453-454; Songeon, *L'Histoire de la Bulgarie*, 358-367.

but they were all imbued with a sense of shame for the weakness of Turkey, and were firm believers in the necessity of change. An added cause of dissatisfaction was the fact that their pay was often far in arrears.[18]

The revolutionary movement was thus in part one of liberalism, an aspect represented by the idealistic views emitted by the Committee of Union and Progress; it was also, and perhaps chiefly, patriotic and chauvinistic. The immediate impetus towards revolutionary action is perhaps to be found in the agreement of Great Britain and Russia that the Powers must intervene to settle the Macedonian question. The meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval, in June, 1908, infuriated the Young Turkish officers beyond measure. It was the public manifestation of the fact that Turkey was unable to settle her own affairs, another proof that she had sunk so low that her private concerns were to be made the business of Europe. The direct answer was the revolution of July 24, 1908, when the Hamidian régime was overthrown and constitutional government inaugurated. Abdul Hamid, however, remained on the throne and continued to plot for the restoration of his absolute power. This first revolution was the work of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose power was solely moral, and in April, 1909, came the inevitable counter-revolution. The constitution was torn up, and the Young Turks in Constantinople annihilated.[19]

But the Sultan had not realized the power that lay

[18] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 319; Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie*, 50, sq.

[19] *Annual Register*, 1908, 324-327; Bauer, *op. cit.*, 18; Reventlow, *op. cit.*, 322, sq.; Pinon, *op. cit.*, 78, sq.

behind the Committee of Union and Progress. The real force of the revolution lay in the determination of the officers in the army to resuscitate Turkey. When the news of the counter-revolution came to Salonika, Shevket Pasha, the commanding officer, immediately prepared to support the Young Turkish movement by force of arms. Marching upon Constantinople, he brought to the service of the revolutionaries his military skill and the best troops of the Empire. The Sultan, undefended, was compelled to revive the constitution and to abdicate in favor of his brother. The Young Turks immediately assumed control of Ottoman destinies.[20]

A full consideration of the Young Turkish régime would pass the scope of this book. Everyone remembers the exalted hopes aroused by the accession to office of the men who seemed to be filled with the highest ideals for the regeneration of Turkey; sympathy with their ambitions was freely and sincerely expressed. Nor will be forgotten the intense disappointment when it became obvious that they were incapable of fulfilling their task and that they were merely continuing the despotism of the Hamidian régime. Inexperienced and untaught, they soon made it clear that they lacked the skill of their predecessors, as well as the will to maintain their promises of justice and efficiency. An authoritative study of the causes of their failure is yet to be made. Our purpose is merely to consider the effects of their accession to power upon the international situation.

First of all, perhaps, should be noted the effect upon Austrian policy and Serbian ambitions. It will not

[20] *Annual Register*, 1909, 328-333; Pinon, *op. cit.*, 94, sq.; Ramsay, *The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey.*

be forgotten that in 1878 the Congress of Berlin had placed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the administrative control of Austria. The Sultan retained nominal sovereignty over the provinces, but Austria was determined that actual sovereignty should never be reclaimed by the Sublime Porte. The Revolution of 1908 caused tremors at Vienna and Buda-Pesth. It was well known that the Young Turk leaders were inspired with patriotic if not jingoistic sentiments, and the first demand that Austria might expect from a rejuvenated Turkey was the return of the two provinces. To forestall such a demand Austria determined to tear up the Treaty of Berlin. On October 3, 1908, the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople informed the Porte that his Government had annexed the provinces, renouncing the right of military occupation of Novi Bazar, the territory belonging to Turkey and lying between Serbia and Montenegro.[21]

The European crisis that resulted has already been discussed. The protests of Serbia and of Russia, her protector, were quelled by the threat of force on the part of Germany. Serbia's ambitions were for the moment sacrificed to the peace of Europe. Turkey, after a boycott of Austrian goods, carried on for four months, agreed to accept financial compensation for the provinces. But the importance of the crisis in the history of the Near Eastern Question is to be found in the desperate spirit of the Serbian Government after the surrender of Russia to Germany. The annexation of the provinces seemed to Serbia a fatal blow to all her national ambitions. The action of Austria apparently destroyed her hope of winning for

[21] *Supra*, Chap. VIII; Reventlow, *op. cit.*, 324; *Annual Register*, 1908, 309-310.

herself these provinces, the centre of the Serbian race; it seemed to cut her off forever from the sea. Not merely was her dream of a great Serbian Empire ruined, but she must look forward to the ultimate domination of Austria. Any change in the status quo would be for her a relief. Serbia's action in 1912 against Turkey can be understood only if we realize that her people believed that some compensation must be found for the loss of Bosnia, if she were to preserve her independence.[22]

Another vitally important result of the Young Turkish régime is to be found in Macedonia and in the altered attitude of Bulgaria towards the Macedonian problem. Before 1908, Bulgaria, although aspiring to the ultimate lordship of Macedonia, had favored its autonomy rather than its immediate independence. The absolute independence of Macedonia would necessarily give rise to serious trouble with Serbia and Greece, since each of these states claimed much of Macedonia on racial and linguistic grounds. Autonomy, on the other hand, would allow Bulgaria to carry on a propaganda, by schools and priests, which would end in making the province in reality Bulgarian. She might then hope to imitate successfully her own example of 1885 when she had annexed Eastern Rumelia.[23]

But the Young Turks soon made it evident that the granting of autonomy to Macedonia formed no part

[22] Georgevitch, *Die serbische Frage;* Kautskey, "Oesterreich und Serbien," in *Neue Zeit,* xxvii, 1; Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,* 328.

[23] *Annual Register,* 1912, 349; Songeon, *L'Histoire de la Bulgarie,* 383-385; Dragonoff, *Macedonia and the Reforms;* Pinon, "La Question de Macédoine et des Balkans," in *Question Actuelles de Politique Etrangère,* 1911, 181-233.

of their policy. They immediately began a process of bringing in Turks of the lowest classes to strengthen the Moslem element in districts where it was weak, and forcing the Christians to serve in the Ottoman army. Bulgaria perceived that the possibility of autonomy was rapidly receding. Furthermore, terrible persecutions of the Bulgarians in Macedonia were inaugurated. A cry of despair went up from them and was answered by a cry of rage from their kinsmen in Bulgaria. For the Tsar of Bulgaria to refuse the aid which the Macedonians so anxiously sought, and the Bulgarians so eagerly desired to give, possibly meant the overthrow of the dynasty. Hence it came about that Bulgaria, like Serbia, found herself impelled by reasons of policy and of sentiment, towards a disturbance of the status quo in the Near East.[24]

The accession of the Young Turks to power had momentous results in a third quarter, namely, in Crete; and the new aspect of the Cretan question which developed after 1908 bulks large among the factors that resulted in the reopening of the whole Eastern Question, and ultimately led to the European War. Crete, which lies to the south of Greece and is largely inhabited by Greeks, had taken part in the insurrection of 1821; but at the time of the emancipation of Greece had been handed over to Egypt, and ten years later reverted to Turkey. Frequent insurrections broke out and the Turks were never able to reduce the island to

[24] Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Publication No. 4), 36; Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 206-210. On the Balkan States from 1909-1912, see the volume issued by the Cambridge Press, *Russia and the Balkan States*, Appendix I, 177, sq.

complete subjection. Finally in 1897, as a result of a massacre at Canea, popular feeling was so aroused in Greece that the Government was forced to intervene. A Greek army was sent to the aid of the Cretans, and war broke forth with Turkey.[25]

In this war the defeat of Greece was so complete that the Powers were forced to intervene; but the purpose of the war was at least partially attained, for Crete was granted autonomy and placed under the protection of France, Russia, Great Britain, and Italy. Prince George of Greece was appointed High Commissioner, and upon his resignation in 1906 he was succeeded by a Greek statesman, Zaimis. The autonomy of the island was complete: it had its own postal system, flag, and laws; in its relations with Turkey the latter Power treated it like a foreign country. Ultimate union with Greece was confidently expected.[26]

This state of affairs was definitely threatened by the Revolution of 1908. Here, as in Macedonia, the Young Turks began to make it clear that Turkish sovereignty over the island would be reclaimed. Annexation to Greece would never be allowed by them. Their mission, as they conceived it, was to regenerate the Ottoman Empire, and smarting under the loss of Bosnia, they were determined to find compensation in winning back Crete. Their policy was clearly manifested in the spring of 1910, when they began to press the Powers for the restoration of Turkish rights, and demanded from Greece renun-

[25] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 104-105; Bérard, *Les Affaires du Crète;* Cahuet, *La Question d'Orient*, 477, sq.; Rambaud, *L'Histoire de la Russie*, 842, sq.

[26] Hawkesworth, *The Last Century in Europe*, 477-478.

ciation of any intention of annexing the island. To enforce their demands they began a boycott of Greek goods, with disastrous effects upon Greek commerce.[27]

The leader of the Cretans during the latter days of the island's autonomy was Eleutherios Venizelos. A practical statesman, who like Cavour knew how to be prudent and also daring, he had advocated continuing the régime of autonomy until Crete was so far Hellenized and the Powers so far prepared, that annexation to Greece would be simple and peaceable. The new policy of the Young Turks made it plain that peaceable annexation as a result of diplomatic manœuvres was out of the question. Crete must look to Greece for liberation by force of arms. In 1910 Venizelos left Crete for Greece, established himself as Prime Minister within the space of a few months and began the reorganization of the country. In eighteen months he had so far succeeded in his financial and constitutional reforms, and in his improvement of the army and navy, that Greece was well prepared for any policy of action against Turkey that might be necessary. By taking away from Crete her prospect of continued autonomy, the Young Turks had forced Greece to prepare for attack on Turkey.[28]

Three states of the Balkan Peninsula, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, thus had strong motives for a disturbance of the status quo in the Near East. It remained for the Young Turks to furnish to one of the great European Powers equally strong motives for reopening the Eastern Question. By their policy in Tripoli they forced Italy to make the first attack

[27] Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 220-240.

[28] Nikoläides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen*, 12; Schurman, *The Balkan Wars*, 42-48.

upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and begin the series of wars which has culminated in the general struggle.

To the interests of Italy in North Africa allusion has already been made. We have seen how the dream of Italian control of Tunis was dissipated by French enterprise in 1881, thereby opening a gulf of bitterness between the two Latin nations. Shortly afterwards England assumed control of Egypt, and in the nineties Italy's ambitions for empire in Abyssinia were destroyed by the annihilation of her expeditionary force at the battle of Adowa. But in 1901 the interests of Italy in Tripoli were recognized by France, in return for Italian acquiescence in the French development of Morocco; and at the Conference of Algeciras the principle of Italian rights in Tripoli was accepted by all the great Powers.[29]

Italy was not slow to make the most of the privileges which Europe recognized and which Turkey did not protest, and began to develop a carefully prepared campaign of commercial penetration. She had every hope of winning economic control of the Tripolitaine and of so increasing the prosperity of that region that the native inhabitants would prefer Italian rule to that of the Turks. The resources of the country were developed, trading-posts established, branches of Italian banks set up, and Italian steamship lines maintained; Italian capital in the meantime prepared to finance a whole system of railways. The trade of the hinterland was captured by the Italian parcel

[29] Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy*, 42-110; McClure, *Italy in North Africa*, 1-19. On Italy's recent colonial policy, see Tittoni, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy* (selections from the speeches given by the Italian Foreign Minister in Parliament, translated by di San Severino).

post. Except for its political status Tripoli was in 1908 practically an Italian province.

Italian hopes of the peaceable, economic conquest of Tripoli were crushed by the Young Turk Revolution. The regenerators of the Ottoman Empire were determined that Tripoli should not be lost like Bosnia. They sent out new officials to Tripoli, who immediately began a campaign of systematic obstruction directed against every form of Italian enterprise. Italians were subjected to consistent persecution, concessions were refused to Italian capital, and steps of a military nature taken, which indicated clearly that Turkey intended to retain what was left of her African provinces for herself.[30] If Italy was not to lose her last chance of a colony on the North African seaboard, she must obviously support her claims to Tripoli by force of arms. In 1911, after Italian opinion had been prepared by a long press campaign, Italy took the fateful step of declaring war on Turkey and setting the example for the attack on the integrity of the Turkish Empire.[31]

It was thus that the accession of the Young Turks and their chauvinistic policy led to a reopening of the Eastern Question. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece were all ready for the opportunity offered by the Italian War on Turkey. For each of them a change of the status quo in the Near East seemed vitally necessary: for Serbia, because of the annexation of Bosnia, which

[30] Letter of the Foreign Minister, the Marchese di San Guilano, cabled to *New York Times*, September 30, 1911, setting forth Italy's grounds for the declaration of war; Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 234-245.

[31] McClure, *Italy in North Africa*, 19, sq. The documents relating to the outbreak of the war are published in Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War and its Problems*, 109, sq.

followed the Revolution of 1908; for Bulgaria, because of her interests in Macedonia; for Greece, because of her interests in Crete. But the moment that the position of Turkey was threatened, the question became one of European concern. Neither Austria and Germany on the one hand, nor Russia on the other, could for the sake of their vital interests watch unmoved any alteration in the Balkan balance. It was for this reason that the Turks could never believe that Italy would draw the sword. "If she does attack us," said the Grand Vizier, "all Europe will be eventually drawn into the bloodiest struggle of history—a struggle that has always been certain to follow the destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire."[32]

[32] Personal conversation related by Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 247.

CHAPTER X

THE BALKAN WARS

The vital significance of the Italian declaration of war upon Turkey, September 27, 1911, was not generally realized at the time. None of the Powers approved Italy's aggressive action, but apparently they failed to perceive the far-reaching consequences that might result from it. France and Great Britain feared that it would lead to a disturbance of the Mediterranean balance, and although they had consented to Italy's occupation of Tripoli, when it was put before them in the light of a rather indefinite possibility, they were obviously troubled by the active steps taken by Signor Giolitti. Germany and Austria were naturally displeased by this attack made by their ally upon Turkey, with whom they themselves were anxious to remain on terms of close friendship. But all the Powers trusted that the conflict would be confined to Tripoli and that it would not reopen the Eastern Question.[1]

Italy herself desired sincerely to avoid any disturbance of Turkey's position in the Near East; she hoped that the war would be brief, and even that the result of her declaration of war would be the peaceable surrender of Tripoli by the Turks. Hence she confined her first military actions to the African seaboard.

[1] Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War and its Problems*, 38, sq.; McClure, *Italy in North Africa*, 35, sq.

Tripoli was bombarded on September 30, and a week later surrendered. An expeditionary corps disembarked early in October and succeeded in foiling all attempts made at counter-attacks by the Turks. On November 5, the Italian Parliament approved the decree that declared the annexation of the Turkish provinces in North Africa. The following months were spent in merely securing the foothold that had been won on the coast.[2] The Government continually made clear its unwillingness to prosecute an aggressive war against the Porte, provided Tripoli were surrendered.

But the Turkish Government refused to take advantage of the opportunity offered her of escaping from further attack, and the position of Italy, both from the military and diplomatic point of view, was difficult. Turkey was, it is true, incapable of winning back the military positions that she had lost, or of driving out the invaders. But the Arabs continued a vexatious and at times effective resistance under Turkish leadership, and in February, 1912, it became clear that if Turkey refused to acknowledge the Italian conquest, it would be years before Italy could hope to pacify and control her new possessions. The sole way of striking Turkey and forcing her to admit defeat was to shift the war to the Adriatic or the Ægean. Action in the Adriatic was not possible because of the interests of Austria, Italy's ally. An attack upon the Dardanelles threatened the position of Turkey so vitally that it might reopen the whole Eastern Question; and

[2] The decree of annexation is printed in Barclay, *op. cit.*, 113. The expedition and the occupation of Tripoli is briefly described in Beehler, *The History of the Italian-Turkish War*, 5-23. See also, Corradini, *La Conquista di Tripoli* (letters from the front); McClure, *op. cit.*, 38, sq.

as we have seen, the ambitions of Italy's other ally, Germany, demanded that the status of the Eastern Question remain unchanged. Turkey's position as guardian of the Straits was essential to the German policy in Mesopotamia.

Italy had promised at the beginning of the war that she would not under any circumstances disturb the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. But by April, 1912, as the deadlock in North Africa was becoming more and more apparent, it was obvious that a direct attack upon Turkey must be undertaken. Only thus could Turkey be forced to recognize the Italian conquest of Tripoli. On April 18th the forts of Kum Kalé at the mouth of the Dardanelles were bombarded, and early in May, Rhodes was invaded. Other islands in the Ægean were also occupied. Turkey's answer was the closing of the Dardanelles. Had the hands of Turkey been absolutely free, Italy would have found difficulty in wringing acceptance of her conditions from the Porte, even after the direct attack upon the Ottoman Empire. The Dardanelles were impenetrable and Turkey might well have prolonged the deadlock. But revolution had broken out in Albania and taxed the military resources of the Young Turks to their fullest extent.[3] Furthermore, the Balkan States were assuming a hostile attitude and an outbreak in that quarter began to appear imminent.

The result was that in June, 1912, Turkish representatives met the Italians to discuss bases for a settlement of the conflict. Oriental methods prolonged the negotiations until October, when Italian patience was finally exhausted and a distinct threat conveyed

[3] *Annual Register*, 1912 347-348; Beehler, *The History of the Italian-Turkish War*, 23, sq.

to Turkey that in case of war in the Balkans, Italy might be found in alliance with the Balkan States. Turkey yielded and the preliminaries of peace were signed on October 15, 1912.[4] The Treaty of Lausanne provided for the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Tripoli and of the Italian army from the islands of the Ægean; nothing was said about the cession of Tripoli to Italy for the sake of Turkish pride, but the recognition of the conquest was absolute, although merely tacit. Italy's restoration of the islands, provided for in the treaty, has never taken place. Nor has Turkey complained, inasmuch as they must later have fallen into the hands of Greece had they not been held by Italy.

The real significance of Italy's war with Turkey is not to be found in the conquest of Tripoli. That was an eventuality already foreseen by the Powers, and before 1911 Italy had taken long steps toward its accomplishment. The importance of the war lies rather in the example of direct attack upon Turkey that had been set by Italy. It was too much to expect that the Balkan States would not follow the lead thus given, and take advantage of the favorable opportunity offered in 1912.

We have seen that three of the Balkan States had very strong motives for an alteration of conditions in the Balkan Peninsula. The horrible persecution of Christians in Macedonia affected sentimentally both Bulgaria and Greece. Of equal importance was the fact that the diplomats of both nations realized that the attitude of the Young Turks threatened their dearest policies. Bulgaria had been willing to accept autonomy for Macedonia in the belief that by vigorous

[4] *Annual Register*, 1912, 352.

propaganda she could prepare the way for ultimate annexation. But the Young Turks made it plain that Macedonia was to remain under Turkish authority. They had also destroyed the autonomy of Crete and thus driven Greece into a state of desperation. Serbia, moreover, had been rendered equally desperate by the definite loss of Bosnia and looked forward to compensation in the conquest of Novi Bazar, and possibly the opening up of a pathway to the Adriatic, through Albania.

It was obvious that the Balkan States could bring effective pressure upon Turkey only by means of an alliance. The defeat of Greece, in 1897, was in the minds of all and a second attempt of the same kind promised no better success. On the other hand, Serbia and Bulgaria together could not hope to stand out against the Turk without the assistance of Greece. The coöperation of the Greek navy was essential, since that alone could prevent the disembarkation of Turkish reinforcements from Asia on the shores of Thrace. The possibility of a Balkan Alliance was scoffed at by Turkey and generally regarded by foreign diplomats as a dream that could never be realized. The hatred of Serbia for Bulgaria was only surpassed by that of Bulgaria for Greece; and all three Powers had interests in Macedonia which seemed absolutely irreconcilable. Circumstances, however, forced them to sink their differences and act together, and it was obvious that the advantages to be gained from union outweighed the disadvantages that would result from mutual compromise.

It is probable that the organization of the Balkan League resulted from the determination of Venizelos to bring such pressure upon Turkey as would lead to

a restoration of Cretan autonomy. His position as Prime Minister of Greece made him practically arbiter of the situation, for the naval power of Greece was the *sine qua non* of a successful attack upon Turkey. That Venizelos, as well as the Governments of Bulgaria and Serbia, hoped to avoid a war with Turkey is almost certain. Military success was by no means assured even to their combined forces. It was known that the Ottoman Empire could put large armies in the field, which were supposed to be perfectly disciplined and well equipped; no one will forget that the unanimous verdict of military experts at the beginning of the war was entirely favorable to Turkey. Furthermore it was certain that any attack upon Turkey would be viewed by the Powers with disapproval, a consideration, possibly, of far less weight in the minds of the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian diplomats. But even in the event of a successful war it was by no means clear that the results would be commensurate with the costs.[5]

Events, however, forced the Balkan Allies to give up their hopes of a peaceable adjustment. Turkish arrogance and incredulity as to the possibility of a real alliance between the Balkan States, forbade any concession to the demand that effective reforms be introduced in Macedonia.[6] It was obvious that if the new Allies were to maintain their position they must act vigorously and quickly. Fear of Turkish military strength vanished before the opportunity that was open: for the war with Italy had demoralized the

[5] Statement of Herr von Jagow to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, April 3, 1913; *Annual Register*, 1912, 349-350; Songeon, *Histoire de la Bulgarie*, 388-392; Schurman, *The Balkan Wars*, 34, sq.

[6] Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 267.

Turkish administration, and the revolution in Albania had weakened her strength. If they were to strike, it was advisable to strike before the full effects of the money spent upon army reorganization in Turkey were realized.

But the real force that led the Balkan Allies to war was popular opinion. There is a limit to the capacity of Governments for resisting the temptation to make war; and that limit came when it was evident that the dynasties of Bulgaria and Serbia faced the choice of war or internal revolution. The massacres of the summer of 1912 in Macedonia had so inflamed the Bulgarians that there was no holding them back. The inevitable result of popular sentiment and Turkish refusals was the declaration of war by Montenegro on October 8, 1912, and the ultimatum of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece a week later, demanding the autonomy of the European provinces of the Turkish Empire.[7]

Too late Turkey perceived that the Balkan Alliance was an accomplished fact and that the Allies were serious. Hastily the Ottoman Government offered to Bulgaria the complete reversal of its Macedonian policy, and to Greece the annexation of Crete. These offers were refused, although had they been carried out the ambitions of both states would have been largely realized. For the sake of her dignity Turkey could not accept the terms of the ultimatum and on the eighteenth of October declared war on Serbia and Bulgaria. On the same day Greece declared war on Turkey.[8]

The course of the conflict that followed is well-

[7] *Annual Register*, 1912, 352.

[8] Songeon, *Histoire de la Bulgarie*, 395-404.

remembered. According to the plan of the Allies, Greece and Serbia were to keep the Turkish army in Macedonia in check and prevent reinforcements being sent from Albania. The Greek navy was to win control of the water communications between Constantinople and Asia Minor, so that no troops could be hastily transported to Macedonia. It fell to the lot of Bulgaria to advance into Thrace and meet the main attack of the Turks. In each field the success of the Allies was complete.

In Thrace the Bulgarians began immediately the investment of Adrianople, and from the twenty-first to the twenty-third of October were engaged with the Turkish armies, which were attempting an encircling movement. The valor of the Bulgarians and the tendency to panic displayed by the Turkish troops, as well as the mistakes of the Turkish generals, led to an overwhelming victory of the Bulgarians at Kirk Kilissé. A week later the Turks made a desperate stand at Lulé Burgas, where for three days, despite their faulty equipment and lack of food, they threw back the furious Bulgarian charges. But on November 1, their powers of resistance broke and they fled to the Tchatalja lines, the final bulwark of defence before Constantinople.[9]

The Bulgarian attack on these lines was halted, largely, as seems probable, because of the success of the Greeks and Serbians in Macedonia. The major part of the Greek army, under the command of the Crown Prince Constantine had crossed the frontier into Thessaly and, advancing in the face of rather slight opposition, had cleared the way to Salonika.

[9] *Annual Register*, 1912, 353-356; Songeon, *Histoire de la Bulgarie*, 404-445.

Notwithstanding the fact that the city was well garrisoned and completely supplied, it surrendered unconditionally on November 9, and the Greek army took possession. On the following day an auxiliary corps of Bulgarians also entered the city and placed the Bulgarian flag on the towers of St. Sophia.[10]

In the meantime the Serbians had expelled the Turks from Novi Bazar, and driving them back, marched upon Monastir. By skillful strategy, combined with the utmost daring, the Turks were forced to withdraw, and ultimately encircled by the Serbian left wing, they were compelled to surrender. Monastir, coveted by each of the three Balkan nations, was captured.[11]

The disasters of Turkey had led to the fall of the Young Turk Administration, and the return to power of the veteran Kiamil Pasha. Realizing the necessity of peace, he had authorized negotiations with the Balkan States, and on December 3, 1912, an armistice was signed. The demands of the Allies for the cession of European Turkey, with the exception of a strip to the north of Constantinople as well as the Gallipoli Peninsula, were not excessive when one considers the desperate situation in which the Ottoman armies found themselves. And the opinion of Kiamil Pasha that even the holy city of Adrianople must be sacrificed to win the respite so necessary for Turkey, was endorsed by a Divan, or congress of Turkish notables. But the Young Turks were unbending in their determination to continue the struggle. On January 23, 1913, they carried out a palace revolution. Led by Enver Bey, they assassinated Nazim Pasha, the

10 Nikoläides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen*, 47, sq.
11 Schurman, *The Balkan Wars*, 53-54.

military representative of the Kiamil administration, and forced the Sultan to reinstate Shevket Pasha with a cabinet pledged to the continuation of the struggle. Further negotiations were clearly useless and the war reopened.[12]

During the second period of the war little was accomplished except the capture by the Allies of the fortresses of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. The Bulgarians were unwilling to push their attack against Constantinople, inasmuch as their interests lay rather to the west, in Thessaly, and they were occupied in watching the Greeks. Shevket Pasha soon realized the hopelessness of the Turkish position, and early in February began secret negotiations with the great Powers for their mediation. After the fall of Adrianople a basis of negotiations was proposed, accepted at once by Turkey, and on April 20, after a month's delay, by the Allies.[13]

The Treaty of London, which resulted from the negotiations that followed, decreed the dismemberment of Turkey in Europe. Everything was ceded by the Porte except the strip of territory bounded on the west by a line running from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea. Albania was given to the Powers, who were to decide upon its status and frontiers. The rest of the territory west of the Enos-Midia line was ceded to Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece for division amongst themselves, doubtless in the well-founded hope that they could not agree. Crete was given to the Allies, but the Ægean Islands were left to the Powers.

[12] *Annual Register*, 1913, 342-347; Songeon, *Histoire de la Bulgarie*, 446-451.

[13] *Annual Register*, 1913, 347-348.

It was generally understood that Crete would be handed over to Greece, but two circumstances made the division of conquered territory on the mainland an extremely delicate operation. The first of these circumstances was the disposition of Albania made by the great Powers. This province is of the utmost importance strategically because of its position guarding the entrance to the Adriatic Sea; it was coveted by Austria and Italy for this reason, and by Serbia as offering an outlet to the ocean waterways. It possesses no really national character that would allow of its absorption by any state or enable it to stand alone; and yet the forcible conquest and annexation of Albania presented extraordinary difficulties; the sturdy and half-civilized mountaineers have never been actually subjected by any of the dominant states of the Balkan Peninsula.

Since the establishment of united Italy, the rivalry of Austria and Italy for the control of the Adriatic has been keen. Italy's coastline is the longer, but Austria's possession of the indented shore of Dalmatia has assured her the advantage. Italy's ambition of winning an Albanian port in order to control the Straits of Otranto has not been veiled; Austria, on the other hand, has been equally determined that Italy should not thus establish herself at the point of vital importance. For thirty years each state has maintained a constant propaganda in the hope of winning an economic and intellectual ascendancy in Albania.

The two states, however, were allies and felt it essential to their larger relations to arrive at some sort of accord on the Albanian question. After 1907 they came to the conclusion that the point of greatest importance was to prevent Albania from falling into

the hands of Serbia in the event of the dismemberment of European Turkey. For behind Serbia they saw Russia, and Serbian control of Albania seemed to presage the extension of Pan-Slavism to the Adriatic, an eventuality that neither of the Powers could afford to consider. Accordingly they agreed to support the national movement in Albania, as the solution least inimical to their interests; and the principle of an independent Albania was maintained by them and accepted by the other Powers.[14]

The result was that after the close of the first Balkan War, Serbia and Montenegro saw themselves forced to renounce the conquest of Albania. Montenegro surrendered her claim on Scutari, which was to have been the outlet to the sea for that State and the Serbs, and Albania fell into the hands of the Powers. An independent state was created, and a German prince, William of Wied, put upon the new throne.[15] Even apart from his lack of ability as a ruler, his failure might have been expected, for there was in the turbulent province no spirit of national consciousness that would enable it to stand by itself as a separate entity. With the outbreak of the general war the supporting contingents of the Powers left Durazzo, and were shortly followed by William himself. Albania was left to itself, and Durazzo fell into the hands of Essad Pasha, self-appointed ruler.

The disposition of Albania had important effects upon the Balkan situation in the spring and summer

[14] Chlumecky, *Oesterreich-Ungarn und Italien;* Bauer, *Der Balkankrieg und die deutsche Weltpolitik,* 28; Hanotaux, *La Guerre des Balkans,* 209.

[15] *Annual Register,* 1912, 356; *Ibid.,* 1913, 332, 339, 344-345, 356; Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns,* 301.

of 1913. When the division of conquered Turkish territory was brought under consideration, Serbia could justly complain that her share of the booty had been snatched from her by the Powers. The Serbian Government had signed a treaty of partition with Bulgaria in March, 1912, by which the greater part of Macedonia was allotted to Bulgaria; but this was on the understanding that Serbia was to find her aggrandizement in Albania. If Albania were independent and the partition treaty were carried out, Bulgaria would gain everything and Serbia practically nothing. Furthermore, Monastir and Salonika, the portions of Macedonia that were coveted by Bulgaria, were in the hands of the Serbian and Greek armies, which were in a position to defend them. To strengthen their position, Serbia and Greece, early in 1913, concluded an alliance against Bulgarian ambitions, reciprocally guaranteeing their Macedonian conquests.

For Bulgaria the situation was difficult. Her armies had, it was felt, borne the brunt of the Turkish campaign and deserved the recompense. But the territory she had won was Thrace, which she did not care for, while Macedonia, which had been conquered by the Serbs and Greeks, was the home of the Bulgarian race and the object of all Bulgarian efforts. Her conquest of Adrianople meant little to her; but the acquisition of Salonika and Monastir was all important. The Bulgarians felt "that they had accomplished everything to receive nothing."[16]

Bulgarian discontent became constantly keener, as

[16] *Annual Register*, 1913, 349-352; *International Commission Report*, 21; Dehn, *Die Völker Südeuropas und ihre politischen Probleme.*

the resolve of Serbia to secure her hold on Macedonia became more obvious. That discontent was increased by the stories of Serbian cruelty towards the Bulgarian inhabitants of Macedonia. At first the Bulgarian Government hoped to bribe Greece by the offer of Salonika, if Greece would assist Bulgaria against Serbia. With the refusal of this offer by Venizelos, the extreme party in Sofia began their schemes for carrying through their ambitions by force of arms.

The belligerent policy of Dr. Daneff, the leader of the Macedonian party in Bulgaria, who replaced the pacific minister, Gueshoff, was supported by the Germanic Powers. For Austria and Germany the outcome of the first Balkan War had been by no means pleasant. German military prestige had been dimmed by the defeats of Turkey, and the effectiveness of the French Creusot guns as well as the faults of Turkish army organization, led to many whispers that German military superiority was not what it was supposed to be. Austrian opinion had supported Turkey, and Austrian diplomatic prestige had been lowered by this backing of the wrong horse. Furthermore, if Serbia and Greece carried out their scheme of partition it meant a vast increase of Serbian power in the Balkans, which must threaten the safety of the Austrian Empire. Nothing would suit the policy of Germany and Austria better than to see an internecine quarrel between the victorious Balkan States.

The attack of Bulgaria, designed to win for her Macedonia and destined to end in Bulgarian humiliation, began suddenly. On June 29, 1913, a general advance against the Greeks and Serbs was ordered, without declaration of war or any intimation of

attack.[17] Apparently it was believed at Sofia that merely a demonstration would suffice to result in an immediate arrangement according to the Bulgarian demands. But the positions held by the Greeks and Serbs were excellent and Bulgaria was worn out by her efforts of the year before. Instead of negotiations, both states ordered a counter-advance on the Bulgarian armies. The retreat of the Bulgarians began on July 6, and continued for three weeks. The victories of the first week satisfied the Serbs, who then rested quietly; the Greeks, on the other hand, pushed forward rapidly, so much so that on July 29, they found themselves in a difficult position.

But any chance of Bulgarian success against Greece at the end of July was eliminated by the action of Rumania. This Power saw in the circumstances of 1913 an opportunity for winning advantage out of what at first seemed to her a distinctly unfavorable situation. The initial success of Bulgaria in 1912 against the Turks had threatened Rumania's position, for it seemed to lead towards the supremacy of Bulgaria in the Balkans. To neutralize the advantage of Bulgaria, Rumania asked in the spring of 1913 for a cession of territory from Bulgaria that would give to Rumania a strategically defensible frontier on her southern border. She adduced her benevolent neutrality in 1912 as well as her assistance in the liberation of Bulgaria in 1877 as claims upon Bulgarian gratitude.[18]

Bulgaria refused to admit the justice of the Ruma-

[17] Nikoläides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen*, 252, sq.; Schurman, *The Balkan Wars*, 94-108; *International Commission Report*, 65-69.

[18] Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 338-340; Schurman, *The Balkan Wars*, 112-116.

nian demands, although a small part of the territory asked for was ceded in April, 1913. Rumania was not satisfied, and the victorious advance of the Serbian and Greek armies in the first week of July furnished her with the opportunity for which she had been waiting. She declared war on July 10, invaded Bulgaria, and advanced upon Sofia. Her action ended the war. On July 30, an armistice was declared and the delegates of the five states of the Balkan Peninsula met in conference at Bukarest.[19]

The terms of the settlement of Bukarest were naturally unfavorable to Bulgaria; with a Rumanian army in her rear she could not hope to continue the war with Greece and Serbia, and must perforce submit to their demands. Greece not only secured Salonika but extended her coastline to the east so as to include Kavalla, thus taking from Bulgaria the port on the Ægean so vitally essential to the economic development of the small portion of Macedonia won by Bulgaria. Crete was granted to Greece without serious discussion. Serbia extended her territories southwards as far as Monastir, and Rumania took from Bulgaria the territory on her own southern border, the desire for which had caused her entrance into the struggle. Another humiliation was reserved for Bulgaria, namely, the successful reclamation of Adrianople by Turkey. The frontier running from Enos on the Ægean was to take a sweep to the northwards, cutting the railway communications of Bulgaria with the sea.[20]

[19] *Annual Register*, 1913, 352-353; Hanotaux, *La Guerre des Balkans*, 374, sq.; Nikoläides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen*, 321, sq.

[20] *Annual Register*, 1913, 355; see map published in *International Commission Report*, 70.

It has been a matter of common knowledge that the Balkan settlement of 1913 was so unsatisfactory as to make it extremely improbable that it could remain permanent. The discontent of Bulgaria at her portion can be realized when we remember that though in weakened condition she had gone to war in order to prevent exactly this settlement. Serbia had won territory in Macedonia to which her claim on racial and linguistic grounds was very shadowy, and which at Sofia was regarded as *Bulgaria irredenta.* The aggrandizement of Greece on the Macedonian littoral was so great as to threaten Bulgarian economic development, at the same time that it brought a considerable portion of the Bulgarian race under Grecian domination.[21]

But the Balkan States were so worn out by the efforts made during the two wars, especially during the second, that pure exhaustion might have ensured peace in the Balkans, had it not been for the effect of the settlement at Bukarest on the great Powers. All the Powers were troubled by the upsetting of the status quo in the Near East. For Great Britain, Russia, and France, who were involved in domestic difficulties, the crisis of 1912-1913 had occurred at a most inopportune moment; internal troubles in each country were such that the prospect of international affairs being thrown back into the Balkan melting-pot, from which might emerge the unknown, had at the beginning of the war terrified the Foreign Ministers of all three nations.

[21] Dominian, "Linguistic Areas in Europe: Their Boundaries and Political Significance," in *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society,* Vol. XLII, No. 6, 435-437; Leger, *Turcs et Grecs contre Bulgares en Macédoine.*

The diplomatic prestige of the Powers suffered all through the wars. They had in effect prohibited any armed attack upon Turkey, and the Balkan States, led by Montenegro, laughed at the prohibition. They had insisted that there should be no alteration in the territorial status quo, and Turkey in Europe had been carved up. Their impotent efforts largely justified the remark of Venizelos that the Powers were "venerable old women."

Nevertheless the settlement of Bukarest calmed the Powers with the exception of Austria and Germany. If only that settlement could be made solid, France and Great Britain were by no means dissatisfied with the result. These Powers took no direct interest in the Near East, except for their desire that a permanent peace in that quarter might be obtained. The victory of Serbia and Greece was not displeasing to Russia. And Italy, although she watched the rise of these two states with alarm, was content with the settlement, since it ensured an independent Albania, where the Italian propaganda might be continued.

But to Austria and Germany the settlement of 1913 presented itself in far different colors. For both Powers it was a humiliation to their prestige and a menace to their interests. It is true that Austria had prevented Serbian influence from touching the littoral of the Adriatic by insisting successfully on the independence of Albania. But this triumph of Austrian diplomacy was more than offset by Serbia's vast accession of territory in Macedonia. Austria's political and economic control of the Balkans, which in 1908 seemed on the point of establishment, was threatened with annihilation. Salonika, toward which Austria had long cast covetous eyes was in the hands of Greece.

Bulgaria, bitter at the results of the war of 1913, was in bad temper and blamed the Hapsburgs. Rumania could no longer be counted upon by Austria and Germany, and seemed to be moving towards the Russian side. Turkey herself, apparently abandoned by her Teutonic friends, was overtly being brought under the influence of the Entente Powers.

Furthermore Austria was threatened at home. An echo of the waxing greatness of Serbia ran through Bosnia, already honeycombed with disaffection, and the Hapsburgs were facing an internal revolution of their Slav subjects. The disintegration of their Empire seemed to be at hand, unless the newly won power of Serbia were broken. Magyar domination over Slav, so carefully planned by Andrassy a generation before, ran the risk of destruction, not merely in the Balkans but in Austria-Hungary itself.[22]

Austrian prestige as well as Austrian interests had received a staggering blow by the Balkan Wars. In

[22] "Since the annexation crisis," wrote Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold, "the relations between the monarchy and Serbia were on the part of the latter poisoned through national chauvinism, enmity, and an effective propaganda of the Greater Serbian aspirations in our countries populated by Serbs; since the last Balkan war the success of Serbia increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the outbursts of which at some points bear the stamp of madness. . . . an accounting with Serbia, a war for the position of the monarchy as a great Power, yes for its very existence as such, cannot permanently be evaded. If we neglect to bring clarity into our relations with Serbia, we shall become accomplices in blame for the difficulties and disadvantage of the relations in a future conflict which after all, whether sooner or later, must be settled. For the local observer and the representative of the Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia, the question has so constituted itself that we cannot endure a further damaging of our prestige," Austrian *Red Book*, 1914, No. 6. Cf. also *Ibid.*, No. 8, Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and Constantinople.

each of them the Austrian diplomats had guessed badly and supported the losing side. In the first they had counted upon Turkey and trusted in its victory over the Allies. In the second, Austria had instigated Bulgaria and had given moral support to the attempt made to alter the partition of territory. In each of these struggles the protegé of Austria had been woefully unsuccessful. In all respects but one (the autonomy of Albania), the settlement of 1913 was thus a disaster to Austria and she felt that it must be speedily retrieved. Some blow must be struck that would rehabilitate Austrian prestige and recover the political and economic influence that she had lost in the Balkans. So early as the autumn of 1913 the determination of Austria was indicated, when she suggested to Italy that the latter Power join with her in an attack on Serbia.[23]

For Germany, the Treaty of Bukarest was no less inacceptable. The diplomatic defeat of Austria was her own, and the general feeling in Germany was "that what was a danger for their ally, was also a danger for them, and that they must do all in their power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great Power."[24] German military prestige had furthermore received a direct blow in the defeat of the German-trained Turkish army in 1912; like Austria she had failed manifestly in her diplomacy when she

[23] Speech of Signor Giolitti, in Italian Chamber, December 5, 1914. For the conditions that were tending to separate Austria and Italy and possibly disrupt the Triple Alliance, see Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, 276; statement of Signor di Sonnino in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. II, No. 3, 495.

[24] "Truth about Germany," in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 2, 248. Cf. also *Ibid.*, 260; *Annual Register*, 1912, 229-342.

instigated Bulgaria against Serbia and Greece in 1913. Remembering the stress laid by German diplomats on the importance of maintaining German prestige, and the blows struck in 1905, 1908, and 1911 for that purpose, it was not to be expected that Germany would suffer quietly the verdict of 1913 to pass unprotested.

Germany's political and economic interests also, like those of Austria, demanded that the settlement of 1913 should not be allowed to stand. We have noticed the interest taken by Germany in the development of her Mesopotamian policy and her efforts for the realization of her Bagdad Railway scheme. After 1910 the success of this scheme was a factor of greater importance in her aspirations than ever before, owing to the exclusion of Germany from Persia. At first German commercial and political agents had hoped to find a field for exploitation in Persia, and to slip in between the ancient rivals in that country, Russia and England. But the Accord of 1907 between those Powers apparently closed the door in Germany's face. Despite her strenuous efforts, Germany found that Russia and England were in Persia to stay, and, making the best of the situation, she accepted the fact of her exclusion. In November, 1910, Germany and Russia exchanged views, which were embodied in the Accord of Potsdam: Russia promised not to interfere with the Bagdad Railway, in return for which Germany agreed to declare that she had no political interests in Persia.[25]

The retirement of Germany from Persia naturally made the development of her Mesopotamian policy

[25] Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 367-369; Rachfahl, *Kaiser und Reich*, 331-332.

more than ever essential to the carrying out of German world policy. The *raison d'être* of the Potsdam Accord is to be found partly in the hope of separating Russia from England; but chiefly in the desire of ensuring Germany's position in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. But the Balkan settlement of 1913, if it proved to be permanent, would be fatal to German control of Mesopotamia, for it threatened to block the road to Asia Minor. So long as Austria was supreme in the Balkans and Turkey on the Dardanelles, the path from Hamburg to Bagdad was clear. But the Treaty of Bukarest seemed likely to give control of the Balkans to the Slavs. The power of the Turks was weakened and their allegiance to the Teutonic cause possibly shaken. The islands of the Ægean were held by Greece, the protegé of the Entente Powers, and by Italy, who would not sacrifice her interests in the cause of Pan-Germanism. Bulgaria was crushed and the chance of Rumanian assistance doubtful.

Germany, like Austria, was thus forced to regard the Balkan settlement as inimical to her interests as well as a humiliation to her prestige, and determined that it must be upset. By diplomacy or force the new Serbia must be paralyzed and Turkey strengthened. Bulgaria must be dragged back under German influence and reinforced by the Macedonian provinces which she had failed to secure in 1913. Greece must surrender the islands to Turkey, and Rumania again be attracted within the Teutonic orbit. If possible this rearrangement must be rendered permanent by the creation of an understanding or league between Turkey, Bulgaria, and Rumania, into which Greece also might be drawn; such a league, supported by

Germany and Austria, would offset the influence of Serbia and ensure the exclusion of Russian interests from, as well as the predominance of German interests upon, the Danube and Dardanelles. Towards the execution of this plan Austrian and German diplomats are said to have worked during the autumn of 1913.[26]

But it speedily became apparent that direct diplomatic efforts would prove unavailing. The demand that the Treaty of Bukarest should be laid before Europe for revision, was refused by the Powers; and Rumania, the most important of the Balkan States, soon made plain her determination to uphold the settlement at all costs. Bulgaria and Turkey were disorganized and could give no assistance. Obviously the destruction of the Balkan settlement must come through force, and preferably in a direct conflict with Serbia, such as Austria secretly suggested to Italy.

During the autumn of 1913 and the spring of the following year Austria watched and waited for the

[26] E. J. Dillon, whose knowledge of secret diplomacy is extensive if not always critical, asserts (*A Scrap of Paper*, 23) on what he says to be first-hand knowledge but without adducing proof, that ever since the signing of the Treaty of Bukarest it was the inflexible resolve of the Central Powers to upset it. Furthermore Berchtold admitted to the British Ambassador that the settlement was unsatisfactory to Austria, British *Correspondence*, 1914, No. 161. We find moreover in the "Truth About Germany" (*New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 2, 248), that as soon as the Balkan troubles began the Central Powers had been preparing for war, a war specially directed against Serbia, because it was felt that behind Serbia stood the great Slav Power. The German *White Book* (preface) states the belief prevalent in Austria and Germany that Russia was busy in attempting to direct a Balkan League against Austria, and goes on to say that "under these circumstances it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border." And cf. the speech of Giolitti, December 5, 1914, cited above.

opportunity that might furnish a pretext for the attack on Serbia. On the other hand, the Serbian Government exercised the utmost skill in preserving a perfectly correct attitude. The national aspirations of the Serbs could not be extinguished, and the nationalistic secret society, the *Narodna Odbrana,* flourished and wove its web of plots and intrigues in Bosnia. But no official sanction was given by the Belgrade Cabinet to the anti-Austrian propaganda, and the Austrian agents could discover no *casus belli.* Austria, with Germany behind her, was ready to strike, but the occasion was lacking.

Suddenly, on June 28, 1914, the opportunity waited for, came in startling form. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian imperial crown, was assassinated with his wife, in the streets of the Bosnian town, Serajevo. The murder was done by a member of the Serb nationalistic society, and clearly formed part of a Serb intrigue, whether or not it had been sanctioned by Belgrade. The pretext for the projected attack on Serbia was at hand, and Austria and Germany realized that the moment for action had come.[27]

[27] Austrian *Red Book,* 1914, Nos. 6, 8; German *White Book,* preface.

CHAPTER XI

THE CRISIS OF 1914

It is incontestable that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand furnished an unexpected but not altogether unwelcome opportunity to German diplomats. Sincerely horrified by the brutality of the assassination of the heir apparent to the neighboring throne, they could not but realize that in it lay an opening for the aggressive action which their general policy demanded. Ever since the formation of the Franco-British Entente in 1904, Germany had watched the rise of an international opposition with increasing anxiety. The conditions under which Bismarck had maintained German hegemony had departed. Delcassé, by arranging the quarrels of France with Italy and Great Britain, had enabled France to free herself from German control and establish her diplomatic autonomy. Germany's failure to maintain her mastery of continental diplomacy was further manifested in 1907 when Great Britain and Russia ended their long quarrel and came to an understanding.

The conventions made by the Powers of the Triple Entente were not openly directed against Germany. But she saw in them a concerted policy designed to isolate the German Empire.[1] In any case they

[1] A very clear exposition of the belief prevalent in Germany since 1911 that Great Britain built up the Triple Entente in order to "encircle" and throttle Germany is to be found in an article by Th. Schiemann in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. II,

destroyed the peculiar position of primacy that she had held under Bismarck and during the first decade of the reign of William II; German diplomatic prestige suffered undeniably by the restoration of the balance of power. Such a situation was intolerable to the diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse. The diplomatic as well as the military primacy of Germany had been laid down by Bismarck as an essential condition of Germany's success and even of her existence. With the economic transformation of the Empire, the maintenance of her position in Europe became still more vitally necessary. The Kaiser and his ministers firmly believed that the commercial and political world empire of Germany must be founded upon continental hegemony, and that any serious defeat for German prestige on the Continent would destroy her scheme for the future.[2]

To disrupt the opposing combination and regain the position which she had lost, Germany, as we saw, struck a blow at France in 1905, when the Kaiser disembarked at Tangier and offered to protect the Sultan of Morocco from French aggression. France was humiliated for the moment and Delcassé was forced to resign. But Germany's victory was in a large measure cadmean and she did not receive all that she sought in the following year at Algeciras; and in 1907 was compelled to witness the reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia. She struck another blow, accordingly, in 1908, this time levelled at Russia, and

No. 4, 784-795. Cf. also Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 280, and Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, 159; the latter holds that the object of the Triple Entente was to isolate Germany, so that France might win back Alsace-Lorraine and Great Britain divide Turkey for her own profit.

[2] Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 45-46.

by supporting Austria in the annexation of Bosnia imposed her will upon Europe. Again in 1911 she made another attempt to reinforce her prestige and destroy the Triple Entente, by the *Coup d'Agadir*. But she failed in her double purpose. Her diplomacy did not succeed in imposing itself upon the other Powers, and France and Great Britain were brought still more closely together by her aggressive move. General considerations forced the diplomats at Berlin to believe in the necessity for some new aggressive action which would retrieve the fiasco of 1911 and reëstablish conditions similar to those that had guaranteed German hegemony under Bismarck and in the nineties.[3] Surely no better pretext for such action could be found than that presented by the murder of the Archduke.

The special conditions that had resulted from the Balkan Wars also seemed to call for some action that would rectify, from the German point of view, the settlement of 1913. German military prestige had suffered in the Turkish and Bulgarian defeats, and German diplomatic prestige had been lowered by the Treaty of Bukarest. The advantages won by Serbia were regarded in Germany as an affront to her ally, Austria, and as a victory for Russia. The fear of a great Slavic advance and of the annihilation of Teutonism by an inferior civilization was oppressing Germany. Furthermore, the commercial classes and the Pan-Germanists saw in the Treaty of Bukarest the end of their plan of penetration into Mesopotamia and of a Greater Germany extending from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. For the execution of such a plan Germany must control the Balkans and Dardanelles

[3] *Supra*, Chap. VIII.

by means of Austria and Turkey. But the Balkan Wars had shaken Austrian influence in the peninsula, and the position of Turkey on the Straits was not one of strength.[4]

General and special considerations thus impelled German diplomats to strike a blow similar to those of previous years, and one which would simultaneously reinforce her diplomatic prestige and benefit her political and commercial interests in the Near East. By forcing Serbia to disgorge what she had won at Bukarest, Germany would win a great diplomatic victory over Russia, the protector of Serbia, would weaken the Slavic element in the Balkans, and open the way to Constantinople and Mesopotamia.

It was probable that Germany could never hope to find more propitious circumstances for such action than those of the early summer of 1914. Her ally, Austria, would grant her hearty assistance in the overturning of the Balkan settlement and the humiliation of Serbia, for in this case Austrian interests coincided with those of Germany. The diplomats of Vienna and Buda-Pesth had not always enjoyed the rôle of brilliant second accorded to Austria, and could not be counted upon invariably as tools for the furtherance of German prestige or German world policy. But Austria had every reason to desire the weakening of Serbia and the checking of Slavic development in the Balkans; she would willingly exercise her right to punish Serbia for the crime of Serajevo, in order to reëstablish her own prestige and influence in the peninsula, as well as to protect herself from the intrigues of disaffected Serbs.

Certain of Austrian co-partnership in any attack

[4] *Supra*, Chaps. IX, X.

upon the status quo in the Near East, Germany believed that she could count upon the abstention of the other Powers from any interference. The brutality of the murder of the Archduke had horrified the whole world and aroused the keenest sympathy with Austria. The ministers of the various Powers, even of Russia, agreed that Austria would be justified in taking strong measures calculated to prevent a repetition of such an atrocity.[5] Serbia was identified with crime of the most monstrous sort and Austria became the representative of law and justice. If, as seemed to be the case, the assassination of June 28 was merely a typical act of one of the Serbian societies with which Bosnia was honeycombed, Austria had every right to maintain the forces of civilization and preserve her own existence, even if the most stringent action should prove necessary. It was not impossible that the Serbian Government itself had been concerned in the murderous intrigues of the secret political organizations, and the memory of the murder of Alexander and Draga in 1903 did not weaken the general belief throughout the world that Serbia merited severe punishment.

Even if the projected action of Austria proved to be wider in its scope than was generally expected, it would not, in the belief of Germany, lead to the intervention of the Entente Powers. They had accepted the high-handed action of Austria and Germany in 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, and would doubtless allow Serbia and Russia to

[5] Cf. British *White Paper, Cd. 7467,* 1914, Nos. 5 and 62, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen and Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. This collection of documents is hereafter referred to as British *Correspondence* to distinguish it from the German *White Book.*

undergo a similar humiliation in 1914. Furthermore, any protests they might enter would be futile because of their total incapacity of supporting them by force of arms.

Russia, the natural protector of the Serbs and the Power most directly interested in preventing the annihilation of Slavic influence in the Balkans, was believed in both Austria and Germany to be in no condition to risk a war. Every report from St. Petersburg emphasized the fact that Russia could not take the field and was acutely aware of her own impotence. It was known that the Russian Government had borrowed barely enough money to cover the cost of the Japanese War, and that entirely insufficient amounts had been spent upon the rebuilding of her naval and military equipment. Ammunition and guns demand heavy expenditure and such expenditure had not been made. There were hardly three million rifles in Russia and the lack of high explosives was a matter of common knowledge. It was understood that Russia was on the point of beginning a thorough military reorganization and development; but at the moment she was ill-prepared and her own experts, with few exceptions, believed that a war against the Teutonic Powers would be suicidal.[6]

Confidence in Russia's inability to take the field was increased by Germany's conviction that the financial condition of the Slav Empire was chaotic. German agents reported that the gold reserve sup-

[6] Dillon, *A Scrap of Paper*, 28-39. In using this work, of which the thesis is often utterly unsupported by evidence, the reader must distinguish between Dillon's theories and his statements of fact. Much of the book seems rather fantastic, but the author's knowledge of general conditions and especially of the German attitude may be accepted as exact.

posedly kept in the Imperial Bank for a national emergency, had been loaned out, and that a large amount of it was in the hands of private corporations and individuals, many of them actually German. Should a political crisis occur, the Russian Government would face bankruptcy. Furthermore, the internal dissensions of Russia would necessarily prevent her from entering into war: the Finns, the Poles, and the Jews would take advantage of the situation to create a revolution; industrial discontent would find its opportunity; the greater part of the Russian army could never be used on a campaign, for it would be needed at home to preserve order and maintain the dynasty on the throne. Add to all this the fact that Russia's system of transportation, inadequate at best, was paralyzed by serious strikes and labor difficulties. All such factors were commented upon by German and Austrian diplomats with acrimonious pleasure and they felt abundantly justified in their confidence that no effective protest would come from Russia.[7]

With Russia inactive, it was not likely that France or Great Britain would take any step to oppose the humiliation of Serbia and the breaking down of Slavic influence in the Balkans. And even if they should desire to do so, like Russia they were practi-

[7] According to the French Ambassador in Berlin, Germans realized that Russia was making great improvements in her army and her navy, but that those improvements were by no means completed, French *Yellow Book*, 1914, No. 14. A few weeks later the German Ambassador in Petrograd reported that Russia would never go to war, British *Correspondence*, No. 139, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. An interesting point to note in this connection is that at the beginning of the war, Austria, which ought naturally to be fearful of Russia, sent heavy siege guns and a considerable force of troops to Belgium.

cally impotent. Germany believed France to be politically and nationally decadent. Her distaste for war, and her desire for material comfort and well-being were definitely manifested by the debates on the three year military system. She was pacifist to the core. The French army was ill-trained and ill-equipped, according to the testimony of the French Minister of War himself. Her system of transportation, the most important of auxiliary factors in modern warfare, was totally lacking in the essential qualities of order and rapidity; it was inevitable that the French mobilization should go to pieces.

Furthermore, the political system of France was thought by Germans to be totally incapable of standing the stress and strain of war. The corruption characteristic of the republican form of government would be fatal to the efficiency of operations. The weakness and division of the nation was being demonstrated at the very moment by the scandals of the Caillaux case, which in itself so paralyzed the nation that the Ministry would be incapable of taking effective action in foreign affairs.[8]

Great Britain also was believed to be in no condition to intervene in continental matters. The German secret service agents laid great stress upon the fact that British public opinion was opposed to war, and that the Radicals and Laborites, upon whom the Liberal Ministry depended, were invariably hostile to any action upon the Continent. The Government was in the throes of the Ulster crisis, and the probability of a civil war in Ireland seemed undeniable;

[8] *Annual Register*, 1914, 272-273, 281; British *Correspondence*, No 32, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey; French *Yellow Book*, No. 14; Dillon, *A Scrap of Paper*, 43-49.

at the moment when this fratricidal struggle was about to begin, Great Britain would be in no position to devote attention to the situation in the Balkans. Add to this the impression created in Germany by the British Government's impotence in attempting to deal with the militant feminists; a state which could not suppress its own women must realize its total incapacity to oppose a Power like Germany![9]

Such were the arguments upon which Germany and Austria based their conviction that the moment was ripe for the destruction of the Serb power in the Balkans and the clearing of the path to Constantinople. Serbia was to be stung to a resistance which would justify the entrance of an Austrian army and the subsequent annihilation of Serb power. Austria herself need not annex any portion of Serbian territory, but the districts acquired by the Treaty of Bukarest could be divided between Rumania, Bulgaria, and possibly Greece, who would thus be reclaimed by Austrian influence. Such a humiliation of Serbia would result in a diplomatic victory over Russia, a striking reaffirmation of Teutonic primacy in Europe, and the reëstablishment of favorable commercial conditions in the Near East. The danger of a general war, which might result if Russia dared to intervene, was slight in the extreme, because of the unreadiness of all the Entente Powers. But should Russia refuse to accept the humiliation designed for her and her protegé, Germany was thoroughly prepared and could hardly hope to find a better opportunity for enforcing her position by means of war.

Under these circumstances the Austrian Govern-

[9] Cf. Rose, *The Origins of the War*, 151-152.

ment prepared the note to Serbia which set forth the punishment she must undergo for the murder of the Archduke, and which gave the first indication of the Austro-German scheme of destroying Slavic influence in the Near East. Whether or not Germany assisted in the drafting of the note is a matter of doubt. It is certain, however, that she was fully aware of the general character of the Austrian demands and that she had given her promise to support them to the uttermost. Germany later admitted that the two Governments consulted together with regard to the measures that should be taken, and that Austria received *carte blanche* from her more powerful ally. The German *White Book* says in this connection: "The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our Ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation, and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, would receive our approval."[10]

Thus supported by Germany, Austria presented her note to Serbia on July 23, 1914. The moment chosen for the despatch of the note was carefully selected and the situation seemed to favor the chances

[10] German *White Book,* preface; Bunsen wrote that he had private information that the German Ambassador had knowledge of the text of the note before it was sent and wired it to the Kaiser, British *Correspondence,* No. 95, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey; the Bavarian Prime Minister admitted that he "had knowledge of the note to Serbia," and it was hardly likely that under such circumstances the Imperial German Government would have been kept in ignorance, French *Yellow Book,* No. 21.

of Austria's carrying through her project before the Powers could intervene, even if they dared. During the weeks immediately preceding, Austria had given assurances that her demands would be moderate, and expressed the belief that there would be no serious crisis.[11] None of the diplomats were prepared for extreme measures on the part of Austria. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, having received formal assurances that the situation was not grave, had left Vienna for a fortnight's vacation. The French President, Poincaré, was in Russia with Viviani, the Prime Minister.[12] The French Ambassador to Serbia was away from Belgrade. The attention of British statesmen was wholly directed towards the Home Rule conference; the note to Serbia, in fact, was despatched upon the very day that the conference failed and when civil war in Ulster seemed unavoidable. The diplomats of the Entente Powers thus could not easily meet to arrange a concerted protest to the Austrian demands, and the Germanic Powers would be dealing solely with Serbia.

The character of the demands made in the note of July 23 was such as to indicate the extent to which Germany and Austria meant to alter the Balkan situation.[13] Only forty-eight hours was allowed

11 French *Yellow Book,* Nos. 11 and 12. On July 23 the general secretary of the Austrian Foreign Office assured the French Ambassador that "a pacific conclusion could be counted on," *Ibid.,* No. 20.

12 British *Correspondence,* No. 161, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey; French *Yellow Book,* Nos. 18 and 25.

13 The terms of the note to Serbia are printed in British *Correspondence,* No. 4, and in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,* of July 25, 1914, with comments illustrating the German point of view. Both England and Italy agreed that the terms of the note were of the most threatening character, British *Correspondence,* Nos. 5 and 41; French *Yellow Book,* No. 56.

Serbia in which to make her reply; clearly she was not to have time to consult her friends, or place the question before Europe. She was given her choice of complete submission before the end of this period, or of war. And the conditions laid down for her acceptance were such that if she submitted she would become to all intents and purposes a vassal state of Austria.

The Hapsburg Monarchy demanded that the Serb Government should officially condemn the anti-Austrian propaganda and promise to punish all Serb officials who should later take part in it; that it should dissolve the *Narodna Odbrana,* the great nationalistic organization, suppress all publications directed against Austria, dismiss all teachers connected with the anti-Austrian movement and all military officers and civil functionaries named by the Austrian Government as being concerned in that propaganda; that it should arrest two Serbians, specially named as implicated in the plot of Serajevo, prevent all illicit traffic in arms across the frontier and punish the officials who had facilitated such traffic. These terms were such that Serbia might possibly have accepted them without loss of anything but pride. But there followed two further demands which no state claiming to be independent could accord: Austria insisted that representatives of her Government should be allowed to collaborate in the suppression of the anti-Austrian movement, and, furthermore, that Austrian officials take part in the judicial investigation relating to the plot that culminated on June 28.

The acceptance of the two latter conditions would have rendered the Serbian Ministers liable to a charge

of high treason, for such coöperation as Austria suggested was not merely contrary to criminal procedure but also to Serbian law.[14] As an independent nation Serbia could not be expected to surrender her sovereign rights and quietly accept the suzerainty of Austria, which the note suggested. It seemed obvious that Austria had so constructed her demands as to make their acceptance an impossibility, in order that she might have an excuse for the military invasion of Serbia and a complete overturning of the balance in the Balkans. The Austrian people were clamoring for war and the diplomats realized that their plans found popular support. "The impression left on my mind," said the British Ambassador at Vienna, "is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[15]

From the first, Germany showed an uncompromising attitude: the affair was a local one, according to her expressed views of the situation, and any inter-

[14] Russian *Orange Book,* No. 25.

[15] British *Correspondence,* No. 161, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. Cf. also letter of the Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold, Austrian *Red Book,* No. 6: "An accounting with Serbia, a war for the position of the monarchy as a great Power, yes for its very existence as such, cannot permanently be avoided." The *Militärische Rundschau* said: "If we do not make up our minds to go to war now, we shall have to do so in two or three years' time and under much less favorable

vention of the other Powers was not to be considered. Nor did the German press conceal their pleasure at the prospect of seeing Serbia brought under the suzerainty of Austria, and Austrian influence once more predominant in the Balkans to the profit of Germany. The one fear expressed was that the Austrian conditions would be accepted *en bloc,* and that there would be no war against Serbia.[16]

That fear was almost realized, for the Serbian reply to the note, delivered on July 25, was practically a complete submission. Serbia promised to make the official declaration against the anti-Austrian propaganda that was demanded of her, and of the other ten conditions, she agreed to accept eight. Two she accepted with reserves: the Serbian Government expressed its inability to understand the kind of collaboration which Austria demanded in the attack on the propaganda, but promised to permit such collaboration as was in conformity with international law and criminal procedure; the coöperation of Austria in the judicial investigation was impossible, since it was contrary to law, but Serbia promised to communicate the results of such investigations to the Austrian officials. Finally, if Austria were not satisfied with the terms of the reply, the Serbian Government declared itself ready to place the matter either before the Hague Tribunal or the great

conditions.'' The *Neue Freie Presse* was indignant at the thought of attempting a pacific arrangement; it believed that a peaceful settlement could follow only a ''war to the knife against Pan-Slavism,'' French *Yellow Book,* Nos. 12, 17. Bunsen wrote to Grey that ''the language of the press leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired,'' British *Correspondence,* No. 20.

[16] British *Correspondence,* Nos. 2, 32, 33, 71.

Powers.[17] Thus even in the two points that were not completely accepted, Serbia left wide opportunity for a peaceful understanding, if Austria so desired.

Had Austria accepted the Serbian reply as satisfactory, she would have secured a notable diplomatic victory and would probably have been able to cripple Serb influence so effectively as to nullify the effect of the Treaty of Bukarest and reëstablish her own influence in the Balkans; she would have punished Serbia for the murder of the Archduke and would have received guarantees for the future. But Austria was apparently determined that her troops should enter Serbia and to all appearances had made up her mind to find the Serb reply unsatisfactory. The Austrian Minister in Belgrade spent only forty minutes in an examination of the document, supposed to be of all-importance, declared it unsatisfactory, and immediately left for Vienna.[18] At the moment, no reason was given for the rejection of Serbia's response, and it was not until July 28, that a brief note explained that the Serb answer made no real concessions, and was entirely evasive in character.[19]

Once more Serbia attempted to avert the open hostilities that threatened. On July 28, the Serbian *Chargé d'affaires* at Rome made a proposition to the Italian Foreign Minister which displayed Serbia's eagerness to find any solution, no matter how humiliating for herself: "If some explanation were given regarding the mode in which Austrian agents would

[17] British *Correspondence*, No. 39; *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 29, 1914 (with official comments).

[18] Durkheim et Denis, *Qui a voulu la guerre?* 19.

[19] German *White Book;* French *Yellow Book*, No. 75; British *Correspondence*, No. 31; *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 29, 1914.

require to intervene . . . Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note." And the Italian Minister suggested that if Austria considered that she would compromise her dignity by giving explanations to Serbia, she might communicate them to the Powers, who would pass them on to Serbia.[20] But Austria would not consider this last proposal and on the evening of July 28, declared war on Serbia.[21]

Everything now depended upon the attitude taken by Russia. If that Power accepted the German demand that the question between Austria and Serbia should be localized, and permitted Austria to prosecute her aggressive action against Serbia, it was not likely that France or Great Britain would intervene. Sir Edward Grey had made it perfectly clear that the Austro-Serb quarrel in itself did not interest Great Britain, and that if Russia did not step in, he would not act.[22] In Austria the belief was strong that Russia would not intervene and that war with Serbia would not result in a general European conflict; the British Ambassador at Vienna wrote that few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other great Powers into the field.[23] In Germany the possibility of Russian intervention began to be regarded more seriously; but on July 24, the German Ambassador at Vienna expressed his conviction that Russia would stand aside.[24] Hence the uncompromising brutality with which Austria disposed of every attempt to prevent war with Serbia.

[20] British *Correspondence*, No. 64, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.
[21] British *Correspondence*, No. 50.
[22] British *Correspondence*, Nos. 10, 24, 44.
[23] British *Correspondence*, No. 161.
[24] British *Correspondence*, Nos. 32, 161.

And yet from the very first Russia attempted to make it clear that she could not afford to stand aside from the unequal quarrel; it was morally and politically impossible for her to remain an indifferent spectator of Serbia's annihilation by Austria. The bonds of ethnic relationship and historical tradition that connected the two nations, the rôle of protector of the Slavic peoples assumed by Russia, definitely prevented her from leaving Serbia defenceless. All the political interests of Russia in the Near East, moreover, impelled her to intervene and save Serbia from falling under Austrian suzerainty. During the Balkan crisis of the previous year Russia had made it clear to Austria that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia; should Russia tolerate such action, in the opinion of M. Sazonof, she would have to face a revolution.[25] Russia felt with equal intensity in 1914 that "Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death."[26]

Such sentiments were frankly expressed by the Russian diplomats and had not Germany and Austria been deceived by the reports of their secret service agents and the obtuseness of certain of their own diplomats, they must have realized that Russia would not allow herself and Serbia to be humiliated as in 1908, but would certainly intervene. From the first, Sir Edward Grey had feared that Russia could not stand aside, and that the clash between Austria and

[25] British *Correspondence*, No. 139.

[26] British *Correspondence*, No. 139, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

Russia would at once bring in Germany and precipitate a general war. He had therefore suggested that the Powers should exercise concerted pressure upon both Austria and Russia in the hope of discovering a peaceful solution of the Austro-Serb crisis.[27] But for this the coöperation of Germany was necessary, and when suggested it was categorically refused; the German Government replied that it could not "mix in the conflict." Germany desired that pressure should be brought upon Russia to prevent her intervention on Serbia's behalf, but at the same time insisted that Austria should be left with free hands.[28]

On July 26, after the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia but before the former's declaration of war, Sir Edward Grey made another attempt at conciliation. He proposed that the four Powers not directly interested should authorize their Ambassadors to meet in conference and seek some formula of agreement; in the meantime Serbia, Austria, and Russia should enter upon no military operations.[29] To this suggestion France and Italy agreed, and it was also favored by Russia, who had already made overtures to Austria for the purpose of entering into direct conversations.[30] But Germany refused the project of this conference although she approved its "principle"; it would be, in her opinion, tantamount to calling Austria and Russia before an international court, which was out of the question.[31] In vain did

[27] British *Correspondence*, No. 24, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

[28] French *Yellow Book*, Nos. 36, 37.

[29] British *Correspondence*, No. 36, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd.

[30] British *Correspondence*, Nos. 49, 51, 53, 55.

[31] British *Correspondence*, Nos. 43, 67, 71.

the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, point out to Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, that in such a crisis questions of form should be left on one side, and that if a peaceable solution could not be speedily discovered, the responsibility for the catastrophe would rest upon Germany. The German diplomat replied in evasive terms and still refused the conference.[32] The Russian proposition for conversations was likewise refused by Austria, and on July 28, Count Berchtold withheld from the Austrian Ambassador the powers necessary if he was to discuss with Russia the terms of the note to Serbia.[33]

Previous to the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia (July 28), there were thus three definite attempts made by the Entente Powers in the hope of preventing the crisis from becoming so acute as to force the entrance of Russia into a conflict with Austria. The offers of Sir Edward Grey to bring pressure upon Russia if Germany would act in similar fashion at Vienna, and his suggestion of a conference of the Powers not directly interested, had been refused by Germany. Russia's offer to enter into conversations with Austria had been equally refused by that Power. Evidently both Germany and her ally still clung to their belief that Russia would stand aside. So firmly convinced had they been of the impossibility of any effective protest on the part of the Slav Power, that they still failed to realize that Russia was serious in her expressed determination to support her protegé, and still believed that they could carry through their plan for overturning the Balkan balance of power without a general war.

[32] French *Yellow Book*, No. 74.
[33] British *Correspondence*, No. 61.

For another forty-eight hours, following the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia, the situation was not materially changed. It is true that Germany gave assurances that she was working for peace, but she continued to reject all pacific proposals, and in her *White Book* there is no document suggesting that she attempted to bring pressure to bear upon Austria which would lead the latter Power to moderate her action.

Russia, on the other hand, although she had ordered partial mobilization in answer to that of Austria, continued to offer suggestions that were calculated to facilitate an arrangement. On July 29, the Russian Government signified its willingness to concur in any procedure proposed by France or England for the safeguarding of peace.[34] And on the same day, M. Sazonof, in a conversation with the German Ambassador, made an offer which, if accepted, would have provided the delay necessary for a peaceful arrangement. "If Austria," he said, "recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are an infringement of the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to cease her military operations."[35] But the German Foreign Minister, without even consulting the Austrian Government, declared that this suggestion could not be accepted at Vienna.[36]

Previous to July 30, both Austria and Germany thus maintained their uncompromising attitude. But on

[34] French *Yellow Book*, No. 86.

[35] Russian *Orange Book*, No. 60; French *Yellow Book*, No. 103.

[36] Russian *Orange Book*, No. 63; French *Yellow Book*, No. 107. There is no trace of these latter negotiations in the German *White Book*.

that day certain effects of the partial mobilization of Russia were discernible in Vienna. On July 31, Austria having decreed general mobilization, Russia also ordered the mobilization of her entire army and fleet a few hours later;[37] the fact was capital and from this moment the scene changed abruptly. Austria suddenly realized that the execution of her plan was impossible, since it had become obvious that the projected annihilation of Serbia would not be quietly permitted by Russia, who was serious in her determination to intervene. Austria found herself facing a general war and began to draw back in fear of the consequences.[38]

Germany, on the other hand, accepted the consequences. Disappointed that the crisis was not to end, as she had hoped, in a diplomatic victory, she was nevertheless determined that the position she had taken up should be maintained, even at the cost of war. Although she had been convinced that Russia would allow herself to be quietly humiliated, she had weighed the possibility of Russian resistance and was well prepared to break down that resistance by force of arms. From two o'clock of July 31, Germany began to force the issue, anxious for military reasons that the war which seemed to her inevitable, because of her own and Russia's determined attitude, should be precipitated at the earliest possible moment.

[37] German *White Book*, preface; French *Yellow Book*, Nos. 115, 118.
[38] Austrian *Red Book*, Nos. 48, 49; British *Correspondence*, No. 96.

CHAPTER XII

THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK

The realization on the part of Austria that she had gone too far and was treading on dangerous ground, seems to have been first awakened by the partial mobilization of Russia. M. Sazonof had hoped that this military measure would be regarded as a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia, and the hope was largely justified. Count Berchtold, who two days before had brusquely refused to allow direct conversations with Russia by withholding the necessary powers from the Austrian Ambassador, agreed on July 30, to a resumption of such conversations; his refusal, he explained, had been due to a misunderstanding. And for the first time Austria made a concession of enormous importance when she admitted the subject of the Austro-Serb quarrel to discussion. The Austrian Ambassador was authorized "to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige which was of equal importance to both Empires." And the Russian Ambassador gave his assurance that "his Government would take into consideration the demands of the Austrian Monarchy in a far more generous spirit than was expected."[1]

The general mobilization of the Russian forces on the next day (July 31) increased the pacific spirit

[1] Austrian *Red Book*, Nos. 50, 51; French *Yellow Book*, No. 104.

of Austria in the most striking fashion. The Austrian Government agreed to discuss the substance of their ultimatum of July 23 to Serbia. They further agreed to accept the mediation of the Powers, based on a proposition suggested by Sir Edward Grey and drafted by M. Sazonof, to the effect that after the occupation of Belgrade, Austria would cease her advance into Serbia and would discuss a settlement, Russia also agreeing to suspend further military preparations.[2] Austria thus conceded the main point of the Russian demands and showed clearly her desire for a peaceful settlement. Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador to do all that lay in his power to remove the false impression that St. Petersburg had received of the Austrian attitude; it was not true, he said, that Austria had "brutally banged the door on negotiations." And he hastened to inform Paris and London that the Austrian Government had no intention of impugning the sovereign rights of Serbia.[3] It was all that Russia asked for.

The willingness of the diplomats of the Ballplatz to compromise, once they were convinced that Russia would not stand aside, was thus complete, and the path to a peaceable arrangement seemed clear. Russia was prepared to accept any reasonable settlement which would not force humiliation upon Serbia and herself, and Austria was negotiating in the most amicable spirit. Provided no other factor obtruded itself, the peace of Europe was assured. But now for the first time Germany definitely entered into

[2] Austrian *Red Book,* Nos. 53, 55, 56; Russian *Orange Book,* No. 67; British *Correspondence,* 103, 120, 133, 135.

[3] Russian *Orange Book,* No. 73; British *Correspondence,* No. 137.

the situation and her intervention cut short the conciliatory conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Germany has constantly maintained that her influence with the Austrian diplomats had always been of a moderating character, that she was "pressing the button" for peace; but the first moment that her action can be clearly traced, it was evidently calculated to prevent the concessions offered by Austria.

From the moment of Russian mobilization, which marked the beginning of Austria's conciliatory tone, the attitude of Germany became increasingly bellicose. The news of Russia's mobilization, received at Vienna without protest or feeling, provoked the sharpest of rejoinders at Berlin. At two o'clock on July 31, the Kaiser sent to the Tsar a telegram conceived in the spirit of menace and warning him in threats hardly veiled that unless Russia ceased her military preparations war must result, and the responsibility would be Russia's.[4] At the same time the German Government declared *Kriegsgefahr,* thus allowing the virtual mobilization of the German forces.[5] Finally, at midnight, Germany delivered an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she cease all military preparations, whether on the side of Austria or Germany; a reply was requested within twelve hours.[6]

The brevity of the period allowed for response by the ultimatum was such that regard for her own dignity made an acceptance by Russia difficult, if not impossible. It would not have been illogical for Germany to point out that the Russian mobilization

[4] German *White Book,* Annex 24.
[5] German *White Book,* Annex 25.
[6] German *White Book,* Annex 26.

on the German frontier could not be regarded with equanimity at Berlin, although Russia had specifically declared that her military preparation did not signify hostile intentions.[7] But it was beyond reason that Germany should insist that Russia cease to protect herself on her Austrian frontier at the moment that Austria was arming in that quarter and although Austria herself had not taken umbrage at the Russian mobilization. Germany's intervention in the fashion she employed clearly signified that she meant to insist on the complete surrender of Russia, and she backed her demand by a threat of war. As the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg said, "if it was not yet war, it was not far from it."

Thus at the moment when the situation between Austria and Russia was growing brighter, Germany transferred the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Russia and herself. Nor would she accept the mediation proposed by Sir Edward Grey, the principle of which was almost eagerly seized by Austria. In vain did the British Ambassador at Berlin point out to the German Foreign Secretary that the dispute was in reality between Austria and Russia, and that Germany's interest in it was merely as Austria's ally. If Austria and Russia were ready to discuss matters, it seemed only logical that Germany should hold her hand, "if she did not desire war on her own account." Von Jagow only replied that it was too late; if Russia had not mobilized, all would have been well; Russia had

[7] The despatches of the German military attaché at St. Petersburg show that Russia's mobilization was directed against Austria and not against Germany: "Mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not been ordered," German *White Book*, Annex 7.

forced Germany to demand demobilization, and if that demand were not heeded, war would result.[8]

The ultimatum of Germany to Russia, drawn up in terms which were manifestly inacceptable for a great Power, threw the Serbian aspect of the crisis totally into the background. Russia and Germany were now face to face and neither would yield. It is true that the Tsar, without accepting the German demand, made one last effort to prevent war. "I can see that you are obliged to mobilize," he telegraphed the Kaiser, "but I would have from you the same guarantee that I have given—that these measures do not mean war and that we shall pursue our negotiations for the good of our two countries and the general peace, which is so dear to our hearts." But the Kaiser remained deaf to what he doubtless considered to be merely an attempt to gain time. "An immediate reply from your Government," he telegraphed, "clear and unequivocal, is the sole means of preventing an infinite calamity. Until I receive that reply it is, to my great regret, impossible to take up the subject of your telegram."[9]

The reply was never sent by Russia. The demobilization of her army, with Germany's threats hanging over her and at the moment when her principal antagonist accepted that mobilization and yet negotiated, would have meant the deepest humiliation ever undergone by a first-class Power. For the sake of her national honor and her position in Europe, Russia could not consent to the reply that Germany demanded. Germany, on the other hand, was determined to carry through her plan, cost what it might.

[8] British *Correspondence,* No. 138.

[9] Exchange of telegrams, August 1.

From the first she seems to have set her heart on the reaffirmation of German prestige and to have believed that her scheme could be executed by means of diplomatic threats, as in 1908. To draw back at the last moment would mean a diplomatic reverse not less serious than that of 1911. Now that it became apparent that her hegemony was not to be reëstablished by a diplomatic victory, she was prepared to assert it by means of war. At ten minutes past seven, on August 1, having received from St. Petersburg no reply to her ultimatum, Germany officially declared war upon Russia.[10]

That France would be included in the war thus begun, no one doubted. Germany had expected it and her mobilization had been carried out upon her western as upon her eastern front. Premier Viviani had in effect given warning that France would assist her ally against Germany, when he had answered the German question as to whether she would remain neutral, by stating that France would do that which her interests dictated.[11] But France, in order to demonstrate the defensive character of the war on her part, carefully abstained from inaugurating any act of hostility; the French Government believed that it was of importance to lay stress on the fact that she was the attacked party, both to win the public opinion of the world and to ensure the neutrality of Italy. Hence the French troops received orders to retire ten kilometres from the frontier.[12]

Germany, however, because of her plan of campaign, which called for an immediate advance into France,

10 Russian *Orange Book*, No. 76.
11 German *White Book*, Annex 27.
12 French *Yellow Book*, No. 136.

could not afford to wait. On the morning of Sunday, August 2, the Germans crossed the French frontier, and on the evening of the following day the German Ambassador asked for his passports and handed in a declaration of war. Acts of aggression alleged to have been committed by French aviators in Germany, formed the justification.[13]

Germany was entirely prepared for war with France and Russia. She had long realized that the maintenance of her continental hegemony might lead to a conflict of arms, and since 1912 had been putting herself in condition to carry on the war on both of her frontiers. Although she was disappointed that the scheme of annihilating Slavic influence in the Balkans could not be carried through by means of an Austro-Serb war solely, as had been planned, and although she was equally surprised that Russia and France dared to pick up the gauntlet, she recognized that war with these Powers could be waged with better hopes of success in 1914 than a few years later. War with Great Britain, however, she earnestly desired to avoid. Such a contingency might ultimately arrive, as Germany pressed on her path towards world empire, but she hoped steadfastly that it would not be necessary before she had regained control of the Continent through the defeat, either diplomatic or military, of Russia and France. She must not fight all the Entente Powers at once.

[13] The falsity of these allegations is manifest. It was said that bombs were thrown on the railway near Nuremberg, but the *Frankische Kurrier* made no mention of them on August 2, and it was only on August 3 that Nuremberg received word of the attack by a telegram from Berlin. The *Kölnische Zeitung* of August 3 reported that the Bavarian Minister of War doubted the story of aviators and bomb-dropping near Nuremberg.

During the Balkan crisis of 1912 and 1913, when Germany realized that the struggle for primacy on the Continent might be precipitated at any moment, she had done her best to improve her relations with Great Britain. Her attempts had found response in the British Liberal Ministry, and it was largely due to the combined efforts of Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and Bethmann-Hollweg that the first Balkan War had been localized.[14] With the opening of the crisis that resulted from the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the German Chancellor immediately renewed his efforts to secure British neutrality in case of a general continental war.

He made his first attempt on July 29, at the moment when Germany was beginning to menace Russia with threats of war if that Power continued its mobilization. In a conversation with Sir W. E. Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, Bethmann-Hollweg promised that if Great Britain would stand aside, Germany would seek no territorial aggrandizement at the expense of France, although she could promise nothing in respect to the French colonies. The neutrality of Holland would be respected, and although Germany could give no assurance as to Belgium until the French plan of action was revealed, her integrity would be respected at the end of the war, if she had

[14] Cf. "Truth about Germany," in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 2, 247; and Schiemann, "England and Germany," *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 4, 788, 794. Schiemann tells of the pacific attitude of British statesmen during his visit to London in March, 1914, and quotes a personal letter from Haldane: "My ambition is, like yours, to bring Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the coöperation which I believe to be now beginning, become closer and closer."

not sided against Germany. Finally the German Chancellor recalled the fact that his policy had always aimed at an understanding with England, and said that he "had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany . . . and the assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might produce, would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire."[15]

The offer of a general neutrality agreement would doubtless prove a great temptation to British Radicals, and Germany probably hoped thus to keep Great Britain out of the way while she was engaged in dealing with Russia and France. The British Ambassador, however, refused to fetter his Government's liberty of action by any promises, and on the same day Sir Edward Grey warned the German Ambassador at London not to be misled by England's friendly tone into thinking that she would necessarily stand aside. He said frankly that it was impossible to say who might not be drawn into the conflict.[16] And on July 30, the British Foreign Secretary definitely refused the German offer of the day before, in terms that could hardly be misunderstood. What Germany asked, he said, was in effect "to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate

[15] British *Correspondence*, No. 85, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

[16] British *Correspondence*, Nos. 89, 90.

to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of the country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.'"[17]

Germany therefore had clear warning that the neutrality of Great Britain was not a postulate upon which she could count. And the German Ambassador in London became convinced that in the event of a German attack upon France, Great Britain would surely support the latter Power.[18] But at Berlin, confidence in the British pacifist spirit still persisted. The diplomats there counted upon Lord Haldane, who was regarded as Germany's friend and had been prominent in favoring an understanding with Germany; the peace-making influence of Lord Morley and John Burns was also believed to be such that no Cabinet advocating war would receive the support of the Radical and Labor elements, which were not likely to refuse the offer of a general agreement of neutrality between Great Britain and Germany. Above all, the diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse counted

[17] British *Correspondence*, No. 101.

[18] The diplomats at Berlin apparently left England so completely out of their calculations that Grey's very serious warning was received by the German Chancellor without any comment except that his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering it unless a written memorandum were given him, British *Correspondence*, No. 109. The German Ambassador to St. James, on the other hand, was so perturbed at the danger of British intervention that he tried to extract the promise that Great Britain would remain neutral if Germany promised not to violate Belgian neutrality, *Ibid.*, No. 123.

upon the consciousness of unreadiness which they felt must be in the minds of the British statesmen.

It is true that notwithstanding the firm attitude of Sir Edward Grey, neither Cabinet nor people in England were undivided as to the policy that Great Britain should follow. So long as the question was one of Balkan diplomacy and seemed to involve merely a struggle between Austria and Russia for leadership in the Near East, British public opinion remained cold to the idea of intervention. Even the danger that Great Britain would face if France were attacked and subjugated by Germany was not universally appreciated. For a decade the fear of Germany in England had been a very real fact and had led to popular approval of the understandings with France and Russia. But it was one thing to recognize the German menace abstractly, and quite another to enter into a concrete war against Germany for the defence of France.

Of such sentiments the Berlin Government was well aware, and the reports of German agents in England buoyed up the German hope that England would not approve intervention on the Continent for the protection of France. It is almost inconceivable that the opinions of Sir Edward Grey would not finally have triumphed, but it is possible that if Germany had not herself forced to the front the one issue that could unite Great Britain against her, the latter Power might have found great difficulty in making up her mind. But Germany made up Great Britain's mind for her on August 3, by the invasion of Belgium; it was practically impossible for Great Britain to stand aside after this violation of a treaty which she was pledged to maintain, and with Germany threatening

to occupy a strategic position which would render England practically defenceless.

The neutrality of Belgium is, perhaps, hardly less essential for the safety of England than the maintenance of the British fleet, and ever since the Middle Ages it has been a definite principle of British policy that the Low Countries should not be held or controlled by a first-class Power. Geography and history have alike emphasized the necessity of maintaining this principle, if British security is to be assured.[19] The Scheldt is directly opposite the mouth of the Thames, and control of this river is one of the first conditions of a successful raid on, or invasion of the east coast of England, which is far easier to approach than the south coast. This fact has been recognized by the enemies of England as by her statesmen; Napoleon once said, "Antwerp is a pistol aimed point-blank at the heart of England."

All through her history England has never hesitated to oppose with all her power the acquisition of the Low Countries by one of the great continental nations. The Hundred Years' War began in 1340 with the battle of Sluys, when England protected the Flemish burghers from the King of France. Howard and Drake fought the Spanish Armada in 1588 when England was helping the Low Countries win their independence from Spain. Pitt attacked France in 1793, not so much because Robespierre and Danton had cut off the head of Louis XVI as because France was conquering Belgium. As between England and Napoleon, Belgium was always one of the chief issues, and it was the French Emperor's determination to hold on to this strategical position that largely deter-

[19] Cf. Rose, *The Origins of the War*, 176-177.

mined the undying enmity of the British Government towards him.

After the fall of Napoleon, Belgium was united with Holland, but revolted in 1830 and demanded the recognition of her independence. To this demand the Powers agreed, but as it was impossible to form of Belgium a state strong enough to defend itself, they imposed upon her the condition of perpetual neutrality. Belgium thus received the guarantee of security from foreign invasion or absorption by a great Power, and paid for it the price of remaining neutral under all circumstances. In 1831 her neutrality was confirmed, and on April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed a treaty which provided that "Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality"; on the same date Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia signed a treaty, by which those states became the "guarantors" of such neutrality.[20]

Upon the outbreak of the Franco-German War, in 1870, Gladstone entered into special treaties with France and Prussia which reinsured Belgian neutrality, but which did not abrogate the Treaty of 1839.[21] Bismarck also emphasized the security of

[20] The treaties of 1831 and 1839 are published in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, ii, 858, 979, Nos. 153, 183. For discussion of the status of Belgium, see Descamps, *La Neutralité de la Belgique* (1902) and *L'Etat neutre à Titre permanent* (1912).

[21] The treaties of 1870 are published in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, iii, 1886, 1889, Nos. 427, 428. For Gladstone on the importance of Belgian neutrality, see Beer, in *New York Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 3, 448-450. The necessity of Belgian neutrality for Great Britain also appears from a letter of Queen Victoria written to the King of the Belgians in 1852, at the time of the alleged designs of Napoleon III on Belgium: "Any attempt on Belgium would be *casus belli* for us," *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii, 438.

Belgium's position by promising to respect her neutrality, a promise which he declared to be quite superfluous in view of the treaties in force.[22] The Hague Convention of 1907 laid further emphasis on the fact that the territory of neutral countries is inviolable and the transport of troops through them forbidden.[23]

During the crises that marked the first decade of the twentieth century, the possibility of an invasion of Belgium by Germany was more than once considered. And it appears that in 1906 and 1912, officials of Great Britain and Belgium discussed what measures of defence Belgium could take and what assistance Great Britain could offer if Belgian neutrality were violated by Germany.[24] But in 1911 and 1913, the German Foreign Secretary stated distinctly that "the neutrality of Belgium is determined by international

[22] Bismarck wrote: "In confirmation of my verbal assurance I have the honor to give in writing a declaration, which in view of the treaties in force is quite superfluous, that the Confederation of the North and its allies will respect the neutrality of Belgium, on the understanding, of course, that it is respected by the other belligerent," cited by Beck, *The Evidence in the Case,* 194.

[23] The Hague Convention in its chapter on "The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers," declares: "Art. I: The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable . . . Art. II: Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power . . . Art. X: The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act."

[24] Papers discovered in Belgium by the invading Germans show that Col. Barnardiston discussed the problem of Belgium's defence with the chief of the Belgian military staff in 1906. There is nothing to show that the conversations were official, and it is clear that British intervention was not to be considered unless Belgium found herself unable to withstand invasion, "Official abstract of Papers," in *New York Times Current History of the War,* Vol. I, No. 2, 370.

conventions, and Germany is resolved to respect those conventions.''[25]

Nevertheless the construction of strategic railway lines by Germany on the Belgian frontier, which did not seem to be entirely justified by the commercial necessities of the territory, kept alive the suspicion that in case of war with France, Germany would seek the speediest means of striking into the heart of France, which was through Belgium. And on July 31, 1914, when it became obvious that a European war could be averted only with difficulty, Sir Edward Grey asked both France and Germany whether they were prepared to respect Belgian neutrality, provided it were violated by no other Power.[26] To this question France immediately replied in the affirmative.[27] But the German Government refused to give a definite answer, and the British Ambassador reported his belief that for strategic reasons they would probably decline to give any assurance.[28]

It was thus plain that Germany was actually meditating an advance through Belgium and on August 2, the German Government sent a note to Belgium which definitely expressed the determination to violate her neutrality with or without her consent. The note stated that ''reliable information'' gave evidence that France was planning an entrance into Belgium, and explained that Germany was thus obliged to violate Belgian territory. If Belgium consented to the invasion and took up an attitude of benevolent neutrality she was promised that her

[25] Belgian *Gray Book*, No. 12.
[26] *British Correspondence*, No. 114.
[27] Belgian *Gray Book*, No. 15; British *Correspondence*, No. 125.
[28] British *Correspondence*, No. 122.

territorial integrity would be respected at the end of the war and that Belgium would be immediately evacuated by the German army. If she opposed the German advance, she would be treated as an enemy.[29]

Although Germany adduced the prospect of a French invasion of Belgium as justification for her violation of the Treaty of 1839, in which Prussia appeared as a guarantor of Belgian neutrality, the material reason for Germany's action was laid bare in a speech by the German Chancellor. In this speech he admitted the illegality and wrong committed by Germany and entered the plea of military necessity. "We are now in a state of necessity," said Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, "and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought—how he is to hack his way through."[30]

The efforts of the German diplomats to persuade

[29] Belgian *Gray Book*, Nos. 20, 21; British *Correspondence*, No. 153.
[30] The *Times*, August 11, 1914.

Great Britain to stand aside, which in any event could hardly have been expected to succeed, were completely frustrated by the military designs of the German staff. The invasion of Belgium was contrary to a solemn treaty guaranteed by Great Britain which both Conservative and Liberal statesmen felt bound to protect. Belgium had been the special protegé of Gladstone, and even that advocate of a pacific policy had expressed clearly his feeling that Belgian neutrality must be maintained at all costs. If it was a matter of life and death to Germany's military success that she should advance through Belgium, so it was, in the opinion of British statesmen, a "matter of life and death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality, if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?"[31]

Nor was it merely a question of honor for Great Britain, but also one of vital security. The control of Belgium by Germany meant that she would acquire naval bases of inestimable value in time of war, which might be used either for attacks upon British shipping or for launching an invasion against the east coast of England. Should portions of the French coast fall into German hands during the war and be retained at its close, Germany would have what she so ardently desired, ports on the open sea with all the advantages they would give her in the commercial competition with Great Britain.

It is true that Germany had promised to respect the territorial integrity of Belgium, but in the event

[31] British *Correspondence*, No. 160.

of a successful war she could not be held to that promise. She would even have the legal right to break it, for Belgium, if she had quietly permitted the German violation of her neutrality would have forfeited her right to independence, which had been guaranteed her only on the condition of her perpetual neutrality and with the assumption that she would do all in her power to preserve it. Germany's promise to withdraw ultimately, made at the very moment when she was violating a solemn treaty, seemed to indicate that the German diplomats were possessed of a peculiar sense of cynical humor or of extraordinary confidence in British naïveté. And British statesmen could not escape the conviction that if they peacefully accepted the German invasion of Belgium, they would be surrendering in the twentieth century all that England had fought and risked her existence for, in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

On August 3, at seven o'clock in the morning, Belgium delivered her reply to the German demand and expressed her resolve to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.[32] Later in the day German troops having crossed the frontier, the King of the Belgians sent to England an appeal for diplomatic intervention.[33] On the following day, Great Britain, with her national honor and vital interests at stake, protested to the German Government, and Sir Edward Grey sent word to the British Ambassador at Berlin to hand in what was practically an ultimatum: he was again to ask for German assurances that Belgian neutrality would be respected and warn the German Government that if a satisfactory

[32] Belgian *Gray Book*, No. 22.

[33] British *Correspondence*, No. 153; Belgian *Gray Book*, No. 25.

reply were not received by midnight, he would ask for his passports; Great Britain was determined to take all steps in her power to uphold the treaty to which both she and Germany were parties.[34]

As might have been expected, Germany refused to give the required assurances; her troops were already being despatched across the Belgian border, and the plans of her military staff could not at that moment be altered for diplomatic reasons. At midnight of August 4, Great Britain thus entered the war.

Although the German diplomats must have realized that the invasion of Belgium almost certainly meant the intervention of Great Britain, it was with undoubtedly sincere emotion that they saw their hopes of keeping her out of the conflict shattered. Nor could they conceal the bitterness of their disappointment. "Just for a word—neutrality—," said the German Chancellor, "a word which in war-time had been so often disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." "What Great Britain had done," he continued, "was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants."[35]

There is no gainsaying the fact that the emotion of the German diplomats was justified, for the entrance of Great Britain into the war changed its character materially, and affected vitally Germany's chances of success. The violation of Belgian neutrality was thus a great diplomatic blunder; for if British statesmen had decided to intervene in the war purely

[34] British *Correspondence*, No. 159.
[35] British *Correspondence*, No. 160.

for the defence of France, they would have been supported by far less enthusiasm on the part of the British people than was aroused by the German attack on Belgium. Germany thus provided Great Britain with an occasion for the intervention which in any event was demanded by British interests.

But if the violation of Belgian neutrality was a diplomatic blunder, it was one that could hardly have been avoided, nor can the German diplomats be held responsible. For, as von Jagow pointed out, Germany's sole hope for success in a war against Russia and France lay in a speedy invasion of France, which could be carried out only through Belgium. The Germans "had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have gone through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops."[36]

The invasion of Belgium and the participation of Great Britain in the war was thus the inevitable result of Germany's forcing of war upon Russia and France. The aggressive character of her diplomacy all through the crisis of 1914 resulted with almost equal directness from the policy she had followed

[36] British *Correspondence*, No. 160.

since 1871. Bismarck had believed in the necessity of German hegemony on the Continent, and had maintained that hegemony by means of the Triple Alliance until his downfall. The Kaiser William II was equally determined to maintain the position that Bismarck had won for Germany, and largely succeeded in so doing for the first ten years of his reign. But the reconciliation of France with Italy and Great Britain, and the termination of Anglo-Russian hostility which culminated in the formation of the Triple Entente, unquestionably threatened, if it did not destroy, Germany's position of primacy. Hence the attempts made to reinforce German prestige in 1905, 1908, and 1911. Hence also in large measure, the determined attitude of Germany in 1914, which was also actuated by her desire to readjust the Balkan settlement of the previous year. Germany believed that the time had come definitely to settle two questions: the one related to general policy, the second to her aspirations in the Near East. She must reaffirm her continental position, the necessary foundation of her world policy; she must also destroy Slavic influence in the Balkans, so as to reopen the path to Constantinople and Mesopotamia.

It is not for the historian to anathematize the uncompromising tone assumed by Germany in the crisis of 1914. That may be left to the reader, provided the evidence in the case is fairly stated. Without question the extraordinary growth of German population and the resulting development of German industry forced a natural expansion of commerce and led to the demand for a protecting navy. It was inevitable, given the German mentality, which has been dominated by Prussia in recent years, that there should follow a

demand for political influence in the world at large, proportionate to the commercial influence exercised by Germany.

Any philosophical discussion of the moral right of the German nation to such political influence is unnecessary. We are concerned with facts and the chief fact to remember, if we would explain to ourselves the origin of the conflict, is that the Germans sincerely believed that they, as well as the nations first in the field, had a right to world empire, and, if they were capable of seizing it, to supreme world empire. It was because political primacy on the Continent seemed the essential basis of Germany's world empire that she was determined to give the law to Europe in 1914, either by diplomacy or by war.

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The brief bibliography that follows is designed merely to introduce the lay reader to the more interesting and important books on recent aspects of European diplomacy; it makes no pretence of giving a complete list of authorities. An effort has been made to select books which are easy of access and, so far as possible, books published in English are preferred.

Chapter I

Introduction

There is no book in English that covers fully the general diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to the present time. For the most important aspects of international relations the general histories may be consulted; see especially, *The Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. XII; Hazen, *Europe since 1815;* Hawkesworth, *The Last Century in Europe;* Seignobos, *History of Contemporary Europe;* Rose, *The Development of the European Nations;* Andrews, *Contemporary Europe, Asia, and Africa;* Gooch, *History of our Time.* The annuals published in the different countries give a résumé of the most significant events, year by year; the most important are the *Annual Register;* Viallate, *La Vie politique dans les deux mondes;* Schiemann, *Deutschland und die grosse Politik.* See also Driault, *Le Monde actuel* (1909). Books of especial value on general diplomatic history are, Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique;* Tardieu, *France and the Alliances;* Fullerton, *Problems of Power;* Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik;* and Rose, *The Origins of the War.* For the estab-

lishment of united Germany, see Denis, *La Fondation de l'Empire allemand;* Sybel, *The Founding of the German Empire;* White, *Seven Great Statesmen* (Bismarck); Valfrey, *Histoire du Traité de Francfort;* Marcks, *Das Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm I.*

Chapter II

Bismarck and the Triple Alliance

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Chapter III

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Mohrenheim; Adam, *Après l'Abandon de la Revanche;* Rambaud, *Histoire de Russie* and *Jules Ferry;* Bérard, *La France et Guillaume II;* Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la troisième République;* Pinon, *France et Allemagne;* Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe, *Memoirs.*

Chapter IV

German World Policy: Economic Factors

The statistics of German industry and commerce are published in the various trade reports and summarized in *Statesman's Year Book,* in *Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Deutschen Reich,* and briefly in 61st Congress, 2d Session, *Senate Documents,* No. 578; German success in commerce is strikingly portrayed by the British Consular Reports. Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany,* gives a comprehensive and authoritative survey of German development; see also Schierbrand, *Germany;* J. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany;* Collier, *Germany and the Germans* (readable, but based on hasty observations and conclusions); Lair, *L'Impérialisme allemande;* Hubert, *L'Effort allemand.* The significance of Germany's economic development in its relation to her diplomatic policy is clearly exposed in von Bülow's *Imperial Germany,* the study of which is essential to an understanding of the German attitude. See also Rohrbach, *German World Policies;* Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne;* and Fraser, *The Short Cut to India.* On German colonies, Keller, "Beginnings of German Colonisation and Colonial Policy," *Yale Review,* x, 30; xi, 390; xii, 57.

Chapter V

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to be found in Lichtenberger, *L'Allemagne moderne.* Consult also Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* and *German World Policies;* Cramb, *Germany and England;* Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War;* Usher, *Pan-Germanism;* Andrillon, *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne;* Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem;* Von der Goltz, *La Nation armée* (Fr. trans.); Elkind, *The German Emperor's Speeches;* Gauss, *The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances;* Emery, "German Economics and the War," in *Yale Review,* January, 1915; and Abbott, "Germany and the Prussian Propaganda," *Yale Review,* July, 1915. On Treitschke, see Davis, *The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke;* Hausrath, *Treitschke;* Gowans, *Selections from Treitschke's Lectures on Politics;* Hadley, "The Political Teachings of Treitschke," in *Yale Review,* January, 1915; Ernest Barker, *Nietszche and Treitschke* (Oxford Pamphlets).

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Chapter VIII

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The Crisis of 1914 and the Diplomatic Break

For these chapters the reader should consult the documents published by the various Governments, especially the German

White Book, the British *White Papers,* the Russian *Orange Book,* the French *Yellow Book,* the Belgian *Gray Book,* and the Austrian *Red Book.* The chief documents together with important treaties of preceding years are published in Price, *Diplomatic History of the War.* An unbiassed analysis of the documents is to be found in Stowell, *The Diplomacy of the War.* The German *White Book* gives the official justification for German diplomacy; the most skillful presentation of the German case is Schiemann, *Deutschland und die grosse Politik, 1914.* The opposite point of view is developed in Durkheim and Denis, *Qui a voulu la Guerre* (a detailed and scientific analysis); Dillon, *A Scrap of Paper* (valuable because of the author's special sources of information); Beck, *The Evidence in the Case;* Rose, *The Origins of the War.* See also Headlam, *The History of Twelve Days.* On the question of the invasion of Belgium, see Descamps, *La Neutralité de la Belgique;* Weiss, *La Violation de la Neutralité belge;* Von Mach, *Germany's Point of View.* The *New York Times Current History of the War* has published the gist of the official and newspaper comment upon the crisis on both sides.

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